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Internationally there have been series of company scandals over the last 30 years, which have
lead to the belief there is a need for improved corporate governance. The UK has not been
impervious to this and the initial response was the Cadbury Report published in 1992 and
subsequent reports in UK have tackled other aspects of this perceived crisis.
Many authors have studied the impact of corporate governance changes arising from these
reports on firm performance. There are several studies that have tried to discover the
relationship of the codes of practice, which have developed from the reports, and the risk
management of companies. Given the complexity of the situation it is not surprising that the
results have not reached consistent conclusions.
In this study one of the major themes, which has developed, is accounting conservatism,
which exists within the accounting process. Conservatism has existed within practice of the
accounting reporting through time, but the pattern of conservatism became pervasive during
the 1990s. Furthermore conservatism is enforced by corporate governance changes. The
pervasive existence of conservatism induces information risk in the evaluation of firm
performance, and hence to the measurement of firm risks. When firm performance is
measured with income related measures, such as net income or income before interests and
taxes, there is the possibility misleading results occurs. Also there is a high likelihood of poor
measures of firm default risk when using accounting based default model such as Altman
model and Ohlson model.
The findings within this thesis will help future researchers who studies performance and risk
models. As hopefully it will lead them to greater care in interpretation when they use income
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Internationally there have been series of company scandals over the last 30 years,
which have lead to the belief there is a need for improved corporate governance.
The UK has not been impervious to this and the initial response was the Cadbury
Report published in 1992 and subsequent reports in UK have tackled other aspects
of this perceived crisis.
Many authors have studied the impact of corporate governance changes arising
from these reports on firm performance. There are several studies that have tried
to discover the relationship of the codes of practice, which have developed from
the reports, and the risk management of companies. The studies have also sought
the relationship between the changes to corporate governance structures,
companies' performance and risk to companies. Based on this literature several
approaches have been developed and applied to the available data. Given the
complexity of the situation it is not surprising that the results have not reached
consistent conclusions. The current study explores many of these ideas to gain
insight into the relationships.
In this study one of the major themes, which has developed, is accounting
conservatism, which exists within the accounting process. Conservatism has
existed within practice of the accounting reporting through time, but the pattern of
conservatism became pervasive during the 1990s. Furthermore conservatism is
enforced by corporate governance changes. The introducing of the Codes has
impacted on reporting practices. The internal monitoring of the board may have
contributed to conservative reporting.
Yet, the pervasive existence of conservatism induces information risk in the
evaluation of firm performance, and hence to the measurement of firm risks.
1
When firm performance is measured with income related measures, such as net
income or income before interests and taxes, there is the possibility ofmisleading
results. Also there is a high likelihood of poor measure of firm risks of default
risks when using accounting based default model such as Altman model and
Ohlson model.
There are two critical ingredients in the measurement of any economic events:
models and data. Authors have developed a range of models and better methods
of collection, hence improved the quality of data. There is, though, always the
difficulty is making definitive statements across a number of time periods when
exploring issue such as corporate governance, company performance and risk.
Interpretation plays a major role since there will not be a single simple model
which will account for all facets.
The findings within this thesis will help future researchers who wish to study
performance and risk models. As hopefully it will encourage them to greater care
in interpretation when they use income related variables to measure firm
performance and risk.
1.1 Two major influences on governance structure
The corporate governance codes and ownership are the two of the major forces
that influence board structure, value and reporting conservatism. Hence they affect
the reporting practices which impact on value evaluation and risk modelling.
1.1.1 UK Codes
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate
governance changes on performance, risk and reporting. Research by Pensions
Investment Research Consultants Limits(PIRC) reports that 'the overwhelming
majority are of the view that their attention to corporate governance will enhance
portfolio returns, by reducing risk and enhancing performance' (PIRC response,
2
1997). Therefore it can be expected that corporate governance changes may
impact on performance and risk.
The Codes are not mandatory for the company, so each company can decide
whether to follow the Codes or not. When they do not follow the Codes, the
company has to explain the reasons. Previous studies have explored the evidence
of whether the codes are being implemented. This thesis will investigate how the
UK Corporate Governance Codes have had an impact on both board structures
and reporting practices in UK.
1.1.2 Ownership structure
The impact of ownership on several factors is also studied. The changes of
ownership structure provided the initial study of corporate governance. Berle-
Means (1932)'s book explains the processes of the separation of ownership and
control. Ownership composition is a key determinant of governance structure and
decision processes (Dallas, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that director
equity-ownership increase for director incentive to monitor the firms. In relation
to ownership structure, two topics are drawn in this thesis. This study will look
over the changes ofUK ownership, and how the ownership structure had impacted
the board structure and reporting practices, see Figure 1.1
Figure 1.1 Research Map
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1.2 Research Area and Research Questions
1.2.1 Definition
Corporate governance is the mechanism to solve the conflict of interest between
shareholders and management. The conflict, theoretically, can be reduced by
healthy governance structure: Shareholders appoint the board members and
monitor their actions. There is no consensus definition on corporate governance as
the following selection of definitions will testify:
• 'The purpose of corporate governance is to minimise the total cost in aligning
managers' and shareholders' incentives, and in unavoidable self-interested
managerial behaviours' (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
• 'Corporate governance is the system or process by which companies are directed
and controlled' (Cadbury, 1992)
• 'Corporate governance is an institutional arrangement by which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a proper return on their
investment' (Shieifer and Vishny, 1997)
• 'The phrase corporate governance is often applied narrowly to questions about
the structure and function of boards of directors to the rights and prerogatives of
shareholders in boardroom decision-making. Now this definition has been
broadened to refer to the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional
arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, what
controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from
the activities they undertake are allocated' (Blair, 1995)
1.2.2 Theory and UK CG codes
Broadly there are two views of corporate governance: shareholder and
stakeholders perspective. The shareholder perspective emphasis the maximisation
of the shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Cadbury 1992; Shieifer
and Vishny 1997), while the stakeholder takes into account all those with an
interest in the firm (Blair, 1995).
4
The 1990s were a critical point in term of corporate governance changes.
Company scandals lead to the development of UK corporate governance codes.
The Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the
accountancy professions were concerned at the investor's lack of confidence
owing to the scandals. This situation lead to the Cadbury Committee and The
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance (the
Cadbury Report) was issued in 1992. On the recommendation of the Cadbury
Committee, Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998) were published.
Following the suggestion of Hampel Report, the Combined Code (1988) was
drawn from Cadbury report, Greenbury Report and Hampel Report.
In relation to the studies of the UK codes, little attention has been paid to the
theoretical aspect of the UK codes. The previous studies tried to connect the
relationship between board changes and performance, but mainly focused on the
technical nature. This thesis tries to explain the theory perspective of UK codes.
This approach is helpful to understand the Codes in theory terms and to give a
richer background. This leads to the first research question which is: What is the
theoretical basic to the UK CG codes?
Also this study wants to explore the UK codes as risk management tools. Risk
management is the processes of risk awareness, risk assessment, risk evaluation
and risk management. If the codes are applied to the companies, better
management of the risk is expected. This leads to the second research question
which is How have UK CG codes functioned as risk management tools?
1.2.3 Corporate governance, ownership and performance
The General belief is that good governance results in better performance. CIMA
(1999) documents that 'the perceived benefits of corporate governance are
reducing risk, improve performance, better access to capital markets, greater
marketability of goods and services, improved leadership, and the demonstration
of transparency and social accountability'.
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The relationships between corporate governance and performance have been
studied for two decades. Two groups of study are observed: board-specific task
and board-overall performance. The board-specific task studies have consensus
results, but the board-overall performance studies have not reached consistent
results. Cadbury Report specifies the role of the board in terms of corporate
governance. The Cadbury Report suggests there should be separation between the
role of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and that a
single individual should not hold both posts. The latter arrangement is referred to
as Duality. In UK studies, the relationship between board structure and
performance also has not reached consensus results. Two further research
questions arise: what is the impact of the Code on board structure? , and what is
the impact of the board changes on performance?
Also Ownership structure may increase firm value. Several researchers suggest a
significant non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and
performance (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991).
Hence it seems reasonable to explore two other questions: what is the impact of
the ownership on board structure? and what is the impact of the ownership on
performance?
1.2.4 Corporate governance, ownership and risk
Risk is an ill defined term. There is, though, a common understanding of aspects
of risk. For example Renn (1998) asserts that the definition of risk contains three
elements: outcomes that affect that human value, possibility of occurrence
(uncertainty) and a formula to combine both elements. Others define risk in terms
of harm and the chance of the harm and in finance frequently expected loss is used.
'Risks arise from current activity, from changing external environments, and from
the related decisions and actions of the board and management', see Crawford and
Stein (2002). Obviously the stakeholders of a company may have different views
on the risk they face given their interests. The shareholders clearly require the
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managers to protect their interest in the company, possibly both over the short-
term and the long-term. They would generally view the role of corporate
governance to ensure alignment of the managers with the protection of the
shareholders' interest.
For a company the prime risk may be avoiding bankruptcy, but also ensuring
adequate returns on investment either through optimal action in investment,
decision-making or capital budgeting. Boards have the responsibility to protect the
company from risks, which are identified, evaluated and controlled. Kaen (2004)
thinks risk management has to create value for the owners of the company, and
that is the connecting between risk management and corporate governance.
Altman (1968)'s Z-score and company specific risk from London Business School
database are utilized to measure firm risk. It is therefore important to explore the
two questions; what is the impact of the board changes on firm risk? and what is
the impact of the ownership on firm risk?
1.2.5 Corporate governance, ownership and reporting
Failures of corporate governance may lead to inadequate financial reports and
hence may have lead in UK to company scandals. Dcmirag et al (2000) state that
corporations which are dominated by top managements result in creative
accounting practices and hence inadequate control.
The Cadbury Committee was set up due to explore the relationship between the
quality of financial reporting and corporate governance. Investors need the
assurance that the financial report should have been prepared by adequate
processes, not influenced by opportunistic managers. Whittington (1993) argues
that failures of corporate governance may be partly due to inadequate financial
reports. On the other hand, the problems of the financial reporting process may
come from the deficiencies of corporate governance system. Bushman and Smith
(2003) state that corporate governance structures serve to ensure both the minority
shareholders and large shareholders by providing honest information. This leads
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to exploring two other questions; what is the impact of the Codes on financial
reporting? and what is the impact of the ownership on financial reporting?
1.2.6 Conservatism and Risk modelling
Arising from this concern over reporting quality is the desire to produce
conservative accounts, which do not overstate the health of the company in terms
of aspects such as accruals. This has lead to accounting conservatism which is
reinforced by corporate governance. Three methods are used for measure
accounting conservatism: Cumulated non-operational accruals, discretionary
accruals, and earning-return association methods.
Data becomes information when users can understand and utilise the data. Users
should consider several factors including who supplies the information, what are
the information trends, and how to identify the information risk in financial
reports.
In this study one of the major themes, which has developed, is accounting
conservatism. Conservatism has existed within practices of accounting reporting
through time, but the patterns of conservatism became pervasive during the 1990s.
The pervasive existence of conservatism induces information risk in the
evaluation of firm performance, and hence to the measurement of firm risks. Also
there is a high likelihood of poor measurement of firm risks of default when using
accounting based on default model such as Altman and Ohlson models. Hence it is
worth investigating the impact of conservatism on the default models, thus adding
the three final questions; what is the impact of the conservatism on Altman
model? What is the impact of the conservatism on Ohlson model? and which




UK is the leading country in corporate governance reform, introducing the
Cadbury Report. The release of the Cadbury Code in the UK is considered as a
key development in the modem literature on corporate governance in practice
(Dallas and Patel, 2004). This has led to many studies providing interesting
findings. The current research aims to add to there studies.
1.3.2 Reliability ofUK data
UK financial and market data are reliable compared to many countries. Such data
will lead to reliable research results. Taffler (1984) confirms that UK has an ideal
financial environment for the successful development of statistical models.
1.3.3 Industry
This study focuses on manufacturing industry. There are two main reasons to
choose manufacturing industry. First, manufacturing is not so regulated as either
utilities and financial institutions. Second, the default models such as Altman
model and Ohlson model are based on manufacturing industries. For
comparability of research result, this study uses manufacturing industries.
1.3.4 Time: 1990-2000
UK has changed its corporate governance since 1992, after issuing of Cadbury
Report in December 1992. Therefore this research limit the period of study to
before the Cadbury and after the Cadbury, during 1990s.
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1.4 Report Structure
The remaining thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts with corporate
governance theory and UK CG codes. Chapter 3 explains the risk management
aspect of corporate governance Codes. This chapter also include the role of the
corporate governance participants. Chapter 4 is the initial literature reviews on the
performance related studies. Chapter 5 explore the default models, mainly
Altaian's model, Ohlson model and Merton models. Chapter 6 evaluates the
reporting quality and accounting conservatism. Chapter 7 describes the research
methodology. Chapter 8 provides the results of the analysis of the data. The
conclusions are given in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 describes is the contribution of this
study and further study that may be undertaken.
10
CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IDEAS
2.0 Introduction
Before it is possible to explore relationship between corporate governance and risk
there is a need to understand the concept of Corporate Governance. Unfortunately
there is not a single view of corporate governance and the term becomes referential.
The main difference is between a view from shareholder, and a view from
stakeholders. These two positions will be discussed in first part of the Chapter.
During the late 1980s the concerns about protection of shareholder value led UK
bodies to the decision to set up the Cad'oury Committee to advice on best practice in
corporate governance. Subsequently this led to a number of refinements, and so a
series of codes for good corporate governance developed over time. The final section
reviews the UK codes in light of the theory.
2.1 Shareholder View of Corporate Governance
2.1.1 Introduction
According to the theory that has developed based on the shareholders position
corporate governance should maximise shareholder return. When corporation
maximise shareholder value, it should lead to improvement of the corporation's
performance. This therefore leads to social benefit for the whole society. In this
theory it is held that shareholders have title to residual claims since they are the
residual risk-bearers, they have made the investment. The shareholder returns are
incentives for this risk-bearing group (O'Sullivan, 2000). Therefore shareholder
should have the power to control the corporation and the corporation should run for
benefit of the shareholder.
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2.1.2 Inherent property rights theory
2.1.2.1 Basic Concept
The corporate property is the aggregation of individual property rights under this
concept. Thus the shareholders, the owners of the property, are the owners of the
corporation. Therefore the board have a legal duty to act in the interest of the
shareholders. Inherent property rights theory sees companies as private institutions,
and the companies were managed on the basis that they are private property.
2.1.2.2 Development
Inherent property rights held sway in the corporate law theory since the 1800s and
until the early 1900s (Blair, 1995; Letza and Sun, 2002). Inherent property rights
assume that 'the right to incorporate is inherent in the right to own property and write
contracts and corporations are regarded as legal extensions of their owners' (Allen,
1992).
The neoclassic economists, such as Hayek and Friedman, follow the tradition of the
Inherent property rights. Hayek (1969) has the view that individual owning private
property ensures the most efficient economic results, and derived form this
corporation has to seek maximise shareholder profits. If a corporation uses its sources
for any social purposes it is abuse of management power and result in inefficient
outcomes. Friedman (1962) provides major support for the property rights. He states
that: 'there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the games, which is to say, engage in open and free competition, without
deception or fraud'.
Sternberg (1998), one of the strongest supporters of the shareholder theory, refers
solely to shareholders in her definition in corporate governance because corporations
are the property of their shareholders. These strands provide a view, which supports
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the shareholders as the controllers of the corporation and that corporations should be
run for their benefit.
2.1.2.3 How to enhance corporate governance systems
The neoclassic economists stress maximisation of the profit, and minimisation of the
social responsibility. Hayek (1969) argues that property right and control of
shareholders should be fully protected and be strengthened. Friedman (1962) argues
that managers should pursue only shareholder interest, and should not allowed for
social responsibility
Sternberg (1998) argues that the corporate governance can be improved by enhancing
the accountability to the shareholders. She (1998) asserts that to achieve this, there
needs to be the effective internal control (shareholder voting rights, independent non¬
executive directors, and information disclosure to shareholders) and market control
for the managers.
2.1.2.4 Evaluation of the theory
The theory underlines safeguarding of the shareholder interest, and legal duty of the
managers. This theory provides the basic and essential ideas of corporate governance,
but understanding within the legal duty of the board leads to a narrow concept of
corporate purpose. According to this theory there is only one purpose of the
company: maximising profit for shareholders. Yet there is another aspect of the
company purposes, such as the interest of employees, and suppliers.
2.1.3 Managerial Hegemony theory
2.1.3.1 Basic idea
This theory holds that professional managers actually control the company as
shareholdings become dispersed. This situation makes the board a rubber stamp and
all decisions are dominated by professional managers.
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2.1.3.2 Development
This theory was developed in studies of the large companies. During the second half
of the 1900s the process of separation of ownership and control was developed among
the large companies. Berle and Means (1932) defined this process 'the separation of
ownership and control'.
Managerial hegemony theory holds that boards are constrained from decision making
due to lack of information and knowledge (Hung, 1998). Therefore the real
responsibility of running and controlling the company is corporate management.
Berle and Means (1932) explain reasons to abandon the control to the management as:
• The management have better knowledge and expertise than shareholders.
• The shares of an individual investor in large company may be not significant
• The investor has always the option of selling unless there are specific
restrictions.
The procedure for selecting directors also contributes the managerial dominance.
Pfeffer (1972) states that ' the selection procedure by which board members are
chosen guarantees that board members are handpicked by management. In many
practical respects, management is in control of the boards'.
2.1.3.3 Enhancing corporate governance
To relieve the managerial dominance in the company, the introduction of outside
director is recommended by many researches. Yet the most important aspect of the
outside is dependent on how independent they are. The ineffectiveness of the board
to monitor the management is from the lack of the independence of the outside
directors (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).
To secure the independence, transparent selection process is required. Cadbury
Report (1992) recommends that the appointment of non-executive director should be
'a matter for the board as a whole and that there should be a formal selection process'.
14
Zeitlin (1974) states that the increased concentration of ownership and interlocking
directorship can reduce the conditions of the managerial hegemony.
2.1.3.4 Evaluation of the theory
A lot of empirical studies have supported the theory. Mace (1971), in the study of US
directors, reports less involvement in strategic decision except when there is a crisis
and control rested with the chief executive rather than board. Lorsch and Maclver




Agency theory argues that agents, the managers, do not always act for the interest of
the principals and pursue their own interest. This self-interested motivation creates
agency problem.
2.1.4.2 Development
The idea of corporation as a nexus of contracts was developed by Alchian and
Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). The concept of the contract
applied to the relationship between shareholder and managers. The contract between
shareholder and managers is conditioned by incentives by paying according to
performance.
Agency theory views the shareholders not as the owner of the company but the
residual risk takers of the company (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). The shareholders
have most to gain if the company is a success, but have most to lose if the company
fails. In this case there is conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.
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2.1.4.3 Enhancing corporate governance
The question that arises is how under agency theory the shareholders position can be
maintained. Given the management will act out of self-interest can this be employed
to ensure the interest of the shareholders can be protected or improved. Several
potential mechanisms have been suggested to resolve the difficulty: contracts (Jensen
and Mecking, 1976), equity ownership (Jensen and Mecking, 1976), capital and
labour markets, (Fama, 1980) and the influence of the Board on the manager (Fama
and Jensen, 1983).
A corporation is governed via the contracts it has developed over time and therefore
contracts should be used to ensure the maximisation of shareholder value. The
alignment of the interests of the agents and principals can be achieved through the
nature of the contract, which specifies the returns due to agents in service of the
principals' goal.
Fama and Jensen (1983) state 'the board is not an effective device for decision control
unless it limits the decision discretion of individual top managers'. The combination
of the two roles in one person, duality, will lead to a concentration of power and
consequently, owing to the agency costs involved in this, lower returns to
shareholders (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). This is equally the position of Jensen (1993)
who believes a board of directors may fail in case of a CEO dominant on the board, a
low equity ownership among the board members, an excessively large board
members, and a culture of consent. A summary is given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Control tools to protect shareholders' value
Control tools Functions Authors
Optimal
contracts










To control the behaviour ofmanagers Fama (1980)
Boards Monitoring devise Fama and Jensen (1993)
Shareholder
activism
To encourage executives and
directors to adopt practices that
insulate shareholders from
management self-interest
Daily et al (2003)
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2.1.4.4 Evaluation of the theory
The acceptance of Agency theory is down to its simplicity of description of human
nature. It puts greed above altruism, which perhaps fits in with most peoples' low
view ofhuman nature. It provides a rational framework, which appears as old as time
and appears met in many contexts. Daily et al. (2003) attribute the popularity of
agency theory to two factors: the theory is simple and the self-interest assumption is
both age-old and widespread.
There are many detractors from the theory because of its simplicity. A simple rule
cannot hope to cope with the realities of number of complex and interconnected
decision processes. Agency theory cannot explain a particular individual, or the way
a particular corporation will act (Ryan et al. 2002). The theory regards structure as a
control device. Therefore it cannot explain the interaction between management and
the structure. In the context of the Board and its effectiveness the theory tends to be
short sighted in terms of explaining and predicting effectiveness, (Corley, 2005). It
also seems to ignore aspects such as directors' resources, services, and their strategic
roles (Daily et al, 2003). Contracts by themselves are only an instrument they cannot
solve all the problems and issues.
Agency theory follows neo-classic economics and is based on individual decision
making, assuming the maximisation of self-interests. In most studies of governance-
performance relations, though, the board is the main subject of the study. Boards are
the aggregation of individuals, therefore the agency theory could not be argued to be
an appropriate basis for such a study, unless the whole board act as a single identity.
If one did treat as such then there would be difficulties in conflation between the role
ofmonitoring and management.
2.1.5 The finance theory
2.1.5.1 Basic idea
A refinement of the agency theory is finance theory, another kind of agency theory.
In the finance theory there is more focus on the market control of corporate
17
governance. The theory holds that shareholders' interests are best served by
maximising share price in the short run (Letza and Sun, 2002).
2.1.5.2 Development
Financial theory had a critical role in the 1980's takeover movement. This line of
study tried to find the merits of the conglomerate merger and the hostile takeover as
mechanism for reducing agency cost. Jensen (1993) supports this view in saying that
takeover activities provide an early warning system that motivated healthy
adjustments to the excess capacity.
2.1.5.3 Enhancing corporate governance
The supporters of this theory hold that removing restriction on market enhances
corporate governance and allows the market to take corporate control (Fama, 1980).
Those who believe in the market mechanism would wish to let it freely operate, and
oppose any interference to the market, (Kirkbride and Letza, 2003). In doing so the
finance theory provides background for the mechanism of control. Market
governance is seen to be the most effective control mechanism because the pressure
of capital markets and potential takeovers can discipline managers and maximise
shareholder value (Letza el al, 2004). Any market activity causing the increase of the
stock price is therefore justified including hostile takeover (Blair, 1995).
2.1.5.4 Evaluation of the theory
The inherent difficulties are accepting that market forces and market mechanism are
efficient and effective. Collapses of large concerns, ENRON and WorldCom, indicate
that the market can be manipulated and stock prices may describe a false position.
Kirkbride and Letza (2003) state that 'society can not solely rely on the market
mechanism and additional corporate governance measures are required'. This
assertion is rational to see the evidence of the collapse of large corporation, which
manipulated the stock price.
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2.1.6 The myopic market theory
2.1.6.1 Basic idea
This theory argues the problem of the current corporate governance is its short-term
vision. Under this view the managers focus on short-term performance sacrificing
long-term value (Charkham, 1994). The emphasis on shareholder value can simply be
translate into market price and hence can lead to the obvious problem of short-
termism.
2.1.6.2 Development
The issue possibly caused the failure of ENRON. This is the fundamental flaw of
Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The criticism on Anglo-American
model based on its poor performance compared to that of Japan or Germany in the
1980s. Keasey et al (1997) states that institutional fund managers are judged on a
relatively short-term horizon, which results in over-concerned with short-term
forecasts. Typically Fund Managers are assessed on a 1-year basis and so expect
returns within this timescale.
The myopic market model also raise a question that whether the stock price is a
reliable guide to future value. This model views that stock price is not a good
indicator of corporate performance.
2.1.6.3 Enhancing corporate governance
The model contends that 'corporate governance reform should encourage shareholder
and managers to share long-term performance horizon' (Letza and Sun, 2002). The
advocates of this model want to corporate governance arrangement to shield managers
from shareholders pressure, especially pressure to focus on short-term stock prices.
In this sense, the market control is not an efficient disciplinary mechanism. The threat
of a takeover may lead managers to act against the threats, which may result in
distorted results.
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2.1.6.4 Evaluation of the theory
The theory is used as a criticism of Anglo-American model of corporate governance,
in which there is a trend that requires short-term results. Sternberg (1998) argues that
the assertions of the 'short-termism' is used inappropriately for as Riley (1997)
reports the typical shareholding period of large UK institutional investor is 18 years.
2.1.7 Stewardship theory
2.1.7.1 Basic idea
This theory assumes that managers are actually behaving just like stewards to serve
the shareholder's interests and work diligently. Managers' willingness to act as
steward to serve the company may come from self-achievement, responsibility and
working ethics.
2.1.7.2 Development
Stewardship theory is based on a human relationship perspective (Hung, 1988). This
assumption is contrary to agency theory, since they become altruistic servants of the
shareholders.
Donaldson (1990) argue that managers are motivated by non-financial motivations,
saying 'managers should be regarded as wanting to do a good job, to be good
stewards of corporate assets rather than managers being seen as opportunistic, self-
interested actors'.
Donaldson and Davis (1991) state that the executive managers far from being an
opportunistic behaviour, wanting to do a good job, therefore stewardship theory holds
that performance is decided by the structural situation in which the executive is
located. As a result, managers and shareholders can have partnership relationship.
Donaldson and Davis (1991) find that shareholder returns, in terms of return of equity
are superior when there is CEO duality.
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2.1.7.3 Enhancing corporate governance
This theory argued that the economic performance of a firm increases when power
and authority are concentrated in a single executive. Unifying command at the head
of the company can have a beneficial effect on shareholders returns, by providing
greater unity of direction and strong command and control. This belief is based on
depth of knowledge, commitment, access to current operating information and
technical expertise of the manager. These are seen as important requirements
enabling a company to be run effectively.
2.1.7.4 Evaluation of the theory
There is some support for the existence of the stewardship within UK. UK
Accounting Standard Board (1995) defines the stewardship as 'the accountability of
management for the resources entrusted to it'. Yet Devine (1985) states that 'the
concept of stewardship is difficult to define, but one of its characteristics is certainly
responsibility for accomplishing objectives'.
2.1.8 Resource- dependence theory
2.1.8.1 Basic idea
The resource dependent theory views companies as interdependent with their
environments. Therefore this theory regards Boards as provider of resources of
expertise and experience (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
2.1.8.2 Development
This theory view boards as important boundary spanners (Zahra and Pearce, 1989),
which assume that a new director enhance a firm's ability, reputation and capacity to
deal with uncertainty. Several researches support the idea that the board provides the
resources of the knowledge and net-workings. Lorsch and Maclver (1984) state
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Board's key normal duty is giving advice and counsel. Demb and Neubauer (1992)
argue Non-executive directors need to be involved in the decision-making process.
Hill (1995) document Non- executive directors are involved in reviewing and refining
the strategic decisions in UK.
The board provides expertise in relation to risk management as is indicated in the
following. The role of the board is to provide information to reduce environmental
uncertainty and to extract resources for company operation (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).
Pfeffer (1972) states that resources can help diminish the uncertainty. Borokhovich et
al.(2001) report that most active firms in risk management are those firms with larger
number of outside directors on boards.
2.1.8.3 Enhancing corporate governance
This theory views the outside directors as a resource of the company. The outside
directors can provide their expertise and can be a connection point between the
company and outside. Therefore this theory supports the existence of outside
directors.
2.1.8.4 Evaluation of the theory
Zahra and Pearce (1989) state three limitation of the approach. It fails to theorize the
processes by which director's strategy link to corporation performance. It ignores the
dynamic of power in board composition and changes. It fails to assess the links
between board variables and corporate social performance.
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2.2 Stakeholder View of Corporate Governance
2.2.1 Introduction
The stakeholder advocates view that corporation do not exist solely for shareholders,
but also should take account of the interests of other stakeholders. It therefore
suggests that a corporation should not simply aim to optimise shareholder value. As
Keasey et al(1997) state that 'the central proposition at the heart of the stakeholder
approach is that the purpose of the firm should be defined more widely than the
maximization of the shareholder welfare alone.'
In this context corporate governance is not to ensure shareholder control of the
corporation to achieve the goal maximising shareholder value. Corporate governance
becomes the rules and structures that ensure that divisions of the returns from the
corporation are shared equitably amongst the stakeholders.
2.2.2 Social entity theory
2.2.2.1 Basic idea
This theory views the corporation not as a private association, but as both a public
association and a social institution. Hence the corporate governance should reflect the
legal and political aspects of the 'public association' and it is vested in the Board of
Directors to act in accordance with such.
2.2.2.2 Development
Social entity theory is related to communitarian theory, which views the corporation
as a political tool for social purposes (Dine, 2000). Sullivan and Conlon (1997) state
that 'the standard of a corporation's usefulness is not whether it creates individual
wealth but whether it helps society gain a great sense of the meaning of community
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by honouring individual dignity and promoting overall welfare'. Allen (1992) states
that in addition to assurance of return sufficient to shareholder, the corporation has
other purposes including the satisfaction of consumer wants, the provision of
meaningful employment opportunities and contribution to the public life.
This theory has been promoted by three major theoretical concepts: economic
democracy, associationalism and communitarian nation of property, see Letza and
Sun (2002)
2.2.2.3 Enhancing corporate governance
This theory holds that corporate governance is improved by nationalising corporation
or by using legal intervention and improving the system of checks and balance (Allen
1995).
2.2.2.3 Evaluation of the theory
This theory justifies stakeholder interests on the basis of moral value and human
rights. This moral and human rights lead to political orientation of the company. This
political aspect of the company restrains the right of the individual rights in the
company.
2.2.3 The pluralistic model
2.2.3.1 Basic idea
The pluralistic model holds that the corporation should have multiple interests of
stakeholders rather than only taking the shareholders' interest. Under the basic idea
of this model, to make the corporation more efficient and more legitimate the
corporation should serve and accommodate wider stakeholder interests.
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2.2.3.2 Development
Blair (1995) argues that other stakeholders, especially employees, who make firm
specific investment, bear risks in the firm, and have residual claims, can also claim
ownership rights. There are those that argue that increasing the rights within an
organisation can lead to the corporation being more effective.
2.2.3.3 Enhancing corporate governance
Cooperative and productive relationships will increase only if the directors are
permitted to balance the interests of shareholders with other stakeholders whom are
committed to the company (Coyle, 2004). An example is Stoney and Winstanley
(2001) who argue that 'most commonly it is argued that stake-holding is instrumental
in increasing efficiency, competition and profitability'
2.2.3.4 Evaluation of the theory
This theory does not move away from ownership rights, which is supported by
shareholder theory, but the theory moves toward the multiple stakeholders' interest.
This view is supported by modern corporations, which run for long-term purposes. It
is reasonable to say that the balance between stockholder and stakeholder should be
maintained.
2.2.4 The trusteeship model
2.2.4.1 Basic idea
The trusteeship model suggests that management are not the agents of the
shareholders, but the trustees of the corporation (Kay and Silberston, 1995). The
trusteeship model appears similar to stewardship theory, but the trusteeship theory
holds that managers have variety range of motivation other than maximizing their
own benefits or shareholder benefit.
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2.2.4.2 Development
The idea that management are not the agents of the shareholders is stems from the
concept that shareholders are not the owner of the company. Kay and Silberston
(1995) argue that shareholders are merely the residual claimants of the corporation.
The company itself is a separated identity; therefore the company has its own rights
and duties, and its own will and capacity to act. Therefore the management is the
trustee of the company, not the agents of the shareholders.
Within a trustee model the Board act to ensure that the interest of the various groups
of the stakeholders are maintained, Harris (1982). Harris (1982) argues that
'Management claims that it is in the best position to reconcile and satisfy the
numerous and conflicting demands made of it, and that its performance in doing so is
adequate.' This would mean there is no need for unions, state or other interventionist
bodies.
2.2.4.3 Enhancing corporate governance
In this model the corporate governance is enhanced if Board can act independently.
The power needs to be invested in the independent directors who nominate directors
and select senior managers and appoint CEO for fixed term, say 4 years, see Letza
and Sun (2002)
2.2.4.4 Evaluation of the theory
This theory holds a realistic and descriptive perspective on publicly held corporation,
such as museum, and university.
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2.3 UK Initiative of Corporate Governance Development
2.3.1 Historical development of Corporate Governance
In 1553 the first joint stock company was founded in London. The company was a
trading venture, which became the Muscovy Company (Charkham, 1994). Cadbury
(2002) introduces the East India Company as the first company that has the similar
structure of the corporate governance to that of modem company. A Royal Charter
was granted to the company in 1600. The governance structure was a General Court
and the Court of Directors. The General Court acted as the function of Annual
General Meeting, while Court ofDirector has the function of Board.
The recent history of the corporate board in US has been of empowerment as
described by Clark (1998). In the 1950s and 1960s the role of board was
unfavourably described by Mace (1971) as 'Directors are ornaments on the corporate
Christmas tree'. During the 1970s the movement for the independence and
empowerment was initiated, though, it suffered a set back as during the 1980s the
focus on the board receded was replaced by the disciplines of the capital markets.
The 1990s reasserted the empowerment of the board.
MacLean (1999) states that the interest in corporate governance in 1990s emerged
form contentious issues such as business scandal, remuneration controversies, a
growing number of acquisitions and mergers. Whittington (1993) argues four themes
that facility the development of corporate governance: creative accounting, business
failures and scandals, director pay level, and short-terminism.
2.3.2 UK Economy Environment
Elliott and Elliott (2005) document the correlations in consideration of development
of corporate governance requirement. (1) The higher the value of listed companies to
GDP, the more developed the corporate governance requirement. (2) The wider the
share ownership held by financial institution or individuals, the greater the need for
corporate governance. (3) The USA and the UK, and its former colonies, have a
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much more developed corporate governance requirement than other countries. (4)
Countries with single boards have a greater governance requirement.
Table 2.2 shows that UK economy has changed over time, with the decline in
Agriculture and in Manufacturing, and the increase in the Service sectors in the per
cent of GDP. Sawyer (2005), though, suggests that ' the value ofmanufacturing out
in Britain has for most of the last half-century continued to rise, albeit slowly: it is the
share ofmanufacturing in total output, which has declined, not the absolute amount'.
Table 2.2: The structure of British economy, 1961-2001 (% Shares in GDP)
1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Business services, finance, and property 6.4 7.2 11.0 16.0 20.7
Manufacturing 33.8 31.0 24.1 20.7 16.8
Distribution, hotels, and catering 11.4 10.5 12.1 14.0 14.9
Education, health and social work 3.9 5.5 9.1 11.2 12.5
Transport and communication 8.1 8.1 7.1 8.2 7.7
Construction 6.1 6.8 5.7 6.0 5.2
Public administration and defence 5.5 6.9 7.2 6.6 4.6
Energy and water 5.5 4.4 10.3 5.2 4.5
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 3.9 2.8 2.1 1.7 0.9
Other 15.4 16.9 11.4 10.3 12.3
Source: Sawyer (2005)
London Stock Exchange (LSE) is the main market for the listing and trading of UK
equities. Even the stock market provides a small proportion of industry funds, see the
following Tables 2.3 and 2.4 which shows that UK is the highest in the value of listed
companies as percentage ofGross Domestic Production (GDP).
Table 2.3: Value of listed companies as percentage of GDP
1980 1985 1990 1994 1996 1999
UK 38 77 87 114 142 247.5
US 50 57 56 75 114 184.5
France 8 15 26 34 38 117.9
Germany 9 29 22 24 28 76.7
Italy 6 14 14 18 21 71.3
Japan 36 71 99 77 64.5 -
Netherlands 17 47 42 67 95 205.1
Spain 8 12 23 25 33 87
Sweden 10 37 40 66 95 182.9
Source: Adopted from El
(2000)
iott and Elliott (2005), Charkham (1994), Van Der Elst
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Table 2.4: Equity raised by listed companies as per cent of GDP
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996 1999
UK 1.36 1.67 1.21 1.28
US 0.54 1.13 1.87 1.18
France 0.62 1.12 0.80 1.55
Germany 0.62 0.68 0.19 0.45
Italy 0.43 0.83 0.18 2.15
Netherlands 1.97 3.29 2.47 8.87
Spain 0.86 - 0.68 5.48
Source: Van Der Elst (2000)
The annual growth rates of GDP show that 1990-1991 was a period of recession, see












Source: Office for National Statistics (2000)
Figure 2.1 GDP Growth rate
2.4. UK Corporate Governance Codes
2.4.1 Introduction
This section will explore the historical development of the UK codes of corporate
governance. There have been a series of reports since 1992 these are presented in
Figure 2.2. Cadbury Report was response to corporate failure and to doubt about UK
corporate governance system. The Greenbury Report is another response to the
unjustified compensation package for the executives. The Hampel Report is the
review of the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Report. The Combined
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Code brought together both the Cadbury Report and Hampel Report into s single code.
Turnbull Report is on how to implement the Combined Code with regard to internal
control. It also has major concern for risk management. The Higgs Report provides
guideline on making non-executive director more effective. Smith Report gives
guideline for audit committee. Figure 2.1 shows the timeline for the various reports.
Therefore Cadbury Report and Hampel Report are importance to study UK corporate
governance codes.. In this section Cadbury Report and Hampel Report will be
discussed in more detail. In the subsequent sections the codes impact on aspects of
corporate governance will be explored. In each report, three major issues will be
investigated: role of the shareholder, boards and non-executive directors.












> 1992 -Cadbury Report -
> 1995 —Greenbury Report -
> 1998 - Hampel Report -
> 1998 - Combined Code -
> 1999-Turnbull Report -
> 2003 - Higgs Report
> 2003 - Smith Report
Financial aspects of corporate governance
- Directors' remuneration
Committee on corporate governance
Principles of good governance and code of best practice
Internal control :Guidance for directors on the Combined Code
Review of the role and effective ofnon-executive directors
Audit committee: Combined Code Guidance
Figure 2.2 Development of UK Corporate Governance Codes
2.4.2 Role of the Shareholders
The Codes obviously provide guidance of best practice. In this section the power and
the role of the shareholders are considered under the various codes.
2.4.2.1 Cadbury Report
Cadbury Report specifies the role of the general shareholders in terms of corporate
governance and suggests their role is to appoint/elect individuals to specific roles. For
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example the shareholders should appoint directors and auditors, paragraph 2.5 of the
code. Also under this paragraph the shareholders should 'satisfy themselves that an
appropriate governance structure is in place'. The need for electing appropriate board
members by shareholders is also emphasised in paragraph 4.2 and they should do this
to ensure they are properly constituted and 'to prevent one individual's dominance'.
The code also calls for a more active role by institutional investors to secure better
corporate governance. Institutional investors have substantial power given their
shareholding and so to act responsibly they should use this holding 'to influence the
standards of corporate governance'. They have a duty as owners, on behalf of the
investors they represented, to ensure that appropriate changes are made in
corporations, rather than taking the option of walking away by selling shares. This is
under paragraph 6.10.
2.4.2.2 Hampel Report
The report documents that 60% of shares in listed firms are held by UK institution
and of remaining 40% are owned by individual and overseas owners. This gives
institutional investors a major role in determining the behaviour of corporations.
Therefore the Report requires the institutional shareholders 'to make considered use
of their votes' in paragraph 2 CI.
2.4.3 On Board ofDirectors
2.4.3.1 Cadbury Report
The responsibilities of the board are setting the company's strategic aims, providing
the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management and reporting to
shareholders on their stewardship as listed in paragraph 2.5. The Report emphasised
the collective ability of the board, which provide both the leadership and the checks
and balances.
31
The Report provides guidance on the way to achieve an effective board. This
includes the compositions, which suggest that the board should be 'made up of a
combination of executive directors and of non-executive directors under a chairman
who accept the duties and responsibilities which the post entails', see paragraph 4.1.
The member of the board should work together under the chairman, (paragraph 4.2).
The board should ensure that there is no dominance by one person, again paragraph
4.2 and in doing so should collectively meet its obligations (paragraph 4.3). The
board as a whole should have the final authority within the corporation, see paragraph
4.4. The effectiveness of a board should be supported by its structures and processes
see paragraph 4.21.
The Report also suggests that the way to achieve this is to have well defined
procedures for the board. The board should meet regularly, paragraph 4.23, and
should have a formal schedule ofmatters for their collective decision, again paragraph
4.23. The Report provides guidance on the management of transactions suggesting
there should be clear rules to determine materiality for any transaction and establish
clearly which transactions require multiple board signatures, see paragraph 4.24.
Obviously it is important that there should well defined committees of the board such
as an audit committee, a remuneration committee and nomination committee.
2.4.3.2 Hampel Report
The Hampel Report adopted a principled approach rather than issuing guidelines. The
report argues that a principled approach is better to apply in the practices. Hence the
prime responsibility of the board is to determine the broad strategy and to ensure its
implementation.
The Hampel Report requires that every listed company should be headed by an
effective board, which should lead and control the company, see paragraph 21. It also
suggested that combination of chairman and CEO role in one individual needs to be
explained publicly, paragraph 211. (Clearly whilst not outlawing combination the
feeling is that the roles generally should not be assumed to be combined without very
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good reason.) The Board should include a balance of executive directors and non¬
executive directors (NED) paragraph 2III. The report states that it is difficult for them
to be effective ifNEDs make up less than one third of the board, paragraph 3.14. The
board should be supplied in a timely fashion with information in a form and of a
quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties, paragraph 2 IV.
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new
directors to the boards paragraph 2V. All directors should be required to submit
themselves for re-election at regular intervals and at least every three years, paragraph
2VI.
As with the Cadbury Report, the Hampel Report suggest that it is only possible to
fulfil its responsibilities if it meet regularly and reasonably often.
2.4.4 On Non-Executive Directors (NED)
2.4.4.1 Cadbury Report
The Cadbury Report has the view that non-executive director bring judgement and
experience to the Board. Especially independence of judgement is treated as an
essential quality. The views of NED should carry significant weight in the board
decisions (paragraph, 4.11). All boards require a minimum of three non-executive
directors (paragraph 4.11). The majority of non-executives on a board should be
independent of the company.
Non-executive directors have two important contributions to make to governance
process as a consequence of their independence from executive responsibility
(paragraph 4.4). They should review the performance of the boards and of the
executive (paragraph 4.5) and take the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise
(paragraph 4.6)
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For the NED to be effective then they need to have the same rights as other executive
directors and the board should regularly review the form and the extent of the
information (paragraph 4.14)
2.4.4.2 Hampel Report
Hampel Committee finds that the monitoring function of NEDs had been
overemphasised since the Cadbury Report. Hence it tends to suggest that NEDs are
normally appointed for the contribution to the development of the company strategy
(paragraph 3.8). The generally accepted functions of the non-executive director are
strategic and monitoring function (paragraph 3.8). For the small companies, NEDs
may contribute expertise not otherwise available to management, or NEDs may act as
mentors to inexperienced executives (paragraph 3.8).
Again the Hampel report stresses that there should be a sufficient number of non¬
executive directors, a majority of them independent and seem to be independent; and
that these individuals should be able both to work co-operatively with their executive
colleagues and to demonstrate objectivity and robust independence of judgement
when necessary (paragraph 2.5).
2.4.5 On Reporting
Cadbury report emphasised director integrity and board effectiveness in producing a
good quality financial report to users. The Cadbury Report recommended that all
quoted companies should establish internal board sub-committees. The Report argued
that audit committees were an additional control mechanism that ensured that
shareholder interests were being safeguarded. These promoted the effective financial
management of the company and hence increasing accountability (Cadbury, 1992).
Table 2.5 details the statements in the reports about financial reporting.
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Table 2.5: Financial reporting according to the reports
Cadbury Report (1992) Hampel Report(1998) Combined Report(1998)
4.2
The board should ensure





The board should establish






for preparing the accounts
next to a statement by the
auditors
4.5
The director should report
on the effectiveness of




report that the business is
a going concern, with
supporting assumptions or
qualifications as necessary
It is suggested that the
audit committee should
keep under review the
overall financial
relationship between
the company and its






The directors should explain their
responsibility for preparing the
accounts, and there should be a
statement by the auditors about
their reporting responsibilities.
D12
The board's responsibility to
present a balanced and
understandable assessment extends
to interim and other price-sensitive
public reports and reports to
regulators as well as to




The director should report that the




The board should establish an
audit committee of at least three
directors, all non-executive, with
written terms of reference which
deal clearly with its authority and
duties.
D21
The director should, at least
annually, conduct a review of the
effectiveness of the group's
system of internal control and
should report to shareholders that
they have done so. The review
should cover all controls,
including financial, operational
and compliance control and risk
management.
35
2.5. Corporate Governance theory and Codes
2.5.1 Introduction
There is a need to examine the relationship between the different theories of corporate
governance and the codes developed by the reports. This examination will enhance
our understanding of the UK Code and provide some insight how the UK Codes
reflect the theory. Each theory has emphasis different aspects. Donaldson and Davis
(1991) raise the issues of the right theory for the right phenomena. They argue that
the important thing is not to assume of superiority one theory over other theories, but
to accept the validity of a theory for a given phenomena.
Table 2.6: The relationship between theory, interest and resolution
Theory Interest Solving the conflict
Inherent property right
Owners and managers have
different interests
Regulation
Managerial Hegemony Ownership, Appointment
process
Agency theory Contract, Market
The financial theory No intervention to market
The myopic market
theory
Less intervene to managers
Resource dependency Improving networking
Stewardship theory Owners and managers share
interests
Manager independence
Social entity theory The public contain different
interest
Public intervention








The Codes document primary the role of the board, which include the function and
appointing process of the directors. Hung (1998)'s typology gave useful guideline to
analyse the relationship between the theory and codes. Hung (1998) classifies roles of
the boards and matched with board theory. Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between
the function of the board and the theory. Also the figure shows that no single theory
can explain the process of the board.
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Figure 2.3: Hung's typology of relationship between codes and theory,
Hung (1998)
2.5.2 The shareholder perspective of the Codes
2.5.2.1 Inherent property rights theory
The Inherent property rights theory argues that since shareholders are the owner of the
corporation, the managers have a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of shareholders.
Cadbury Report documents the right of the shareholders as owners of the company to
elect the directors to run the business on their behalf and hold them account for its
process (paragraph 6.1).
In relation to the function of the Board, the theory views the Board as enhancing
performance of the companies by carrying out its legal duty being the selection of
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), representing shareholder interests, monitoring
managerial and corporation performance.
Cadbury Report states the legal duty of directors as to act in good faith in the interest
of the company and to exercise care and skill (paragraph 3.2). These legal duties are
from the common law (paragraph 3.2).
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Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggest that there are five reasons why it is hard to conclude
that the view actually dominates corporate governance in board theory. It ignores the
role of the Board in developing and implementing strategy. Most empirical studies
explore only the impact of the Board's composition not the shareholders, which is
often considered too diffuse to encompass in empirical studies. Consideration of the
shareholders position would require an acceptable definition of shareholders wealth
and so far no consensual measure has evolved. When considering the Board even the
role of CEO in Board has not been studied in a systematic fashion. Many studies
make the assumption that there is a direct link between Board attributes and
corporation performance, which Zahra and Pearce (1989) felt was over emphasised.
2.5.2.2 Managerial Hegemony
Managerial hegemony theory represents the phenomenon of the modern large
corporation. The management have the control of the company. The Cadbury and
Hampel Report both are attempts to challenge the managerial dominance reality. For
they recommend the increasing number of the outside directors and the transparency
of the selection processes.
Cadbury Report recommends the calibre and number of non-executive that should be
on the board and that all boards require a minimum of three non-executive directors
(paragraph 4.11). Hampel Report stresses that the board should include a balance of
director and non-executive directors (paragraph III).
For the selection process, Cadbury Report recommends that there should be a formal
selection process, and stresses that the non-executive must be appointed on merit and
not by any form of patronage (paragraph 4.15). Hampel Report also emphasis the
transparent process (paragraph 3.19).
2.5.2.3 Agency theory
Agency theory is the dominant theory in corporate governance studies. Agency
theory sees corporate governance as means to ensure managers act for the interest of
the shareholders. Investigating the role of the Board in achieving the goals of the
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shareholders, then it is the Boards' critical roles of monitoring and rewarding
management to ensure maximise shareholder's interests. In this model of control then
agency theory supports separation of the CEO and Chairman roles, rather than the
duality of a single individual being CEO and Chairman.
Taking it further agency theory support the idea that boards should be dominated by
outside directors to increase the board's independence from management (Heracleous,
2001). Independent non-executive within the board increases the effectiveness of the
board through the direct monitoring and sanctions (Robert el al. 2005), without the
confounding of roles of monitor and monitored. Reducing agency cost and
maximizing shareholder wealth are the key role of the board. This leads to the
emphasis on performance. Therefore the remuneration should be based on firm
performance. Cadbury Report recommended that the role of the chairman and CEO
are separated, and there should be independent element on the board. Cadbury Report
state two important contributions of the Non Executive Directors are to make the
governance process independent from executive responsibility (paragraph 4.4). They
should review the performance of the boards and of the executive (paragraph 4.5) and
take the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise (paragraph 4.6).
2.5.2.4 The myopic market model
During the 1980s, there had been a critical attitude toward Anglo-American corporate
governance system due to its poor performance. As mentioned in the theory part, the
criticism is toward fund managers and corporate raiders. The Cadbury Report though,
supports the UK corporate governance system (paragraph 1.7). Instead of replacing
the system, Cadbury Report strengthens the system (paragraph 1.7) by way of
emphasis of monitoring role of the directors. In regard to Cadbury Report, Terry
(1993) states that 'the guilt has shifted from institutional shareholders to directors'.
Hampel Report documents directors' duty to shareholders both present and future
(paragraph 1.18). Therefore the report holds that as the shareholders are interested in




Contrary to agency theory, this theory views the main function of the boards is not to
ensure management compliance to shareholders' value, but to improve performance
by strategic decision making and working with management. Stewardship theory
views the role ofboard member as collaborating and mentoring (Huse, 2005).
Cadbury Report states the responsibility of the board, which include setting the
company's strategic aims and providing the leadership to put them into effects
(paragraph 2.5). Hampel Report also accepts the strategy role of the board as the
prime responsibility, (paragraph 3.11) Under this view, CEO duality is considered as
fostering strong and unified leadership (Heracleous, 2001). The steward theory views
that empowering managers is necessary to maximise corporate returns.
Boyd (1996) criticized Cadbury Report for its narrow concept of managerial
accountability. Drennan el al. (2001) documents that this narrow concept made the
report fail to provide wide issues of ethics and responsibility in the board.
Hampel Report holds that the basic legal duty of directors is to act in good faith in the
interests of the company and to exercise care and skill (paragraph 3.2)
2.5.2.6 Resources theory
Resource theory gives the foundation for director's resource role. The view that non¬
executive director brings judgement and experience to the Board are based on
resources theory. Blair and Stout (2001) state that directors' responsibility is not only
to shareholder value maximization but also they serve other stakeholders. This point
suggests that director need discretion in allocating resources. This is as analogous to
resources theory (Daily et al, 2003).
The executive and non-executive directors contribute in different ways: 'executive
directors, with their intimate knowledge of the business, and of non-executive
directors, who can bring a broader view to the company's activity, under a chairman
who accept the duties and responsibilities which the post entails.'(Cadbury Report,
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paragraph 4.1). The NEDs should have sufficient influence to affect the board's
decisions. In the report the statement made is 'the board should include non¬
executive directors of sufficient calibre and number for their views to carry significant
weight in the board decisions' (Cadbury Report, paragraph 4.11). NEDs are normally
appointed for the contribution to the development of the company strategy (Hampel
Report, paragraph 3.8)
For the small companies, NEDs may contribute expertise not otherwise available to
management, or NEDs may act as mentors to inexperienced executives (Hampel
Report, paragraph 3.8). The diversity of the NED makes a real contribution on the
board (Hampel Report, paragraph 3.15).
2.5.3 The stakeholder perspective of the Codes
Hampel Report dismissed the stakeholder notions (Tricker 1998), documenting that
'The directors as a board are responsible for relations with stakeholders; but they are
accountable to the shareholders' (paragraph 1.17). Even the Report states that
company need to develop relationship with employees, customers, suppliers, creditor
providers, local communities, but this relationship is only for shareholder interest,
(paragraph 1.16).
2.6 Conclusion
Broadly there are two approaches to the corporate governance: the shareholding and
stakeholding approaches. Shareholder view of corporate governance has argued that
corporation should run for shareholder and controlled by shareholders.
The shareholders views also have diverse theory based on how to enforce corporate
governance. Inherent property right theory is the legal approach and became the
ground of the company law. Managerial Hegamony theory represents the modern
view of large companies in USA and UK. The theory argues that manager actually
control the company. Agency theory is the main stream of current corporate
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governance studies. Agency theory argues the conflict of interest between shareholder
and managers, and provides mechanism to reduce the conflict. The financial theory is
the branch of the agency theory and emphasis the role of the financial market. The
myopic market theory pointed the weakness of current corporate governance, which is
seeking short-term results. The Stewardship theory has different assumption about
managers. The managers are no longer the self-interest seeker, but other motivation,
such as responsibility and honour, contributes their effort for the companies. The
resource-dependence theory sees the outside directors as provider of the resources of
the experience and expertise.
The stakeholder perspective has different views on those topics. On the issue of the
owner idea, the stakeholder advocates state that all stakeholders have some stake in
addition to shareholders. On the management accountability issue, the stakeholder
advocates asserts that managers should accountable for its decision. The residual
risks of shareholders are doubted from the stakeholder perspectives. The social entity
theory sees the company as public associations; therefore the role of public service is
more important than shareholder value. The pluralistic model takes into consideration
ofmultiple stakeholders' interest. The trusteeship model sees managers as trustee of
the company in the perspective of the stakeholder theory.
In relation to corporate governance theory and UK Code, the shareholder perspective
has a majority portion of the Code. But the Codes have adapted various theories as
the Code has developed. The Cadbury Report includes agency theory and resource
theory. Yet the Hampel Report includes agency theory, the myopic market theory,
steward theory, resource theory and managerial hegemony theory.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK MANAGING ASPECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
3.0 Introduction
There are two aspects of the link between corporate governance and risk management:
corporate governance as a risk and risk management in corporate governance. The
first aspect is that corporate governance can be another key factor that can affect firm
risks. Corporate governance failure, such as Enron, has raised the concern for board
structure, directors and chief executive officers. Johnson et al. (2000) states that
corporate governance variables have better explanatory power than macroeconomic
variables when measuring of firm risks. So changes in governance structure may
influence the firm's risk. The decision process of the boards and management can
also affect the firm's risk. The second aspect is that corporate governance requires a
good risk management system. Risk exists around all the company's activities.
Unnecessary risk should be reduced or avoided. Therefore risk management is a key
element in the control and manage the company. Risk management can add value to
the company. Kaen (2004) state that 'the connection between risk management and
corporate governance can be made through asking how risk management creates
value for the owners of the company and ensure that managers manage the company
in the best interests of the shareholders'. Therefore risk management in this view is
essential for the maximization of shareholder values and reducing the probability of
financial failures.
Corporate governance is set by each nation's political and economical situation. In
this sense, the risk management processes are also affected by those conditions. Risk
management is a combination process of structure and decision. In UK the corporate
governance codes provided the structure of risk management. This is particularly true
of the 1990s the period when the series of reports where published. This chapter
explores the relationship between corporate governance and risk management, the
role of codes as risk management tools, and the role of participant in the corporate
governance in the contexts of 1990s in the UK.
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3.1 Corporate Governance and Risk Management
3.1.1 Risks
Risk is a term, which is ill defined. It frequently depends on the context being
considered and so general definitions are hard to come up with. As Renn (1998)
states, there is no commonly accepted definition for the term risk, neither in the
science nor in the public understanding. There is, though, a common understanding of
aspects of risk for example Renn (1998) asserts that the definition of risk contains
three elements: outcomes that affect human value, possibility of occurrence
(uncertainty) and a formula to combine both elements. Some people think in terms of
harm and the chance of the harm and frequently in finance expected loss.
In the financial risk literature, the risks are grouped based on the risk sources. Crouhy
et al. (2006) divided the risk into market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational
risk, legal and regulatory risk, business risk, strategic risk, and reputation risk. The
market risk, the risk due to the changes in financial market, contains interest-rate risk,
equity price risk, foreign exchange risk and commodity price risk. Credit risk is the
risk of changing the credit quality of the counterparty. Liquidity risk is the lack of
cash convertible or lack of transaction possibility. Operational risks are from the
management failure, fraud and human error. Legal and regulatory risk related to the
changes of the law and regulation. Business risk is the risk from shortage of demand,
the changes of prices, and the cost changes. The strategic risk is the risk from the
significant investment or major board decisions. Reputation risk is related to the
reputation of the company. Many firms consider the reputation risk is related to brand
value of the company.
3.1.2 Risk managing process
To implement a process, it needs to break down into and examine the part. Ansell
(2005) classified risk management into four steps: Awareness, Assessing, Evaluating
and Reducing.
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Awareness is having knowledge of being informed about. Being aware is the starting
point for the risk management. Ansell (2005) states that 'awareness of risk is
accepting something may go happen and may lead to harm'. Limitation of our
knowledge and social constructed world-view affect the ability and scope of
awareness. Assessing the risk is the quantification of risk (Ansell, 2005). He states
there numerous ways to assess risk and most depend on context. Risk evaluation is the
judgement ofwhether a risk is accepted or not. It is regarded as setting the criteria for
what is tolerable within a society (Ansell, 2005). The inclusion of society in decision
leads to political issues in risk management. Managing risk may aim to reduce the risk.
Several activities can reduce the risk: gain information, change behaviour, reduce
likelihood, plan recovery and insure against the risk (Ansell, 2005).
3.1.3 Tradition of UK risk management approach
3.1.3.1 Tolerability and as low as reasonably practical (ALARP).
Two principles have been applied to risk management in UK: tolerability and as low
as reasonably practical (ALARP). The concept of tolerability is adopted by Health
and Safety Executive (HSE). Ansell (2005) explain that tolerability means the ability
to live with a risk to secure the benefit from the risk assuming that the risk is being
properly controlled. ALARP means that 'the quantum of risk is placed in one scale
and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk is placed in
the other, and that it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them - the
risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice- the defendant discharge the onus
on them' (Fife and Machim, 1976).
3.1.3.2 A self-regulation approach
UK has the tradition ofminimizing government intervention in corporate governance.
Charkham (2005) explain the tradition by stating that the fundamental British attitude
is that freedom is the natural state that should be guarded against government.
Whittington (1993) reports that 'the oldest and most pervasive form of regulation is
self-regulation by accountants, auditors or other prepares of financial information.
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This has typically been done by professional bodies in the interests of facilitating the
work of their members. Kirkbride and Letza (2003) argue that the City introduced a
take-over code ofpractice in the 1960s in response of fears of government intervene.
Contrast to self-regulation approach, a prescriptive approach is to promulgate
regulations for all risks known to the regulator (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003).
Drennan (2004) states more robust regulation and the introduction of codes of
corporate governance may reduce the risk. Yet the risk of prescriptive approach is
that regulation become outdated and cannot prevent the new type of risk.
Self-regulation has many advantages. The experts within the corporation involved
can adapt the spirit of the regulation to fit the particular circumstances of the
organisation, see Cheffins (1997) and Coyle (2004). Usually this means that the
regulations get more rapidly implemented and can be flexible to reflect potential
changes (Cheffins, 1997). As Coyle (2004) points out self-regulation avoids 'box
ticking' or compliance pursuit, and organisations need to think about the regulations
as it pertains to them.
The downsides are also fairly obvious. Self-regulation will mean that regulations will
be applied with insufficient coherence and hence will not provide co-ordination of
policy and practice over time, see Cheffins (1997). Also Cheffins suggests there are
the problems of setting, monitoring, and enforcing of compliance with the extra-legal
codes.
An approach to corporate governance in UK is 'comply or explain' approach. This
approach is the avoidance of prescriptive rules. This approach does not require to
comply with the Codes, but have to explain why the company does not comply the
codes. This approach is supported by Higgs (2003) who states 'I do not presume 'a
one size fits all' approach to governance is appropriate'.
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3.2 Risk managing role of Corporation Governance Codes
3.2.1 Introduction
As indicated before risk management and corporate governance are closely
intertwined. This is reinforced by Figure 3.1, which shows the relations with the
public, the city and the firm.
3.2.2 Risk Awareness
3.2.2.1 Cadbury Report
Awareness of risk is the ability to accept something may go happen and may lead to
harm. The Cadbury Report can be seen as a response to a set of scandals arising from
business failure. These include: Polly Peck, Maxwell Communications Corporations
and the misuse of pension funds and Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI). Public concerned about the UK corporate governance structure. Under these
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situations, the motivations of the various codes have primarily stemmed from
coverage in the media of events.
The financial stakeholders, accounting and legal professionals realised the business
threat initially. Financial Reporting Council was concerned about the reporting
quality in the major cases of failure and The Stock Exchange was concerned about the
reputation of the City (Jones and Pollitt, 2001). The Accountancy profession was
concerned about the potential liability of auditors and about losing its self-regulating
role' (Napier, 1992).
Many features could be attributed to the causes of corporate collapse and these
included the lack of inside information on reporting (such as company risk
information), one dominant man, the lack of business ethics and the inability of
boards to restrain the dominant power, see Rosen (2003), Drennan (2004) and Coyle
(2004). Gray (1991) identified common characteristics from the causes of company
scandals: a dominant leader, inability of non-executive and little involvement with
institutional investors. Horwood (2001) suggested the common elements of the
business failures were questionable transactions, lack of effective control, few
dominant CEOs, weak boards of directors and over optimistic financial reporting.
Cadbury (1998) attributed the governance problems to a decline in the shared values
in the City, which based on the self-interest of the membership by maintaining the
reputation of the City. The values were broken by a series of momentous changes
such as the expansion of the London's financial service sector in the 1980s. Many
new entrants to the City did not share the values of City club rules.
Drennan and Beck (2001) state that 'Cadbury Report identified the looseness of
accounting standards, the absence of a clear framework for ensuring that directors
kept under review the controls in the business, and competitive pressures on
companies and auditors, as the cause of the governance breakdown'.
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3.2.2.2. Greenbury Report
Greenbury Report was a response to the large pay rises in many executives in
privatised utilities, which were highlighted by the newspaper, pension funds, and
Labour Party (Jones and Pollitt, 2001). Greenbury Report states that large pay
increases and large gains from share options in the recently privatised utilities
industry increased the concern of public and shareholders (paragraph 1.6).
This public concern embarrassed the unpopular government (Jones and Pollitt, 2001).
The Deputy Prime Minister was concerned about the distance the government was
from the issue and hence put pressure on the CBI (Confederation of British Industry)
to look into the matter (White el al, 1994). This process explains that the Greenbury
Report was triggered by the government's realisation of the potential political fall out.
'Government reacted to the events due to political reality' (Jones and Pollitt, 2001).
3.2.3. Risk Assessment & Evaluation
3.2.3.1 Cadbury Report
Risk assessment is the quantification of the risk, and risk evaluation is the judgement
whether a risk is acceptable or not.
Cadbury Report believed that the basic system of corporate governance in Britain was
sound (paragraph 1.7). Thus, UK did not need major changes in the governance
structure, or massive government and regulatory interference in corporations. Based
on this judgement the Report want to strengthen the unitary board system and increase
its effectiveness, not to replace it (paragraph 1.8). The Report recognizes that no
system can eliminate the whole risk (paragraph 1.9), therefore they adopted
compliance with a voluntary code instead of a statutory code (paragraph 1.10). This
approach follows traditional UK self-regulatory approach. The Report documents
that statutory approach would be a greater risk of the boards complying with the letter,
rather than with the spirit of the requirement (paragraph 1.10).
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3.2.3.2 Greenbury Report
Greenbury Report also documents that most UK companies deal with Director'
remuneration in a sensible and responsible way, by showing evidence that payment to
directors in UK lies within the range of the European practice and below American
levels (paragraph 1.9). Even the report states simply the issues as 'mistakes and mis¬
judgements' (paragraph 1.11). Based on this evaluation, the Report also rejected the




Cadbury committee tried to provide reassurance to the public on financial reporting.
The primary approach by the committee is setting the principle of the balances and
checks. For this, the report recommended that at least three independent non¬
executive directors on the board split of chief executive and chairman, audit
committee reviews the internal control systems. This recommendation may prevent
one person's dominance in the board.
Also internally the report stresses the importance of risk management in the board.
Boards should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to them for
their collective decisions, to ensure that the direction and control of the company
remains firmly in their hands and as a safeguard against misjudgements and possible
illegal practices. A schedule of these matters should be given to directors on
appointment and should be kept up to date. Such schedule would include risk
management policy (paragraphs 4.23 and 4.24).
Directors should make a statement in the report and accounts on the effectiveness of
their system of internal control and the auditor should report thereon (paragraph 4.32).
An effective internal control system is an essential part of the efficient management of
a company (paragraph 5.16). The accountancy profession take the lead in developing
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criteria for assessing effectiveness and in developing guidance both for directors and
auditors to assist in reporting on internal control (paragraph 5.16).
3.2.4.2 Greenbury Report
The report stressed that Boards should set up remuneration committees of non¬
executive directors and the accountability and full disclosure of directors'
remuneration.
3.2.5. Review and Reassessing: Hampel Report (1998)
The Hampel Committee was set up to review of corporate governance practices. The
report reviews the Cadbury code and its implication, and pursues any relevant matters
arising from the Greenbury report (paragraph 1.6)
3.2.5.1 Risk Awareness
There were public debates on the importance of business prosperity and
accountability. The emphasis on accountability tends to obscure the board's
responsibility for business prosperity (paragraph 1.1). These debates brought the high
possibility of legislation on corporate governance (Lewis and Wighton, 1996).
3.2.5.2 Risk Assessment
The report states that implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Report has led to
higher standards of governance and greater awareness of their importance, (paragraph
1.8).
It had been believed that the codes have been treated as a set of prescriptive rules
(paragraph 1.12). The focus for shareholders and managers was whether the codes
had been complied with. This led to a 'box ticking' approach (paragraph 1.12).
Hampel Report called this method to guideline approach. The issue of guideline
approach is 'How far are they complied with? (paragraph 2.1).
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The Hampel Report opposed the 'box-ticking' approach by stating that there are no
universally valid answers on such points (paragraph 1.13). Instead the Report adopted
principled approaches. This approach asks 'How are they applied in practice?' in the
particular circumstances (paragraph 2.1).
3.2.5.3 Risk management
Drennan et al (2001) argue that Hampel Report highlighted the role of risk
management to board members not simply in preventing loss but rather in ensuring
the security and profitability of the firms. Kirkbride and Letza(2003) argue, though,
that 'Hampel Report was not clear on how the board was best able to deliver good
internal control and risk management'.
The board should maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard
shareholders' investment and the company assets. This covers not only financial
controls but operational and compliance controls, and risk management, since there is
potential threats to shareholder's investment in each of these areas, (paragraph 2.20)
3.3 Corporate Government Participants in Risk Managing
3.3.1 Risk managing role of the CG participants
According to Greuning and Bratanovic (2003) and Crouhy et al. (2006) the roles of
the stakeholders in managing the risk cane are defined as:
• Shareholders: Appoint fit and proper boards, management
• Boards: Ultimate responsibility for the firms and responsible for overseeing
management and holding it accountable
• Audit Committee / Internal auditors: Test compliance with board policies.
Provide assurance regarding control systems, risk management process.
• Managers: Implement board policies
• External auditor: Express opinion on financial statement
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• Regulators: Provide guidance and methods and implementation of risk
management.
3.3.2 Shareholders
3.3.2.1 Risk of Shareholders
The shareholders take a risk by investing in the company. Given the variability in
share price this may be a high risk. Diversification is a method to manage such a risk.
A portfolio of shares may reduce the overall risk but any single investment may
provide a low return. The shareholders also face the residual risk and this gives them
the control of this risk, which will be achieved through monitoring. Obviously the
stakeholder view would question this position. There is a risk of opportunistic
behaviour by management. In theory shareholders have the right to elect the boards
and to approve the board decisions, but their influence may be diffused by them
acting individually rather than collectively and so it becomes hard to exercise their
power.
3.3.2.2 Change ofUK Shareholders
Table 3.1 Ownership ofUK equities 1963-1999 (percent of total equity owned at
end-year)
1963 1975 1981 1989 1991 1992 1999
Pension funds 6.4 16.8 26.7 30.6 31.3 35.1 19.6
Insurance companies 10.0 15.9 20.5 18.6 20.8 16.7 21.6
Unit trusts 1.3 4.1 3.6 5.9 5.7 6.2 2.7
Investment trusts and others 11.3 10.5 6.8 2.7 2.3 2.5 7.0
Banks 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.0
Total financial institutions 30.3 48.0 57.9 58.5 60.3 61.0 51.9
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 20.6 19.9 20.4 15.3
Private non-financial firms 5.1 3.0 5.1 3.8 3.3 1.8 2.2
Rest ofworld 7.0 5.6 3.6 12.8 12.8 13.1 29.3
Charities etc 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 1.9 1.2
Public sectors 1.5 3.6 3.0 2.0 1.3 1.8 0.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2000.
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Over the 1960s-1990s individual equity ownership has continued to decrease in terms
of the total percentage of equity owned from 54 per cent in 1963 to 15.3 per cent in
1999.
The proportion of total equity held by institutional shareholder has increased during
the 1980s. In Table 3.1, the financial institutions consist of pension funds, insurance
companies, unit trusts, investment trusts and others, and banks. The primary increase
in institutional ownership is due to pension funds. In 1963, they owned only 6.4%, but
increased to 16.8% in 1975, and reached to more than 30% after year 1989. In 1999,
there is increased percentage in the investment from overseas. The details are shown
in Table 3.1, which illustrated the trends of globalisation and internationalisation in a
portfolio of investors.
3.3.2.3 Risk managing role ofUK Shareholders
Investors, in theory, can reduce their risk by portfolio. Therefore most investors may
not need to monitor the board. This situation is supported by Short and Keasey (1995).
They state that ' there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that institutional
shareholders do not adopt a monitoring role, preferring to sell their holdings in
problem companies rather than intervening in the management of that company'.
They gave three explanations for institution's inactive monitoring stances. First, if
they intervene publicly, it becomes bad news to the market. Second, if they are
involved in the management, they become privy to inside information and unable to
trade the shares resulting in their loss. Third, effective monitoring is costly in terms
of time and money.
Recently there are changing attitudes of the institutional investors. Cheffins (1997)
reports 'institutional investors have recently began to work more actively towards
promoting the long-term operating success of the companies. Fund managers have
become more keen to meet with company executives, to voice their dissatisfaction
with board decisions with which they disagree and to support managerial shake-ups in
underperforming companies'.
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Compared to US institutions UK institutions are more active in their monitoring, see
Black and Coffee (1994), Davies et al. (2002). The results may due to the informal
coalition of institutional investors in UK. Short and Keasey (1999) reports that UK
institutions monitor companies by expressing their views privately, taking joint action
to curb managerial excesses without public attention. Also they report that 'the nature
of the City of London means that institutional shareholders are in physical close
proximity to each other, which aids the formulation of informal coalition'.
3.3.3 Creditor
3.3.3.1 Risk of Creditors
The major creditor in a company can be classified into three types: trade creditor,
institutional lender, and other creditors. The trade creditors supply goods and service
to companies and so, provide credit to the company. The institutional lenders, mostly
banks, provide short-term lending underlining overdrafts. Other creditors are those
who have right to receive payment over a period of years, such as debentures.
A creditor faces the possibility that a corporation may breach its obligation to pay
back the principle and interest. Whilst a creditor has priority over the shareholders
when corporation defaults, if a corporation's debts exceed its assets, all creditors
cannot receive payment in full. Creditors also face the problem of high dividend
payments to shareholders, which erodes the creditors' position, and increases the risk
of default. To reduce this risk, creditors often include dividend policy restriction in
debt contract. Among the creditors, the activities of banks are regulated by
governments. Then the regulation directly affect to the lending to company.
3.3.3.2 Change ofUK Creditors
Banks in UK provide large portion of financial sources for UK industrial companies.
Table 3.2, from Clarkham (1994), shows that banks had been a major finance source
in UK. Much corporate borrowing is done on a short-term basis, using overdraft
(Cheffins, 1997).
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1979 33.4 76 12 3 9
1980 29.0 66 22 3 3 6
1981 33.2 64 17 5 4 10
1982 29.4 62 23 4 1 10
1983 33.7 76 5 6 3 10
1984 34.8 80 20 3 3 -6
1985 44.3 68 17 8 6 1
1986 47.9 57 19 11 7 6
1987 70.7 49 17 19 8 7
1988 86.2 41 36 5 7 11
1989 89.8 31 37 2 15 15
1990 66.7 37 28 4 14 17
Source: Clarkham (1994)
3.3.3.3 Risk management role ofUK Creditors
Charkham (1992) reports that UK banks do not often take much equity stakes to
secure influence or to have relationship with corporation. Table 3.3 illustrated the
bank ownership, from a report on the ownership of shares at 31st December 1999,
Office for National Statistics, (2000). Over the whole period the banks have owned
less than 1% on average. He also reports that the bank's indifference toward the role
of corporate governance in UK compared to other countries where the banks played a
much larger part in the development of industry.
Table 3.3: Bank Ownership of UK equities 1963-1999 (percent of total equity
owned at end-year)
Year 1963 1975 1981 1989 1991 1992 1999
Bank ownership 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.0
Those figure shows the stance of UK Bank that the banks consider equity stakes a
poor use of funds and unnecessary for a relationship with clients. Also the bank
wants to avoid a conflict of interest between their role as lender and their role as
shareholders. Keeping this stance, the banks reduce the risks (Charkham, 1992).
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Citron (1992) reports that UK bank use financial ratio covenants and reporting
covenants to secure the loan. Among the financial ratio covenant, interest cover and
gearing covenant are the most widely used. The reporting covenants specify the type
of financial statement and accounting techniques in the company report. With the
violation of those covenants, the banks have the right to accelerate repayment of the
loan. Therefore the covenants used to restrict companies financial policies.
3.3.4 Boards
3.3.4.1 Risk of Boards
Boards have legal authority to control and direct company. They can fire the chief
executive and other senior managers. They also have influence over the running of
the business through asking questions, putting issues on an agenda, commissioning
reports, conducting performance appraisals of the CEO, communicating via company
journals, see Hiller (1993). Lorsch and Maclver (1989) advocate the board should:
implement an annual review ofCEO based on mutually agreed goals and based on
company performance. They should also annually review of corporate strategy and
annually appraise the health of the organisation.
There is clearly a reputation risk associated with the management of a corporation. If
reputation does poorly the blame may be laid on the Board. There are also legal risks
a Board is subject to. Cheffins (1997) indicates that the directors of Insolvent
Corporation may be subject to legal restraints such as disqualification if it is proved
that the Board has engaged in wrongful trading. The Board may also put the
shareholders interest in jeopardy by borrowing since there is no restriction in UK in
law on how much fund the directors can borrow for the company (Coyle, 2004).
3.3.4.2 Changes ofUK Boards
During the 1990s, there had been changes in the composition of the board. The
detailed changes will be discussed in the analysis chapter.
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3.3.4.3. Risk management role of the Boards
The board has the responsibility of control of the management, but the control
function may be varied depend on the situation and structures. Lorsch and Maclver
(1989) report three factors that affect the board's role: their confidence in and
relationship with the CEO, the company's performance history and the complexity of
the company. Hart (1995) criticise two aspects of the boards. First, he argue that how
can the executive director monitor the boards because they are also the member of the
board. Second, he raises the possibility that non-executive director may not perform
the monitoring well for three reasons: (a) they have no incentive (b) they have little
time to deal with the company affairs (c) they may owe their position to management.
Boards have significant role of risk management in both approving risk management
policy and overseeing the risk management process. Boards have the responsibility to
identify, evaluate and control all risks related to companies. Risk management is
difficult to implement and monitor. The problems of risk management in boards are
whether the directors have the ability to assess the risk and to select the right tools.
The Company Act 1985 requires company to have at least two directors (section 282).
The duties of the director in the Act are preparing annual account (section 227) and
laying and delivering annual accounts (section 243). Coyle (2004) states the
responsibility of the board of directors as looking after the assets of their company
and protecting the value of the shareholders' investment. He also argues that the
board of directors should be responsible for ensuring all risks are managed properly.
Cadbury Report and Hampel Report also document the risk management function of
the Board. Those two reports provide the guidelines and principles of the implicit risk
management. Cadbury Report documents that boards should have a formal schedule
of risk management policies for their collective decision (paragraph 4.23), and
directors have responsibilities to maintain internal control system over the financial
management of the company (paragraph 4.31). As the title of the Cadbury Report
indicates, the report mainly deals with the financial control of the company. For this
reason, the report emphasises internal control, audit committee and internal audit.
These checks and balances are the tools of the risk management in the report. Hampel
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Report extended the risk management concepts of the Cadbury Report. In addition to




If the management is forced to leave office this will damage their reputation in the
labour markets. The management can protect their reputation by attempting to
maximise the financial performance and stock price of the corporation, but as Enron
has shown there is a need to do this in an appropriate fashion. Manipulation of
accounting practices can lead to greater legal risks.
3.3.5.2 Changes of the management
The main change of the 1990s is the separation of the chief executive office and
chairman. How the separation has proceeded will be studied in the analysis chapter.
3.3.5.3 Risk management role ofmanagement
There are several reasons for managing risk. The primary reason for managing the
risk is to reduce the costs either directly or indirectly to the corporation. Corporations
hedge the risk in order to reduce the cost of bankruptcy. By reducing volatility of the
income or expenses, the bankruptcy possibility can be reduced and therefore the
expected costs of financial distress are reduced (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that risk management can reduce the under
investment problem, which arises from conflict from between bondholders and
shareholders. Based on agency theory, the manager have already invested their
human capital in the firm, thus the agent is risk averse (Deumes, 2003). Ellstrand,
Tihanyi and Johnson (2002) argue that reducing risk can be advantage to the
management: the less risk the more their job are secure, less risk leads to more certain
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rewards. Therefore managers need risk management to secure their jobs and their
commitment to firms.
Managers are responsible for designing and implementing the risk management.
Sobel (2004) states that risk management is most effective when: The chief executive
officer is committed to the process. Other functional officers manage the risks under




Coyle (2004) raised three issues: (a) the extent to which corporate governance
practices should be regulated (b) how much should be left to regulation by the stock
market regulators (c) how much corporate governance is a matter for companies to
decide for themselves.
3.3.6.2 Development ofUK Company Act
Requirements for the formation and operation of companies are in the Companies Act.
Following UK Company Act development shows the typical prescriptive approach.
The Companies Act 1862 formalised creation and trading of the joint stock company
(Higginson, 2002). The Companies Act 1948 set out detailed financial reporting
requirements for companies (Ryan el al. 2002). The Companies Act 1985 was more
proscriptive over the powers of bodies within the company. It gave shareholder the
power to proceeding to court to prevent the company from doing something ultra
vires, section 35 (2), petition the court for the unfairly prejudicial to some or all of its
member, Section 459, the 10% of the voting shares can call an extraordinary general
meeting, Section 368 and right to remove a director from office in general meeting,
Section 303. It also proscribed the action of directors requiring them to notify the
company the number of the shares he/she hold in either the company or its parent
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company, Section 324, and the company to enter the information in a register of
directors' interests, Section 325.
3.3.6.3 Development ofUK Accounting regulations
The regulatory body is an organisation making rules and principles. There have been a
number of bodies, which have commented over time on accounting regulation:
• 1941: The Cohen Committee - to consider reform of the Company Acts
• 1942: The issue ofRecommendations on Accounting Principles by ICAEW, until
1969. The recommendation is self-regulation, which aims to improve the
quality of the reporting by professional body (Whittington, 1993)
• 1970: The Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC)
o ASSC is ' a more formal body which exposed its views to public comment by
all interested parties, including those outside the accountancy profession'
(Whittington, 1993)
o The objectives of the ASSC were damage limitation, the development of a
consensus, encourage disclosure and improve standards (Elliott and Elliott,
2005)
• 1976: The Accounting Standards Committee (ASC)
o The Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) was renamed to ASC.
o The ASC was charged with defining accounting concepts, narrowing
differences in accounting practice and formulating best practice (O'Regan,
2001)
o The ASC ceased to exist in 1990 when it was replaced by ASB
• 1988: The Dearing Committee and The Dearing Report
o The Dearing report triggered the reform for standard setting process (Huijgen
and Lubberink, 2003)
o The Dearing Committee was set up to review the standard setting process and
recommended the setting of FRC, ASB, UITF, and FRRP
• 1990: Financial Reporting Council (FRC), responsible for giving ASB guidance on
priorities and advising it on areas of public concern.
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o Accounting Standards Board (ASB), responsible for issuing mandatory
standards such as SSAP (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice) and FRS
(Financial Reporting Standards),
o Financial Reporting Review panel (FRRP), examine departure from standards
by large companies,
o Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy
o Auditing Practice Board
o Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Boards
o Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF), amend or expand on suddenly needed
standard
3.3.6.4 Risk management ofUK regulations
La Porta et al. (1998) reported that English legal regime offer the best investor
protection. In theory and legal terms, shareholders have control power over the
corporations. The mandatory takeover threshold 30% rule is a tight rule that makes
UK management less threatened by market control.
There is slightly more protection for UK managers than those in USA, according to
Seetharaman et al. (2002). In the UK, the plaintiffs must prove that manager owed
the plaintiffs, while in US the legal principle of fraud on the market gives the investor
the right to sue even when the investor had not read the financial statements. Facing
the legal cost if one loses also deters parties from suing in UK. Unlike the USA class
actions are difficult to organise in UK.
3.4 Conclusion
The 1990s was a changing period in term of corporate governance in UK. The society
became more sensitive to the risk. This made them more professionals at risk
management; therefore they initiated the Codes to assure the public. The Code, then,
influenced to the companies, especially facilitate the changes of the boards. This
study expects that these changes have impact the risk management aspect of corporate
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governance. The changes may impact on the decision processes of the company, and
then the result may appear in the company reporting.
There are several participants in risk management: shareholders, creditors, Boards,
Managements, and regulations. For the enterprise risk management, the systematic
efforts of all participants are necessary. The shareholders, especially the role of the
institutional shareholders are required recently. The bank loans restrict company
financial policy by contracts. Board and management have the role of risk
management and the roles are enforced by the Cadbury Reports.
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CHAPTER 4
OWNERSHIP, BOARD AND PERFORMANCE
4.0 Introduction
Obviously the stakeholders of a company may have different views on the risk
they face given their interests. The shareholders clearly require the managers to
protect their interest in the company, possibly both short-term and long-term.
They would generally view the role of corporate governance to ensure alignment
of the managers with the protection of the shareholders' interest. For a company
the prime risk may be avoiding bankruptcy, but also it ensuring adequate returns
on investment either through optimal action either in investment, decision-making
or capital budgeting. Those with higher incomes are less likely to default and
clearly the interest of the shareholders is being served. An alternative would be
to use a measure such as Tobin's Q, (Equity Capitalisation plus Total Liability
divided by Total Assets). Such performance measure can be used as a indicator
for risk.
After the Cadbury Report, the board structure has changed: the separation of
Chairman and Chief Executive Office, the increasing number of the outsider
directors. The debate about board-change and performance has continued since
1992 in UK. In addition to UK corporate governance codes, ownership
composition is a key determinant of governance structure and decision processes
(Dallas, 2004). Since Berle and Means (1932), the ownership is an important issue
in management studies.
This chapter reviews the interaction between ownership, board structure and
performance. The topic on ownership and performance is divided into three parts:
separation of ownership and control, managerial ownership and performance, and
institutional ownership and performance. The study on board structure and
performance are consists of two parts: board and performance, duality and
performance. The last section evaluates the performance study in corporate
governance.
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4.1 Development of Ownership models
Three separate models of ownership can be explored as illustrated in Figure 4.1:
the private model, the Berle-Means Basic Model and Revised Berle-Means Model,
see Berle and Means (1932) and Bliar (1995).
In the private model, a single individual or small number of shareholders own all
shares. Jensen and Meckling (1996) state that agency costs can be reduced
through one single owner-manager. In this case, they have control of both the
legal powers of ownership and can make use of powers, especially as they can
elect and dominate the management (Berle and Means, 1932).
Private Model Berle-Means Basic Model Revised Berle-Means Model
Figure 4.1 Three Ownership Models
The Berle-Means Basic Model represents the widely dispersed shareholdings
where there is no single dominant shareholder to exercise a strong discipline on
management. The separation of ownership and control bring about the agency
problem between shareholders and management. In the conditions of Berle-
Means model, it is difficult to expect shareholders to control the corporation. The
shareholders have to pay more in costs than the benefit they receive for
monitoring. Hence shareholders should leave it to management to take control.
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The Berle-Means Basic Model cannot be applied in every country. The model
may be regarded as rather rare in the current context.
La Porta el al. (1999) report that most large companies have a controlling
shareholder or shareholders. Frank and Mayer (1997) reported that most European
countries ownership is concentrated, for example 85% of non-financial companies
in Germany have at least one shareholder with 25% of the total share in 1990.
Also the presence of institutional investors invalidated the basic Berle and Means
analysis (Charkham, 1994).
In such circumstances the revised model may be more appropriate. If there is a
majority shareholder then they will be able to exercise their influence and hence
the control of the company will be straightforward. The large shareholders may
have an interest in active monitoring.
There is a diversity of view about the relationship between ownership structure
and performance. Mostly the studies report that ownership structure affects
corporate value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: Stulz, 1988).
4.2 Institutional ownership and performance
4.2.1 Changes in institutional ownership
In UK, the share percentage of individual shareholders has declined from 54% in
1963 to 15.3% in 1999, while the share percentage of institutional investors has
increased 30.3% in 1963 to 51.9% in 1999, see Table 4.1, from ONS (2000)
reported by Charkham (2005).
Table 4.1: Private and institution shareholders of UK equities 1963-1999
(percent of total equity owned at end-year)
Year 1963 1975 1981 1989 1991 1992 1999
Individuals 54.0 37.5 28.2 20.6 19.9 20.4 15.3
Institution 30.3 48.0 57.9 58.5 60.3 61.0 51.9
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The institutional investment in UK is higher than in USA, Van Der Elst (2000)
provides the composition of ownership in 1990 and 1998 in Table 4.2. It
highlights the differing ownership by institutional in five categories: insurance
companies, pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts and bank, as well as other
groups of owners. To provide comparison USA figures are also given.
As Faccio and Lasfer (1999) point out UK Institutional investors are the largest
category of shareholders, whilst in the US it is individual investors. There is no
legal restriction on stock ownership in UK whilst there is in US, and this extends
into the legal barriers to shareholder activisms, which is low in UK and high in
USA.
Table 4.2: Composition of USA and UK Institutional Investment.
USA UK
1990 1998 1990 1998
Banks 5.4 3.4 0.7 0.1
Insurance 5.0 6.0 20.4 23.5
Pension fund 24.2 24.0 31.6 22.1
Investment fund 7.1 16.3 7.7 10.6
sum 41.7 49.7 60.4 56.3
Individuals 50.8 41.9 20.3 16.5
Companies 2.8 1.2
Public Auth 2.0
Foreigners 7.0 7.2 12.0 24.0
Cadbury Report (1992) expects the institution's monitoring role, stating that
'Because of their collective stake, we look to the institutions in particular, with the
backing of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, to use their influence as
owners to ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the
Code' (para.6.16).
4.2.2 Characteristic of institutional shareholders
Institutional investors have been accused of short-term investment. The main
reason behind the short-term investment of institutions is the performance
evaluation of the fund managers. Cheffins(1997) states that 'institutional
shareholders tend not to vote on resolutions put forward at shareholder general
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meetings. Since the typical general meeting is carried out with fund managers or
representatives not being present, the exercise has been labelled Hamlet without
the prince'. Brickley et al. (1997) state that the greatest opposition by institution
when management-initiated anti-takeover amendments reduce shareholder value,
and reported that fund management institutions are more likely to oppose
management than bank and insurance institutions. They regarded the fund
management institutions as less subject to management influence than bank and
insurance institutions.
4.2.3 Institutional shareholders and firm performance
Short and Keasey (1997) report that the relationship between the large shareholder
and firm performance is inconclusive, but Denis and Denis (1994) found no
relationship between performance and shareholder patterns. This is partially
reinforced by McConnell and Servaes (1990) who discover that blockholders do
not have a significant effect on performance alone, but when blockholder and
director ownership is combined there are significant relationships.
McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) report that institutional shareholder is
positively related to performance measured by Tobin's Q. A high value of
Tobin's Q indicates that more value has been added or there is an expectation of
great future cash flow. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) report that institutional
ownership have a positive effect on the return on equity, but not on the return on
assets, price earning ratio and total stock return. Short and Keasey (1995) report
that institutional ownership has a positive effect on perfonnance only when there
were no other large external shareholders.
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4.3 Managerial ownership and performance
4.3.1 Introduction
It is arguable whether the holding of share by management is a motive to increase
shareholder value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that management shareholder
reduce the agency cost and increase the shareholder values. Each study has
different terms of ownership: inside ownership, see Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), managerial ownership see,
Palia and Lichtenberg (1999), Cho (1998)
4.3.2 US Studies
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that there are no cross-sectional relationship
between accounting rates of return and the concentration of shareholdings on firm
performance. Morck et al. (1988), using 371 Fortune 500 firms for the year 1980,
though, find that inside ownership has a positive effect on firm value up to 5% and
above 25% managerial share holdings, but negative between 5% and 25%
holdings. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) discover a non-linear relation between
inside share holdings and firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) report
that there is non-linear relation between inside shareholding and firm performance
in the single OLS regression, but the relation is statistically insignificant in the
simultaneous equation. Palia and Lichtenberg (1999), using 255 firms for the
period of 1982-1993, find that managerial ownership changes are positively
related to changes in productivity. Cho (1998) reported that managerial ownership
has no causal effect on corporate value, but that managers in firms with higher
Tobin's Q may tend to have higher portion of the their firms share.
4.3.3 UK Studies
Short and Keasey (1999), using UK data during 1988 to 1992, report that the
performance of firm, measured by return on equity, is positive in the 0% to
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15.58% of manager ownership, negative in the 15.58% to 41.8%, and positive
when the managers' ownership exceed 41.8%.
Faccio and Lasfer(1999), using UK data, find that managers become entrenched
when they hold more than 12% of the shares in the companies by controlling the
board. They are less likely to split the role of the CEO and the chairman, to
appoint non-executives as a chairman, to have a large proportion of non-
executives on the board and to have large boards. Davies el al. (2002), using UK
data both 1996 and 1997, report that Tobin's Q increase when the managerial
ownership level up to 7% and then decrease to up to 26%. Vafeas and Theodorou
(1998) report percentage of stock ownership by executives is unrelated to
performance.
4.4 Board Structure and Performance
4.4.1 Boards
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that effective boards have to be composed of
outside directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988, 1991) support the view of Fama
and Jensen (1983) when they suggest the main factor affecting board's
effectiveness is its independence from the CEO. Also Denis (2001) states two
conditions for an effective governance mechanism: First is narrowing gap of
interest between managers and shareholders and second is the ability to contribute
to firm performance and value. Beekes et al. (2004) require two pre conditions for
outside director to be effective as monitors. There should be sufficient incentive
to monitor performance and sufficient expertises amongst them. Board size is
related to directors' ability to monitor and control the managers. Many
researchers report the positive aspect of large number of board members. Klein
(2002b) states that larger boards increase monitoring due to the spread of work¬
load among directors.
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The Cadbury Report sparked the debate within the UK. The report states "The
country's economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Thus the
effectiveness with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines
Britain's competitive position". The remark stresses the relationship between
board effectiveness and firm performance. When boards are effective the firms in
UK may be more likely be competitive.
Cadbury Report, though, contends that board effectiveness come from the
separation of power. The report's confidence in separation of power may base on
Fama and Jensen's (1983) evidence. Implementing the recommendations of the
Cadbury Report is not compulsory, but the London Stock Exchange requires all
listed companies registered in the UK to state whether they are complying with
the code and if not to supply the reason for any areas of non-compliance.
4.4.2 Board and firm performance
A study of the relationship between board and performance has to take a view
about the likely effect of the independence of the board of directors. For example,
one could assume that the board becomes more independent and hence more
effective in monitoring as the number of the outside directors increases. The
empirical evidence on the monitoring role of the board is inconclusive.
4.4.2.1 US Studies
Yermack (1996) finds negative relationship between board's size and three
financial ratios; sales over assets, return on assets, and return on sales, using data
from 1984-1991 for 452 large public corporation. Dalton et al. (1998) find that
the board composition has no effect on performance. Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) find a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and
Tobin's Q, using 385 samples firms in 1983-1987 year data. They regard the
fraction of outsides on the boards as an internal decision, so they expect the
composition of board to maximise firm value. This result was a 'puzzle' for them.
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Their explanation of this result is that more outsiders on the board reduce firm
performance since they are added to boards for political reasons not to enhance
performance.
Bhagat and Black (2001) report a negative relationship between the proportion of
independent directors and performance, using 928 large US public companies for
1988-1990 and 1991-1993. Even they state that 'there are hints that greater board
independence may impair firm performance'.
4.4.2.2 UK Studies
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), using regression analysis with 250 UK quoted firms
for the fiscal year 1994, find that both the percentage of non-executive directors and
percentage of independent non-executive are not significantly related to
performance. Also percentage of stock ownership by executives is unrelated to
performance. In simultaneous equation analysis, there is a negative relationship
between the percentage of non-executive directors and director ownership. They
used MB (equity capitalisation +total liabilities, all divided by total assets) and
ROA (return on assets) as performance measures.
Laing and Weir (1999), using 115 UK quoted firms (excluding financial
companies) for the fiscal year 1992 and 1995, found that firms with fewer than 50
percent non-executive directors perform better than firms with more than 50
percent non-executive directors both year in 1992 and 1995. They are discovered
that firms with at least three non-executive directors do not perform better than
those with less than three in 1995 data. Their research concludes that the
governance structures based on Cadbury Report have not brought better
performance. Laing and Weir (1999) suggested several reasons for the
unsatisfactory results.
Weir and Laing (2000)'s study, using 200 non-financial, fully quoted UK
companies for the fiscal year of 1992 and 1995, report that the result of Return On
Assets (ROA) indicates that finns with separation do not perform better than firms
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with duality. Firms with at least three non-executive directors have negative
relation in 1992 (statistically not significant), negative and significant in 1995,
being measured with ROA.. Also increasing the number of non-executive has a
negative impact on performance. The research shows that the results depend on
performance measure. Accounting performance is negatively related to outside
director representation, while market return is positively related to variable. Weir
and Laing (2000) state that economic cycle may have impact on the performance
rather the structure of governance mechanism. They suggest further research
topic, pointing three issues; time lag between changing the governance structure
and seeing an effect on corporate performance, characteristics of board and its
commitment and processes of corporate governance.
Weir, Laing and McKnight's (2002) OLS regression, using 200 UK quoted firms
(excluding financial companies) for the fiscal year 1994 and 1996, show that the
proportion of non-executive directors has an insignificant effect on performance,
but the independence of non-executive directors is positive and significant at 5 %
level. Their results using logistic regression indicate that a weak relation between
the internal governance relationship and performance. The conclusion of this
section is that previous research, whether UK or USA, indicates empirically that
there is little relationship between performance and board structure. There may be
a number of conflicting effects arising within specific firms which cloud the over¬
all effect. It argues almost for individual studies of firm performance, which
might be too specific to be generally rewarding.
4.4.3 Duality and Performance
Duality means the CEO of the firms has two roles simultaneously: CEO and chair¬
person. When studying the relationship with performance a summary would be
that for USA data Pi and Timme (1993) show positive relationship, Baliga, Moyer
and Rao (1996) no significant effect, Brickly, Coles and Jarrell (1997) mixed
outcome and Dalton et al. (1998) a positive effect. So again the results are not
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very conclusive. For UK again slightly different results dependent on year of
study Weir and Laing (1999) find no harm but not any improvement, and Weir
and Laing (2000) finds effect not significant
4.4.3.1 US Studies
Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) explore three different aspect, announcement,
impact on returns and difference in duality, using 181 industrial firms over the
period 1986 to 1991. The announcement of changes in managerial structure from
duality to non-duality seems insignificant based on 37 firms. There were no
significant differences in cumulative average excess returns over 2 day, 5 day, 10
day and 60 day of announcement effects. There is no evidence of significant
changes in the return of equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), operating cash
flows to sales (OCF/Sales), and operating cash flows to assets ratios (OCF/TA),
measured as ratio value 2 years after change in the duality status. There is no
difference in performance between firms with non-duality and firms with duality
measured by MVE over the 1986- 1991 periods. In conclusion, duality changes
have no impact on performance.
Pi and Timme (1993) state positive relationship between non-duality and
performance. Using a yearly average of 112 US banks, they document that the
ROA for the duality group is 18 basis points less than the ROA for the non-duality
group. They also argue that the duality group shows 73 basis points less in cost
efficient than the non-duality group.
Brickly, Coles and Jarrell (1997) study broadly the leadership structures in boards,
using 628 firms for 1988 and 1989-1991. In 1988 data, firms with duality show
higher in return on capital than firms with separated positions. In 1989-1991 data,
both firms are the same return in capital. For stock return, though, firms with
separation position have higher in stock return than firms with duality.
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4.4.3.2 UK Studies
Laing and Weir (1999), using 115 UK quoted firms (excluding financial
companies) for the fiscal year 1992 and 1995, compared the mean difference
using Mann Whitney test due to non-normal distribution of return on assets across
the governance variables. Firms with duality show higher ROA than firms with
non-duality in 1992. By 1995 firms without duality were performing better. Both
cases have no significant difference in statistically. Firms moving from duality to
non-duality performed worse, while changing non-executive firms show a little
better performance. The differences are not significant
Weir and Laing (2000), using: 200 non-financial, fully quoted UK companies for
the fiscal year of 1992 and 1995, documents the result that firms with separation
do not perform better than firms with duality. In OLS regression, firms with
duality show negative coefficients both 1992 and 1995.
Heracleous (2001) summarized the possible explanation of failing to support best
practice in corporate governance through performance. First possibility is that
best practices in corporate governance have no relevance to performance (Johnson,
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). The second possibility is the assumption of board
vigilance is not valid. Usually proportion or numbers of outside directors are used
as a proxy for board vigilance. Heracleous (2001) argue that other factors such as
personality and a sense of duty is more important to measure board vigilance,
though, might be more difficult to measure these aspects. The third possibility is
that performance was affected by many other factors, which may obscure the
effects due to the board attribute. If there is an effect it is swamped by other
effects. For example Roberts et al. (2005) argue that actual board effectiveness
depend on the dynamics of a board, and the interaction between executive and
non-executives. The fourth possibility is that different organisation requires
different board characteristics. This indicates that the general adoption of
Cadbury Report is not appropriate for all firms.
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4.5. Conclusion
The studies report that there are diversity results on ownership-performance
relationships. No relationship or inconclusive results are reported when used large
shareholders and blockholder shareholders (Short and Keasey, 1997); Holderness
and Sheehan, 1988; Murali and Welch, 1989; Denis and Denis, 1994).
A positive relationship between institutional shareholder and performance is
reported (McConnell and Servaes, 1990 & 1995; Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991;
Short and Keasey, 1995). Also many researchers report non-linear relationship
between managerial ownership and performance (Morck et al., 1988; Hermalin
and Weisbach, 1991, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999;
Short and Keasey ,1999; Faccio and Lasfer, 1999).
Most studies on boards and performance in UK seek to explore the relationship
between duality and performance or outside executive director and performance.
The results of the studies are inconsistent. Researchers need to understand better
the board dynamics. There exists other important influence on performance, or it
may be that other elements obscure the relationship between performance and
either duality or independence, some may even contradict the relationship.
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CHAPTER 5
RISK MODELS AND RISK STUDIES
5.0 Introduction
To explore further firm risk there is a need for appropriate measures of risk and this
Chapter will consider the range of possible measures that can be used to assess risk.
There are several models that can be used to assess the risk of a corporation.
One way of assessing how the risky of a corporation is to assess how close it is to
bankruptcy and hence a number of models exist for the assessing the likelihood of
bankruptcy. Aziz and Dar (2004) suggested three categories of model; Statistical,
Artificial Intelligence and Theoretical models. The Statistical model are, according to
Aziz and Dar (2004), Univariate Analysis, Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Linear
Probability Models, Logistic Models, Probit Models, Cumulative Sums procedures
and Partial Adjustment Process. Artificially Intelligent Models comprise: Expert
System Models, Recursively Partitioned Decision Trees, Case-based Reasoning
model, Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms, Rough Set Models. The Theoretical
Models are more eclectic and include Balance Sheet Decomposition Measures,
Gambler's Ruin theory, Cash management theory, Credit Risk Theories (Merton
model, KMV model).
Aziz and Dar (2004) report that 64% of previous studies used statistical models, 25%
of them used Artificially Intelligent Models and 11% of them used Theoretical models.
Among the statistical models used 77% used MDA model or Logit model. They also
report the accuracy rate of the models: Credit model (Merton type models) 91%,
MDA 86% and Logit (including logistic) 87%. It, therefore, seems natural to
concentrate discussion on the more common models MDA, Logit Analysis, and
Credit Model.
The main division is between models based on accounting measures and financial
statements and those based on share-price. Typical of the former are approaches such
as linear discriminant models, logistic analysis and expert systems and neural
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networks. Typical of the latter are Capital Asset Pricing Models, CAPM, and models
based on option theory developed by Merton (1974). Besides describing the model
the Chapter will assess the effectiveness of the model and evaluate the use of the
models in the study of risk.
5.1 Models with Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
5.1.1 Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA)
MDA is a method that examines whether a set of variables (Xi....Xn) is capable of
distinguishing between the two groups. Usually MDA is actually Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA). The LDA searches for a linear combination of the discriminating
variables in such a way that two groups are maximally distinguished, t is the
discriminant function defined as t = kiXi + k2X2 + ... + kpXp, where k; is a coefficient
chosen to maximise the discrimination. It can also be described as
T-T = *,(*,-Xx) + k2(X2-X2) + ... + kp(Xp-Xp)
Altman (1968) states the advantages of the MDA are that it can consider a broad
range of common characteristics, which may be relevant firm distress, as well as the
interaction of these characteristics. MDA reduce the analyst's space dimension, from
the number of different independent variables to G-l, where G equals the number of
original a priori groups.
Ohlson (1980) criticised the MDA. He suggests that it imposed distributional
restrictions on the underlying populations (usually the normal distribution), though,
the approach is reasonable robust. It assumes also the same variance-covariance
matrices for the population, but it can be generalised to Quadratic Discriminant
Analysis (QDA) to overcome this problem. (QDA is often found to have poor
discriminating powers than LDA). The output of the MDA model is t, a score, which
Ohlson (1980) suggests has little intuitive interpretation. There are concerns over the
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matching procedures, which have been used in MDA. This model has formed the
basis ofmany models Altman Models (1968, 1977) and Taffler (1983, 1984). These
will now be discussed.
5.1.2 Altman Model (1968)
5.1.2.1 Z-score Model (1968)
Altman (1968) used 66 manufacturing corporations with 33 bankruptcy firms and 33
non-bankruptcy firms, data between 1946 and 1965. The paired samples are chosen
on a stratified basis; by industry and by size. The non-bankruptcy firms are the firms,
which were still in existence at the time of the analysis. Data were from the same
year as those compiled for the bankruptcy. Among initial 22 variables (ratios) five
were selected as the highest predictive power ratios. The variables are classified into
five categories: liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency and activity. The Z-model
is shown in following equation. Altman (2003) states that the following model does
not contain a constant term due to the particular software utilized. Therefore the
relevant cut-off score between the two groups is not zero.
Z= .012 X, + ,014X2+.033 X3+ 0.006 X4 + .999 X5 (Equation 5.1.1)
where variables are defined as follows:
• Xi is working capital / total assets; working capital is the difference between
current assets and current liabilities. A firms with consistent operation losses
have shrinking current assets in relation to total assets.
• X2 is retained earnings / total assets; this ratio reflects the age of a firm. The
younger the firm's age, the more likely the firm fail.
• X3 is earning before interest and taxes /total assets; It is a measure of the true
productivity of the firm's assets. This ratio is justified by its earning power of
its assets.
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• X4 is market value equity / book value of total liabilities; The measure show
how much the firm's assets can decline in value before the liabilities exceed
the assets and the firms become insolvent.
• X5 is sales / total assets; This measure management's capability in dealing
with competitive condition
The following Table 5.1, taken from Altman (1968), show the relative contribution of
each variable to the total discriminating power of the function. The scaled vectors
indicate the degree of contribution. X3 (earning before interest and taxes /total assets)
contributes the most and X5 (sales / total assets) is next to X3.
Table 5.1: Discriminating Power of the Variables






Altman (1968) performed six tests to establish the best model. The initial test shows
95% accuracy in classification. The second test is used two year prior to bankruptcy.
It shows reduction in the accuracy (83%). The third test is for the check the potential
bias and validation techniques. Using five different subset of the original sample, the
percentage of the correct classification is calculated (93.5%). The fourth test
introduced new 24 bankruptcy sample. The results show higher classification
accuracy (96%). The fifth test used manufactory firms with losses in 1958 or 1961;
the result shows high type II errors. The final test is for long-range predictive
accuracy. The results show the accuracy of prediction decrease with 3 year prior to
bankruptcy. Details are given in Table 5.2
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Table 5.2: Altman's results using Z-score
Sample Error Number Percent Percent n
Correct correct Error
(1) Initial sample Type I 31 94 6 33
Type II 32 97 3 33
Total 63 95 5 66
(2) Two year prior to Type I 23 72 28 32
bankruptcy Type II 31 94 6 33
Total 54 83 17 65
(3) Potential Bias and Average 93.5 34
Validation
Techniques
(4) New 25 bankrupt firms Type I 24 96 4 25
(5) Manufacturing firm with Type II 52 79 21 66
losses in 1958, or 1961
(6) Long-range predictive 1st 31 94 33
accuracy 2nd 23 72 32
3rd 14 48 29
4th 8 29 28
5th 9 36 25
Altman generalize that all firms with Z scores greater than 2.99 belong to the non-
bankrupt group, while firms with Z score less than 1.81 went bankrupt. Therefore the
cut-off point has more information than that of actual Z-score itself (Agarwal and
Taffler, 2003). Altman (2003) performed three subsequent tests with data from 1969-
1975, 1976-1995, and 1997-1999. Table 5.3 shows an accuracy level of between 82%
and 94%, but Altman documents that the Type II error has increased by as much as
20% of all the firms.
Table 5.3: Altman's results for z-score over 1969 to 1999
1969-1975 1976-1995 1997-1999
Year prior to Distressed bankruptcy bankruptcy
failure
1 82% 85% 94%
2 68% 75% 74%
* Using 2.67 as cut-off score
Altman (2003) compares the Z-Score with the bond rating from 1995-1999. His
findings are presented in Table 5.4.
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Tabic 5.4: Comparison of Z-Score with bond rating
Average annual
number of Firms
Average -Z-Score Standard Deviation
AAA 66 6.20 2.06
AA 194 4.73 2.36
A 519 3.74 2.29
BBB 530 2.81 1.48
BB 538 2.38 1.85
B 390 1.80 1.91
CCC 10 0.33 1.16
5.1.2.2 ZETA Model (1977)
Using the same approach Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) presented a new
model which included other variables to enhancement the discriminating power. The
list of variables used was:
• Xi is EBIT / total assets
• X2 is a normalized measure of the standard error of estimate around a 5 to
10 year trend of earnings
• X3 is EBIT / total interest payment
• X4 is Retained Earnings / total assets
• X5 is Current assets / Current Liabilities
• Xe is Five year average of total market value / total capital
• X7 is Total assets
5.1.3 Taffler's model (1983, 1984)
MDA is the most widely used failure prediction techniques in UK. Taffler used the
approach in two papers Taffler (1983, 1984). The list of variables in the 1984 model
1984 was:
• Xi is profit before tax / current liabilities
• X2 is current assets / total liabilities
• X3 is current liabilities /total assets
• X4 is No-credit interval in days
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5.2. Models with Logit analysis
5.2.1 Logit Analysis
The logit model weighs the financial ratios, and creates a score, and the score can be
transformed to probability.
pi =
i + e-Lfr,)' (Equation 5.2.1)
where, P; is probability of failure for firm i, a is the intercept, (3 is slope, X are the
explanatory variables
Ohlson (1984) claims that Logit avoids all the problems in MDA and there is no
assumption needed regarding prior probabilities ofbankruptcy.
5.2.2 Ohlson Model (1980)
Ohlson (1980) established three models using conditional logit analysis. The three
models are estimated based on 105 bankrupt firms and 2,058 non-bankrupt firms
using the data between 1970 and 1976. The variables selected are based on the most
frequently mentioned in the literature, consisting of nine variables, which were:
• Xi (Size) is log (total assets / GNP price level index)
• X2 (TLTA) is Total liabilities / total assets
• X3 (WCTA) is working capital / total assets
• X4 (CLCA) is Current liabilities /current assets
• X5 (NITA) is Net income / total assets
• Xe (FUTL) is Funds provided by operations / total liabilities
• X7 (INTTWO) is (l=if net income was negative for the last two years, 0=
otherwise)
• X$ (OENEG) is (1= if total liabilities > total assets, 0= otherwise )
• X9 (CHIN) is (Net Income t - Net Income t-i)/(|Net Income t| + | Net Income t-i|)
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Three sets of estimates were computed for the logit model; Model 1 predicts
bankruptcy within one year, Model 2 predicts bankruptcy within two year and Model
3 predicts bankruptcy within one or two year. The estimates of the coefficient he
obtained are given in Table 5.5
Table 5.5: Estimates of the Coefficient for the Three Models.
Model 1 SIZE TLTA WCTA CLCA NITA FUTL INTWO OENEG CHIN CONST
estimates -.407 6.03 -1.43 .0757 -2.37 -1.83 0.285 -1.72 -.521 -1.32
t-statistics -3.78 6.61 -1.89 .761 -1.85 -2.36 0.812 -2.45 -2.21 -.97
Model 2
estimates -0.52 4.76 -1.71 -.297 -2.74 -2.18 -0.78 -1.98 0.421 1.84
t-statistics -5.34 5.46 -1.74 -.733 -1.80 -2.73 -1.92 -2.42 2.10 1.38
Model 3
estimates -.478 5.29 -0.99 0.62 -4.62 -2.25 -0.521 -1.91 0.212 1.13
t-statistics -6.23 7.72 -1.74 0.738 -3.60 -3.42 -1.73 -3.11 1.30 1.15
The overall measure of the models performance is given in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Overall measures of model performance
Likelihood Ratio Index Percent Correctly Predicted Cut-ff point
Model 1 0.8388 96.12 0.5
Model 2 0.7970 95.55 0.5
Model 3 0.719 92.84 0.5
5.3. Merton-type model
Black, Scholes, and Merton provided a general framework for valuing contingent
claims.
5.3.1. Option model
The important paper on option pricing was Black-Scholes (1973). It provided a
method based on Ito calculation. Black-Scholes (1973) arranged following a
differential equation and boundary condition from the stock-option hedging position;
2 2
W2 = rw - rxwi~ 14 v x wn
w(x, t*) = x-c, x ^ c
= 0, x < c
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They calculated value of call option
W(x, t) = x N(d[) - ce'tt",*)N(d2) (Equation 5.3.1)
d






w(x, t) is the value of option, x is stock price, c is exercise price, t* is the maturity
cumulative normal density function
5.3.2 Merton (1974) Model of risky debt
The work of Black-Scholes on option pricing led Merton (1974) to suggest a model
for assessing the risk of bankruptcy on the basis of share price for list corporations.
Merton (1974) provides the ground to value the debt based on the company's asset
value and volatility.
The Merton model assumes that equity of a levered firm is a European call option on
the value of the assets of the firms. The strike price of the call option is equal to the
face value of the firm liabilities. At time T, maturity time, the lenders are paid the
promised amount and the shareholders receive the residuals if the value of the firm
assets exceeds what the firm owes its creditors at debt maturity. If the asset value is
less than the promised payment the firm will default on the debt.
Merton (1974) draw the equation for the market value of risky debt, F(r )
2date of the option, v is the variance rate of the return on the stock, N(d) is the
F(t) = Beix [(1 / d)N(hx) + N(h2)] (Equation 5.3.2.1)
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t is the length of time remaining to loan maturity; that is, r =T-t, where T is the
maturity date, and t is current time, d is the firm's leverage ration measured as
Be~IT /A, where the market value of debt is valued, N(h) is a value computed from the
2 / 2standardized normal distribution. hi= -[lA c r - In (d)]/ ovr h2= -[/i a r + In (d)]/
oJt , where a2 is the asset risk of the borrower.
Merton (1974) also writes the equation 5.3.2.1 in terms of a yield spread equation
5.3.3.2.
k (r ) - i = (-1/t )ln [N(h2) + (l/d)N(ln)j (Equation 5.3.2.2)
where k( r ) is the required yield on risky debt, In is natural logarithm, i is the risk-
free rate on debt of equivalent maturity
5.3.3 KMV Model
KMV model focuses on measuring default risk. The model was developed by KMV
Corporation which utilized Merton's model (Bharath and Shumway, 2004). The
market value of equity (Ve) can be represent by the value of call option that use assets
value (Va) as underlying asset and liability (X) as striking price.
VE = VAN(d1)-Xe-rTN(d2) (Equation 5.3.3.1)
d, =
lnM-) + (r + 0.5^)7-
-A
CTa^T
, d2- di -aAVr




Ve is the current market value of firm's equity, di is ln( / > + (r + 0-5or , d2= di
a
-cA ■v/r , Va is the firm's assets value, X is the book value of the debt at time t, that
has maturity equal to T, r is risk-free rate of interest, aA is the volatility of assets value,
the standard deviation of asset return, N is the cumulative density function of the
standard normal distribution
Ve, Oe can be observed but VA, oA are not directly observable and must be inferred.
To infer VA and oA, KMV solved it by using the relationship between the observable
Ve and the unobservable cA.. The equation 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2 are solved
simultaneously by successive iteration.
Then the distance to default (DD) is calculated. In the option model, the default
occurs when assets value is below the liabilities, but KMV observed that default does
not always occur at this point.
DD is an ordinal measure of the company's default risk (Kealhofer, 2003). The DD
express the unit of asset return standard deviation at the time ofmaturity.
inQ)Hp-0
DD j= (Equation 5.3.3.3)<Ja^T
KMV derived the Expected Default Frequencies based on historical database. The
Empirical EDF is as follow. KMV update EDF score frequently for more than 20, 000
firms (Saunders, 1999)
Number of firms that defaulted within a year
Empirical EDF =■— — (Equation 5.3.3.4)
Total population of firms
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5.3.4 Hillegeist et al (2004) Model
Hillegeist et al (2004) show the default probability using lognormal distribution of
assets value. They estimate VA and aA by solving equation 5.3.4.1 and 5.3.4.2
simultaneously using SAS program. Also the expected market returns on assets, u,
based on the actual return on assets during the previous year.
VE = VAe"8TN(di) - Xe~rTN(d2) + (1- e"8T )VA (Equation 5.3.4.1)
ln&)+(r-* +0.5(Ty




They provide the default probabilities by using lognormal asset value distribution.
The probability that VA(T) < X is as followers:
\n(VA/X) + (u-S-(a]/2))T, nrr>, „ , /r, . , „ „N( — — -j=————) = BSM-Yrob (Equation 5.3.4.3)cjaJT
u is the expected market return on assets based on the actual return on assets. They set
the limitation of the u(t) are set to follows:
U(t) = max VA (t) + Dividends -VA(t-1)
^(>-1) 'r (Equation 5.3.4.4)
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5.4. Evaluation of risk studies
5.4.1 Accounting models
5.4.1.1 Most Accounting model use dichotomy method.
Most studies use dichotomy method, dividing corporation into failure and non-failure
corporations. Astebro and Winter (2003) argue that using multinomial models is a
better predictor since it uses more information. Also the dichotomy method results
in linear in explanation of the default, but the actual default is nonlinear
(Saunders, 1999).
5.4.1.2 No theory in accounting models
The accounting models, using statistical and artificial intelligent methods, currently
employed do not attempt to provide a theory of failure (Keasey and Watson, 1991,
Charitou et al, 2004). Rather the researchers choose the variables based on popularity
and predictive success in previous studies, and they summarize information in the
financial statement to decide whether the information is fit to distinguish failed
company from non-failed company. It might be plausible to build models, which do
have a theoretical base using accounting information.
5.4.1.3 Data changes
Begley et al. (1996) document that the researches using Altman (1968) and Ohlson
(1980) as indicators of financial distress may face measurement error. Most
researchers use the original models with current data, which raises several concerns.
They indicate the data and circumstance changes that took place in the 1980s. The
first is an increasing acceptance of relatively high corporate debt levels. The second
is the changes in the bankruptcy laws in the late 1970s, which may have encouraged
firms use bankruptcy as strategy. Astebro and Winter (2002) report that they found
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that 3-digit industry average liquidity varied between 2.95 and 4.56 during the periods
of 1980-1993.
5.4.1.4 Common factors
One common factor in the following set ofmodels is an earning variable see Table 5.7.
High earnings are believed to indicate for a lower risk of bankruptcy.





X! = working capital / total assets
X2 = retained earnings / total assets
X3 = earning before interest and taxes /total assets
X4 = market value equity / book value of total liabilities











Xi = profit before tax / current liabilities
X2 = current assets / total liabilities
X3 = current liabilities /total assets











Xi = EBIT / total assets
X2 = A normalized measure of the standard error of
estimate around a 5 to 10 year trend of earnings
X3 = EBIT / total interest payment
X4 = Retained Earnings / total assets
X5 = Current assets / Current Liabilities
X6 = Five year average of total market value / total capital








X|= Size = log (total assets / GNP price level index)
X2= Total liabilities / total assets
X3= working capital / total assets
X4= Current liabilities /current assets
X5= Net income / total assets
X6= Funds provided by operations / total liabilities
X7= ( l=if net income was negative for the last two years,
0= otherwise)
X8= ( 1= if total liabilities > total assets, 0= otherwise )
X9= (Net Income t - Net Income ,.]) /
















Xi= Net income to total assets
X2= Total liabilities to total assets




X[= Net income to total assets
X2= Total liabilities to total assets
X3= Relative size to NYSE/AMEX market
XL|= Excess return




There is an argument that use of only financial statement information is insufficient to
be able to predict corporation failure. Zavgren(1985) states that 'any economic model
containing only financial statement information will not predict with certainty the
failure or non-failure of a firm'. A question arises whether failure can be generally
modelled or whether it is particular to the corporation under study. Also the financial
information is reported at discrete interval (e.g., quarterly), there are of difficulty to
identify rapidly deteriorating companies (Saunders, 1999).
5.4.2 Merton type Models
5.4.2.1 Comparison between Merton model and KMV model
The accuracy of the model depends on how realistic its assumptions are. Merton
(1974) model makes a set of assumptions to derive the value of the debt; constant
interest rates, drivers of default by the value of the company assets which evolves as a
lognormal process, a single debt issues, one period, short-sales of the all assets. The
assumptions of the Merton model may lead to loss of ability to predict default: The
tail of the assets value distribution below total debt, the non-normality of assets return
distribution, the simple assumption of the capital structure may not provide the actual
probability of the default (Crouhy et al. 2000). And most companies cannot sell short
all or part of the assets to hedge debt; therefore the assumption of the short sales is
less plausible. Further the Merton model assumes constant interest rate, while interest
rate volatility is a factor that determines the probability of default. Furthermore, the
Merton Model does not take into consideration of the correlation between the value of
the company assets and interest rates. Finally, the single period assumption has its
limit on the reflection of the reality; most financial have multi-period contracts.
The KMV model has relieved the assumption ofMerton model (Kealhofer, 2003): In
addition to equity, the company has preferred stock, warrants, convertible debts, and
convertible preferred stock. The debt may be short term, or long term. Default is a
company-wide event, not obligation-specific events. Contrary to Merton model, the
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KMV predict the default rate mapping DD (distance to default) to the actual
probabilities of defaults, which based on historical information of a large sample
firms. The using of actual data increases the accuracy of the default rate. Kealhofer
(2003) confirms that researches using the Merton model have poor results in
measuring the value of corporate debt, while researches based on the KMV model
have excellent results for the measure of default risk.
5.4.2.3 Comparing Merton-type models with other models
Models providing causation information is more useful than models providing
relationship information in determine the effect of the decision makers. Kealhofer
(2003) argues that accounting model only measure the correlation, not the causation.
In this sense, the Merton model is more useful to determine the effect of financial
decisions, such as dividend, maturity of debt, adding leverage. Van Deventer and
Outram (2002) also state the superiority of Merton type model over other models.
Merton type models are more precise in default probabilities than ordinal credit
ranking, the probability of default by Merton models can be calculated more
frequently than accounting models, and the the Merton type models can be produced
in less cost. Hillegeist et al. (2004) compared the information content of bankruptcy
probability among Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Black-Scholes-Merton models.
They show that the Merton type model provide more information about the
bankruptcy probability than do the accounting models. Based on the previous research,
Merton-type models, even with its limitation, provide more information and
theoretical basis on default risk. Also the Merton-type model can increase the
accuracy by adapting more realistic assumption, using term structure interest rate.
5.4.3 Risk Study limitation
Studies of corporation distress risk have many common aspects. They often use long
time frames to investigate corporations. They tend to divide the firm years into
deciles based on the relative level of distress of the corporations. Dichev (1998) finds
that higher risk firms earn significantly lower return than average returns since 1980,
using Ohlson model (1980) and Altman model (1968) as proxy of the likelihood of
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financial distress, and subsequent realized returns as proxy for systematic risk,
calculating the proxies using data from 1981 to 1995. Griffin and Lemmon (2002)
use Ohlson model as a proxy for financial distress, and test the relationships between
book-to-market equity, distress risk, and stock returns. They find that among firms
with the highest risk (classified by O-score quintile), the difference in returns between
high and low BE/ME securities is more than twice as large as the return in other
groups. In this study, O-score is calculated using accounting values for the periods of
1965 to 1996.
Hanna (1995) uses O-score to test the effect of financial distress on cash flow and
accruals. Using 1984 to 1988 data and coefficient from original Ohlson model, Hana
calculated O-score and classified 10 groups based on the level of risk. Jeffrey (2004)
measures distress risk combining Z-score, O-score and Merton model together and
makes risk index using data from 1989 to 2001.
5.5 Conclusion
Based on Aziz and Dar (2004) report, MDA model, Logistic model and Merton model
are studied. The first MDA model is Altman's Z-score model (1968). Later Altman
revised Z-score model into Zeta model (1977). In UK, Taffler developed the MDA
model with UK data. Ohlson used logistic regression to develop Ohlson model
(1980). CAPM approach provided the general concept of risk-return relationship by
the systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Merton model are utilised option theory to
measure the distance to default.
So far, there is no single measure of firm risk. Each measure has its limitation. The
limitation may from the modelling process or variable compositions. Most
accounting default model use dichotomy method, this lead to error to predict of failure.
Also the accounting data are vulnerable to income related variables. Most models
have several income related variables. Many efforts in developing default model have
been based on accounting data and market data. The accounting data, however, is
historic fact and the market data are the expectation ofmarket. The basic information
difference may lead to different result in the default estimation.
93
CHAPTER 6
REPORTING QUALITY AND CONSERVATISM
6.0 Introduction
The International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) states that the objective of
financial statement is to provide information about the financial position, performance
and capability of an enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making
economic decisions (IASC, 1989). Financial accounting information is the product of
corporate accounting and external reporting systems (Bushman and Smith, 2003).
There are two aspects of information utilisation: supply side and demand side. The
supplier of information should consider the relevance and reliability of the
information. Relevance and reliability are two major qualities that distinguish better
information from inferior information. For information to be relevant, information
should have predictive or feedback value, and timeliness in reporting. For
information to be reliable, it should be faithful in representation, neutral and verifiable.
Bushman and Smith (2003) states that corporate governance structures are a
mechanism to ensure that minority shareholders receive reliable information. On the
demand side, data is useful information when users can understand and utilise the data.
The users have to understand how the data have changed in different time periods.
With the level of interpreting ability, the data can be risk factor or risk management
tools. In this sense, information risk in accounting data depend on users and time.
Therefore it is important for investors and regulators to have the ability to assess the
quality of the report and whether it is free from manipulation. For this they should
consider several factors including who supplies the information, what are the
information trends, and how to identify the information risk in financial reports. In
this term, the identification of the conservative trend in accounting reporting is of
important. Conservatism is requiring a higher verification for recording revenues than
recording expenses. Therefore company recognize loss quickly and earnings slowly.
Conservatism increases the quality of reporting by the requirement of a higher degree
of verification for gains than for losses. Also the conservative accounting can induce
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risk information in value evaluation and risk modelling. Careful consideration is
required for the earning related studies.
This chapter discusses the issue of reporting quality and accounting conservatism. It
will explore the measure available and the implication for the study. The Chapter will
discuss reporting and accounting information and the linking to Corporate
Governance (CG) and financial information. It will investigate the role of reporting,
reporting in the CG codes, and changes of accounting regulations. Measuring
reporting quality leads naturally to the concept of accruals, and hence accrual models
(Jones model and Modified Jones model), and studies on reporting quality. An aspect
of the reporting is accounting conservatism. It is therefore important for later work in
this thesis to explore the sources and types of conservatism, and its measure of
conservatism. Measurement of conservatism can be either accrual based or market
based. The previous researches on conservatism will also be discussed.
6.1 Reporting Quality and Conservatism
6.1.1 Reporting Quality
The role of the quality financial reporting has been studied in various perspectives.
Arrow (1972) states that truth-telling is a public good: lying may produce individual
gain but, if prevalent, it raises the cost of information-gathering for all. Higson
(2003) argue that the financial statement is communication process of corporate
performance and risk to the world outside. In the corporate governance context, the
financial statements are a method that directors report the performance and situations
of the companies. The connection point between corporate governance and reporting
is monitoring and controls. Shareholders can monitor and control boards through the
outside financial reporting. Also Boards monitors and control managers through
inside financial and managerial reports.
Quality financial accounting information aids investors in identifying and evaluating
investment opportunities with less error (Bushman and Smith, 2003). With lower
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estimation risk the firm can reduce the cost of capitals, contributing to performance.
Botosan (1997) reports that higher the quality disclosure, lower the cost of equity.
Further Sengupta (1998) documents that higher the quality disclosure, lower the cost
of debts.
Also, the governance roles of the accounting information enhance economic
performance by providing honest information (Bushman and Smith, 2003). The
verifiable information allows the director to enhance shareholder values by
monitoring the managers and providing optimal rewards to managers. Boards of
directors have a primary responsibility ofmonitoring the firm's reporting.
Financial accounting systems reduce adverse selection and liquidity risk. Bushman
and Smith (2003) state that firms' timely disclosure of financial accounting
information reduces investors' risk of loss, this reporting policy attracts more funds
into the firm. It is argued that high quality report is assurance method for the
investors.
Bushee and Noe (2000) report that the investors invest more in firms with high
reporting quality and add to their holdings with increasing report quality. Beasley
(1996) reports the lower incidence of financial fraud with the relative higher
percentage of outside directors in a board. Using a matched sample of 75 firms with
fraud and 75 fraud-free firms during 1980- 1991, they find that the outside directors
improve board effectiveness in monitoring. Sharma (2004) reports that as the
percentage of the independent directors increase the possibility of fraud decreases.
He used a sample containing 78 firms with fraud and 75 fraud-free firms during 1988-
2000. Peasnell et al. (2000) documents less income increasing earning management
in firms with a higher proportion of outside directors.
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6.1.2 Accounting conservatism
6.1.2.1 Definition of the Conservatism
There is no consensus definition on conservatism as the following selection of
definitions will testify:
• FASB Statement of Concept No.2 (1982) defines 'Conservatism is a prudent
reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in
business situations are adequately considered'.
• Smith and Skousen (1987) 'when there is a genuine doubt concerning which
of the two or more reporting alternative should be selected, the alternative
with the least favourable effects upon owners' equity should be chosen'.
• Basu (1997) 'Conservatism that requiring a higher verification for recording
revenues than recording expenses'.
• Watts (2003) 'Differential verifiability required for recognition of profits
versus losses'.
• Feltham and Ohlson (1996) 'conservatism as an asymptotic difference
between book and market value'.
• Beaver and Ryan (2002) 'The understatement of the book value of net assets
relative to the market value ofnet assets'.
6.1.2.2 Sources of the Conservatism
A conservative valuation arises by the combination of the historical cost convention,
the choices of income-deferring method and estimates within the framework of
historical cost, and the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. The following
Table 6.1 provides guidance on sources of conservatism and relationship to financial
reporting and discretion available to management and is based on Givoly et al (2003).
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Table 6.1: Sources of conservatism
Conservatism sources Financial reporting Extent of Discretion available to
management
Failure to capture the positive
present value of project and
subsequent increase in value
The historical cost convention No discretion
Minimisation of the carrying
value of net assets in places
Choices of income-deferring
methods and estimates within







Promter recognition of losses Asymmetric treatment ofgains
and losses: LCM verses no
recognition of unrealised gains
Discretion in the timing and amount
of implementing LCM
(Adopted from Givoly et al, 2003)
6.1.2.3 Role of the Conservatism
Bushman et al (2005) state conservative financial reporting reduces agency cost by
providing loss recognition information to the shareholders. Watte (2002) explains
four main reason of conservatism: contracting, shareholder litigation, regulations, and
taxes. Conservatism constrains managers' tendency to make opportunistic payments
to themselves by limiting dividend and compensation payouts based on conservative
earnings. Also conservatism reduces the possibility of litigation because shareholders
are much more to litigate when earnings are overstated than they are understated. The
regulators set more conservative regulations to enforce conservative reporting.
Further conservatism reduce the present value of taxes the firms have incentives to
defer the income.
Ahmed et al (2002) report that accounting conservatism reduces the bondholder-
shareholder conflicts over the dividend policy, and reduce debt costs. Using
regression analysis it is possible to explore the relationship within conservative.
Firms with greater operating uncertainty (measured by the standard deviation of
ROA: STDROA) are more conservative. Firms with greater conflict (Dividend,
Leverage) appear to adopt more conservative accounting. Table 6.2 indicates the
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nature of the relationships discovered. It can also be established that firms with more
conservative accounting have more favourable debt ratings, indicating lower debt
costs.
Table 6.2: Relations with Conservatism
Market based measure of
conservatism




1993-1998 1987-1992 1993-1998 1987-1992
STDROA + + + +
Dividends + + + +
Leverage +
On the other hand, Hendriksen and Van Breda (1992) argue that conservatism is a
very poor method of treating the existence of uncertainty in valuation and income, and
the inconsistent reporting will distort accounting data. This inconsistent data
processing is the risk of financial data handling in the value evaluation or risk
modelling.
6.1.2.4 The Pervasiveness ofConservatism
Recent researches show the pervasive of accounting conservatism in USA and UK.
Givoly and Hayn (2000) report US accounting conservatism has increased since 1950.
Using US data for the periods of 1950 to 1998, they identify the pervasive
conservatism in the sample periods. They used four measures for investigate
conservatism; (a) The level and rate of accumulation over time of negative non-
operating accruals shows non-operating accruals accumulates steadily over the sample
periods and the accumulation is more pervasive in the more recent years, (b)
Measures based on the earning-return associations show earning reflect bad news
more quickly than good news and the response time to bad news are more pronounced
in recent years, (c) The skewness of the earnings distribution relative to the cash flows
distribution and the variability of earnings relative to cash flows result earnings have
increasingly dispersed over the periods and the accounting accruals contributed the
increasing volatility of earnings, (d) The market-to-book ratio show U shaped pattern:
before 1974, the ratio is decreasing, but increasing after 1974.
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Huijgen and Lubberink (2003) studied the conservatism difference between firms
with cross-listing in UK and USA and firms listed in UK. The cross-listed firms show
more conservative in earning reporting than non-USA listed firms: to avoid litigation
in the USA. UK firms that cross-listed in the USA since 1993 shows higher level of
conservatism than firms that cross-listed before 1993: to establish credibility by way
of conservative accounting. Pope and Walker (1999) test the degree of conservatism
between USA and UK. USA shows higher degree of conservatism by measured
earning before extraordinary, while UK shows higher by measured earning after
extraordinary.
6.1.2.5 Conservatism and CG
Beekes et al (2004), extending Basu (1997) model, and using UK data from 1993 to
1995 explored issues surrounding conservatism. They discovered that the sensitivity
of earnings to bad news is greater than that of the good news and firms with above the
median level of non-executives on the board have more sensitivity to bad news than
firms with lower outsider representation. Firms with external block-holders are more
sensitive to bad news when there are more non-executive directors on the board.
Firms with more outside directors are more sensitive to bad news where managerial
ownership is below 5%, the results are not significant above 5%.
Lara, et al (2005) assesses the association between conservatism and corporate
governance, using UK 1623 firms for the period of 1992-2003. They found that firms
with strong governance had more conservative accounting than weak governance
firms in terms of earning sensitivity to bad news. They also showed that firms with
strong governance firms have more conservative accounting than those with weak
governance in terms of discretionary accruals.
LaFond (2005) studied the relationship between closely held ownership and
conservatism, using 16 countries. LaFond's first study was to investigate influence of
the ownership on conservatism within 5 countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan
and UK. It was found that Australian firms show the largest coefficient, following
UK, French German and Japan by measuring sensitivity to bad news. In the
ownership study, he found that the more closely held ownership, the less conservative
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earning in France, Germany, and Japan. But there is no consistent pattern in UK. In
the second study LaFond investigated the influence of the ownership on conservatism
within three legal regimes: English, French and German. The result is that the greater
closely held ownership, less conservative earning in all regimes.
Moreira and Pope (2004) tested the relationship between earning management and
conservatism, using US data for the period 1976-1994, with graphical and probit
analysis. In Graphical analysis the distribution of deflated earning level shows that
the discontinuities at zero are higher for the Bad news distribution. In Probit analysis,
bad news firms have a higher degree of earning management, avoiding small earning
losses and reporting small profits, than good news firms.
Jain and Rezaee (2004) investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on
accounting conservatism, using data from the period of 2001-2003 with 3546 firms.
They find different results depend on different measures. They finds no difference
when they used BTM (Book to Market value), Income increasing Abnormal accruals,
and Income decreasing Abnormal accruals, but they did find a difference when they
used Total accruals, Abnormal accruals, and Earning-return measures.
In a study based on US, Protiviti (2002) reports the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002 will
induce more conservative financial reporting by companies. Watts (2003) also states
that 'the government regulation of financial reporting, dating from the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934, actually contributes to conservatism'.
6.2. Measuring reporting quality based on accruals
6.2.1 Accruals
Based on the revenue recognition principle, accrued revenues occur when revenues
earned but not yet received in cash, such as credit sales. For revenue recognition,
following two conditions have to meet at the same time: (1) revenue is recognized
when it is realized or realizable and (2) it is earned (SFAC No.5, 1984). Kieso and
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Weygandt (1998) state the details for the terms in the revenue recognition principles
are needed.
"Revenues are realized when goods and services are exchanged for cash
or claims to cash, such as receivables. Revenues are realizable when
assets received in exchange are readily convertible to known amounts of
cash or claims to cash. Revenues are earned when the entity has
substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitles to the benefits
represented by the revenues".
The matching principle indicates that the costs should be related to the achievement of
reported revenues. Thus expense recognition is tied to revenue recognition. Also for
those costs for which is difficult match with revenue, a rational and systematic
allocation policy is used that will approximate the matching principle. Accrued
expenses are occurred when expenses incurred but not yet paid.
Component of accruals
Current accruals affect financial reporting within two accounting periods. Thus
current accruals adjust operating cash flows that occur one year before or one year
after the accruals is recorded. Table 6.3 defines the characteristics of the components
of accounting associated with accurals.
Table 6.3: Characteristic of Accounting Components
Component Characteristics
Account receivable A sale on credit, which increase revenues. Net account
receivable represents management's expectation of future
collections
Inventory There are several measurement methods based on the different
assumptions. Inventory also utilised by subjective write-down
(Richardson et al. 2005)
Account payable Richardson et al.(2005) regard account payable as high degree




Debt in current liabilities is excluded from operating accruals
due to it is related to financial transactions
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Non-current accruals mitigate timing and matching problems that are of longer
duration. Two types of non-current accruals are identified. One type reflects timing
differences between earnings and cash flow from operation for more than two
accounting period, such as long-term warranty provisions. The other is a permanent
difference, such as depreciation.
Reliability of accruals
Researches have studied the reliability of the information about accruals. Richardson
et al (2004) presents the following assessment of the reliability of accruals, see Table
6.4.
Table 6.4: The reliability of accruals
Accruals Reliability Summary of reasoning
Receivable Low Estimation of uncollectible are required
A common earning management tools
Inventory Low Various cost flow assumption
Subjective write-down
Payable High financial obligation with a high degree of reliability
PP&E Low Involve in subjective amortisation and write down
Intangible Low Involve in subjective amortisation and write down
Long-term
Payable
High Measured with high degree of reliability
Post retirement
benefit
Low Involve many subjective estimates
6.2.2 Approaches to calculate accruals
Balance Sheet approach
Each researcher use different definition in calculating the accruals. Since Healy
(1985) many researchers used the definition of total accruals as the change in
nonworking capital less total depreciation expense.
TA= (A Current Assets - A Cash) - (A Current Liability - A Current maturity of
Long-term debt - A income tax payable) - Depreciation & Amortisation
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Cash-flow statement approach
But the above definition of accruals omits non-operating accruals; loss and bad debt
provisions, restructuring chares, the effect of changes in estimates, gains or losses on
the sale of assets, assets write downs, the accrual and capitalisation of expenses, and
the deferral of revenues (Richardson et al. 2005, Givoly and Hayn 2000). Givoly and
Hayn (2000) calculated total accruals from cash flow statement;
TA = Net income - cash flow from operation (CFO)
Further they calculated non-operating accruals;
NOA= Total accrual before depreciation -Working capital accruals,
where total accrual before depreciation = NI + depreciation - CFO
Reconciling the two approach
The major difference between Givoly and Hayn (2000) and other are the recognition
of non-operating accruals. Following Table 6.5 shows how the two approaches use
the accounting counts and how two approaches reconcile each other. Table 6.5
illustrates 3 year consecutive financial statement including Balance Sheet, Income
Statement and Cash Flow. Two approaches of calculating accruals are displayed. The
BS approach uses the accounting items from Balance Sheet such as Accounting
Receivable (AR), Inventory, Prepaid Expense, Account Payable, while the CF
approach uses items from Income Statement and Cash Flow.
In BS approach, the current assets accruals (CAA) are calculated from changes of
current assets deducting changes of cash. Also the current liability accruals (CLA) are
calculated from changes of current liabilities deducting both changes of short-term
debts and changes of tax payable. Working capital accruals (WCA) is CAA minus
CLA. In CF Approach, the total accruals are Net Income minus Cash flow from
Operation. To calculate the non-operating accruals (NOA) total accrual before
depreciation (TABD) is introduced. Then the NOA is calculated from TABD
deducting working capital accruals. In the bottom line of the Table 6.5, negative NOA
is calculated in the third year of the report. Givoly and Hayn (2000) used the NOA as
the sign of conservatism.
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Approaches
Financial Statement and Accruals
1st term 2nd term 3rd term
Balance Sheet
Cash 49,000 37,000 54,000
AR 36,000 26,000 68,000
Inventories 54,000
Prepaid expense 6,000 4,000
Land 70,000 45,000
Building 200,000 200,000
Accum dep (11000) (21000)
Equipment 68,000 193,000
Accum dep (10000) (28000)
AP 5,000 40,000 33,000
Bond payable 150,000 110,000
Equity 60,000 60,000 220,000
Retained Earning 20,000 136,000 206,000
Income statement
Revenue 125,000 492,000 890,000
COGS 465,000
Operating expense 85,000 269,000 188,000
dep - 21,000 33,000
loss on equip sale 2,000
Interest exp 12,000
Income tax 6,000 68,000 65,000
Net income 34,000 134,000 125,000
Cash flow statement
Nl 34.000 134,000 125,000
Dep(Eqipment) 21,000 33,000
AAR (36,000) 10,000 (42,000)
Ainv - (54,000)
APrepaid expense (6,000) 2,000
AAP 5,000 35,000 (7,000)
Loss on sale of equip - 2,000
Cash from operation 3,000 194,000 59,000
BS Approach


















CAA=ACA- ACssh 36,000 (4,000) 94,000
CLA=ACL-ASTD-ATP 5,000 35,000 (7,000)
WCA=(ACA- ACssh) - (ACL-ASTD-ATP) 31,000 (39,000) 101,000
Depreciation Accruals - 21,000 33,000
Non operationg accruals 2,000
BS Approach
TA(1)= WCA- Dep 31,000 (60,000) 68,000





TABD=NI+DEP-CFO 31,000 (39,000) 99,000
WCA=(ACA- ACssh) - (ACL-ASTD-ATP) 31,000 (39,000) 101,000
NOA=TABD-WCA (2,000)
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6.2.3 Reporting quality Models
Accruals can be divided into discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals.
The non-discretionary accruals are considered the normal portion of the real
transactions. In accounting manipulation studies, discretionary accruals are used to
measure the degree of manipulation. The discretionary accruals can be separated from
the total accruals by several models.
6.2.3.1 Jones Model (1991)
Jones (1991) gets discretionary accruals from total accruals less an estimate of its
nondiscretionary component. The nondiscretionary components are projected from
total accruals onto sales and property, plant, and equipment. Jones (1991) assumes
that non-discretionary accruals (NDA) depend on the change in revenues (AREV) and
the level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE), both of which reflect the firm's
economic environment. Also Jones assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary.
The coefficient for AREVit is expected to be positive or negative depending on
working capital accruals. If a given change in revenue causes income-increasing
change, such as increasing in account receivable, the sign of the AREVlt coefficeient
is positive. If the revenue change causes income-decreasing change, such as
decreasing in account receivable, the sign can be negative. The expected sign for PPE
is negative because high fixed assets are expected to lead to high depreciation, which
related to an income decreasing accruals.
The nondiscretionary accrual in Jones Model is:
NDA/Ait-,=a j [ 1 /Ait. i ] + a2[AREVit/Ait.i] + a3[PPEit/Ait.,]
Estimates of (Xi, a2; and a3 are generated using following model.
TA jt/A jt_ i=a i [ 1 /A jt_ i ] + a2[AREVit/Ajt.i] + a3[PPEjt/Ajt-i] + Sit
The prediction error, Sjt, represents the level of discretionary accruals.
£it = TAit/Ain - ( a,[l/Ait.i] + a2i [AREVit/Ait.i] + a3i [PPEit/Ai,.i])
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where TA lt is total accruals in year t for firm i, A,,.j is total assets in year t-1 for firm i,
AREVtis revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i, PPE;;tis gross property,
plant and equipment in year t-1 for firm i and Sjt is error term in year t-1 for firm i.
6.2.3.2 The Modified Jones Model (1995)
Dechow et al. (1995) assume that all changes in credit sales result from earning
management. Thus, the model deducted change of receivable from change of revenue.
Compare to Jones' model (1991), therefore, the portion of discretionary accruals
increases. Estimates of cq, 012, and a3 are obtained from the original Jones Model, not
from the modified model.
NDA, =a,[l/Ait-i] + a2i [(AREVit-ARECit) /Ait.,] + a3i [PPEit/Ait.,]
where TA jt is total accruals in year t for firm i, Ajt_i is total assets in year t-1 for firm i,
AREV tis revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i, ARECifis change in
account receivables, PPE;jt is gross property, plant and equipment in year t-1 for firm i
and Sit is error term in year t-1 for firm i.
6.2.3.3 Critics of accruals based model
Gomez, Okumura and Kunimura(2000) state that the Jones model assigns most of the
total accruals to the discretionary accruals. Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995)
suggest that the variables used are not be free of earning management and that the
simultaneity problem may affect the estimated coefficient and standard error. They
suggest that the study did not control for unmanaged accruals related to cost of goods
sold and other expense
Sloan (1996) argues that firms with extreme accruals have lower persistence of
accruals and earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest that firms with large
accrual estimation errors have low quality of earnings. Accrual-based model may
perform well for firms that have a range of moderate to large accruals (Dichev and
Tang, 2005)
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6.3. Measuring Accounting Conservatism
6.3.1 Accumulated accruals
Givoly and Hayn's (2000) definition of conservatism is that' it is a selection criterion
between accounting principles that leads to the minimisation of cumulative reported
earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset
valuation, and higher liability valuation'. They also state that a consistent
predominance of negative accruals over a long period is an indication of conservatism.
Givoly and Hayn (2000) measure conservatism by the level and rate of accumulation
over time of negative non-operating accruals. The non-operational accruals are the
total accrual (TABD) minus operational accruals.
Non Operating accruals = TABD - Operational Accruals
TABD= Net Income + Depreciation - Cash from operation;
Operational Accruals = working capital accruals = AAR + A Inventories + A
prepaid Expenses - A Account payable - A Tax payables
The non-operating accruals consist of loss and bad debt provisions, restructuring
charges, gains or losses on the sale of assets, the effect of changes in estimates, assets
write-downs, the accruals and capitalisation of expenses, and the deferral of revenues.
These accruals are somewhat discretionary in nature (Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan,
(2003). They state that conservative accounting leads to accumulated negative
accruals. Qiang (2003) suggests using cumulative earning discretion as conservatism
measure. In his study, debt ownership, litigation costs, auditor liability, corporate
governance, and political costs are associated with conservatism.
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6.3.2 Variability and Skewness of earnings
Basu (1997) documents that conservatism results in the lower persistence of earnings,
mean higher volatility, in bad news periods relative to good news periods. In his
regression analysis, bad news earnings changes have a greater tendency to reverse in
the next period than good news earnings periods. This results show that bad news
reduces current earnings through write-off expected loss immediately, but good news
spread over earnings over several periods. Givoly and Hayn (2000) measure
conservatism by variability of earnings. The more the accounting is conservative, the
more variability of earning. They document that accruals variance contribute to an
increased in earnings variability. They also reveal that the variance of non-operating
accruals is the greatest contributor to the increasing in earning variability. Dichev and
Tang (2005) use earning volatility by the standard deviation of the deflated earnings
for the most recent five years, where earnings are deflated using average assets.
Minton, Schrand. and Walthe (2000) use volatility as the coefficient of variation of
the twenty observations within each time period. The coefficient of variation is
calculated by the standard deviation of cash flow (or earnings) divided by the mean of
the absolute value of the same variable
Conservatism recognises loss immediately, and delays earnings, resulting in a
negatively skewed earning distribution. Givoly and Hayn (2000) measure
conservatism by the skewness of earnings. The more conservative the accounting is,
the more negatively skewness of earning distribution is.
6.3.3 Book to market (BTM) ratio
A BTM ratio is used as a measure of conservatism by several researchers (Beaver,
Givoly and Hayn 2000, and Ryan 2000, Ahmed et al, 2002). BTM ratio shows the
extent to which book value is lower than market value. A ratio less than one indicate
conservative accounting.
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Beaver and Ryan (2000) argue a function of two components in the variation of book-
to-market ratio. The two components are biased accounting recognition, which
represent conservatism, and lagged accounting recognition, which reflects market
shocks not yet recognised in book value. Ahmed et al. (2002) estimated using the
fixed-effect model of pooling analysis. They measure conservatism based on the
firm-specific coefficient, a;, in the following model:
BTMjt = a + a; + at + Z (3^ RETit-k + ejt,
where BTMlt is the book-to-market ratio for firm i at fiscal year-end t, a is the
intercept across all firms and years, a; is the persistent firm-specific bias component of
book-to-market ratio over the sample period is at is the year-specific component of
book-to-market ratio across all firms; and RET^k is the stock return (with dividends)
for firm i in year t.
6.3.4 Earning and return model
Basu's (1997) measure of conservatism relied on the assumption that conservative
accounting recognizes bad news in a timelier manner than good news. In his terms,
'conservatism results in earnings being timelier and more sensitive concurrently to
publicly available bad news than good news'. In this case, earning is predicted to be
more strongly associated with negative stock returns, as a proxy for bad news. The
primary measure of conservatism is derived as the coefficient Pi in the regression:
Xit/Pit-i = ao + ai DRit + PoRit + PiRit DRit,
where Xjt is the earning per share for the firm i in the fiscal year t, Pjt.i is the price per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year, Rjt is the return on firm i from 9 months
before fiscal year-end t to the three months after fiscal year end t, DRjt is a dummy
variables; =1 if Rn <0, =0 otherwise.
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Basu (1997) measures conservatism by the slope coefficient and R2 from a regression
of annual earnings on annual unexpected return. The slope coefficient Pi measures
the incremental response of earnings to bad news over the response to good news.
The more the firms are conservative in accounting, the higher the slope coefficient
and R due to unrealized losses are more likely to be recognized immediately under
conservative accounting than unrealised gains.
There are limitations to the method suggested by Basu. Using stock price movement
to proxy for unbiased financial information has the difficulty that stock prices reflect a
series of issues and hence the information will be beset by the problem of noise. It
does not account for other sources of information on bad news for example earnings
also contains measurement error for bad news firms see Pae et al (2004). Hence
Basu's model does not provide a comprehensive measure of conservatism (Givoly et
al. 2003). The timeliness of the measurement will also have an impact on the R
according to Pae et al (2004). They also point out that the measurement error in the
regressors will inflate the error (ejt), and hence reduce the R .
6.3.5 Limitation of the models
Several researches document different results from the range of models. Givoly el al.
(2003) reported negative relationship among different measure for conservatism.
They used Market to Book of operating assets, Conservatism due to present value
investment, Conservatism due to accounting rules, and Conservatism as measured by
Hidden Reserves. Pope and Walker (2002) also reported negative relationship among
different timing measure and the market-to-book ratio. Pae el al (2004) reports that
Earning conservatism increase as market-book ratio declines. Beaver and Ryan




This chapter dealt with reporting quality and conservative reporting. Reporting is the
communication tools between management and shareholders. Therefore reporting
quality is of interest in corporate governance perspective. The governance system
enforces the reporting quality. Another issue is conservative reporting. Conservative
reporting is pervasive in USA and UK. The measures for reporting quality and
conservatism have been explored. Accrual and stock information are used, but there
are limitations in measuring of these qualities.
Data can only become information when users can understand and utilise the data.
Users should consider several factors including who supplies the information, what






The previous Chapters have provided the review of the literature on corporate
governance, risk and conservatism. This Chapter will describe the approach taken
to explore the issues of corporate governance, risk and conservatism. This
chapter will provide the methodological base to the analysis employed. It
includes discussions of how theories are generated and tested. The research
methods are the actual techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data
related to the research questions of the thesis.
The Chapter will start by discussing the philosophical approach taken in the study,
a Positivistic Approach. It will then describe the sampling approach and the
collection of the data. It will consider the performance measures. It then will
describe the research design for the particular studies Board, Ownership,
Reporting Quality and Conservatism, and finally for the Risk Models.
7.1 Positive Approach
Positivism is the mainstream of study in finance and accounting. Positive theories
are based on empirical data, and concerned with explanation and prediction (Ryan
et al., 2002). The tradition of positivism goes back to Aristotle's empiricism,
which argues that knowledge is gathered by observation and categorization (Ryan
el at., 2002). This tradition is linked to logical positivism, founded in Vienna in
the 1920s (Blaikie, 1993).
Positivism holds ontology of an ordered universe made up of atomistic, discrete
and observable events (Blaikie, 1993). The order can be represented by constant
conjunctions or being ontology (Letza and Sun, 2002). Under this assumption,
reality is enduring and permanent, exist independent of our perception, belief and
biases (Letza and Sun, 2002). In this context, corporation is a ready-made
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institution and enduring social reality. Under logical positivism, knowledge can be
derived from sensory experience such as experimental or comparative analysis
(Blaikie, 1993). There are a number of criticisms of the approach. In ontology
terms, the reality is changing and movement and the flux of things are the
fundamental aspect of reality. In epistemology terms, the difference is between
theoretical words and observable world. In these terms, there are problems of
correspondence between the world and the words. Letza and Sun (2002) suggest
the process is meaningful in understanding of social phenomena of corporate
governance.
7.2 Data Sampling and Collection
7.2.1 Sampling
The sample comprises manufacturing firms listed and de-listed in UK stock
market, which are covered on OSIRIS database. The sample selection procedure
and its effects on sample size are summarized in table 7.1. Initially 436 firms for
16-year period, 1988-2001, are retrieved from OSIRIS database. Non-financial
data was collected by hand as it is not available in machine-readable form. Each
relevant data based on 436 firms are collected for the period of the 1989-2000.
The firms broken down by SIC code are presented in Table 7.1, giving the
number, which were listed and de-listed. See Appendix 1 for the more detail of the
sample.
TABLE 7-1: Sample by SIC and list and de-listed
SIC List Delist Total
20 Food and kindred products 43 23 66
28 Chemicals and allied products 74 42 116
35 Industry, commercial machinery computer equip. 43 30 73
36 Electric and Electronics 64 29 93
37 Transportation equipment 23 18 41
38 Measurement instrument, photos 33 14 47
Total 280 156 436
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7.2.2 Data for Board Structure
Governance data were taken from the Corporate Register, which includes
coverage of all UK fully quoted companies. The Register provides information on
duality, board size, board structure, etc. The Registers were provided by different
consulting firms based in different periods: 1989-1991 (The Hambro corporate
register), 1991 (The Corporate register), 1992-1994 (The Arther Anderson
corporate register), 1995- 2000 (The Price Waterhouse corporate register).
A firm was classified as having a duality structure in a year if the CEO and
Chairman of the Board was the same individual. Separation firms were those
where the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board were held by separate
individuals.
7.2.3 Data for Tenure
To investigate the impact of corporate governance changes and ownership
changes, the tenure data were collected from the Corporate Register. The
Corporate Register provides the starting date of the director in the board, and the
director is still a member of the board, the tenure can be calculated. The tenures
for Chairman, CEO and Financial director were calculated.
7.2.4 Data for Ownership
Ownership data consists of institutional ownership and board ownership.
Ownership data were collected from the Corporate Register and Crawford's
Directory of City connections.
The Corporate Register provides the large shareholder information which contains
directors and institutional investors. Each year data are collected manually from
1990 to 2000. The institutional ownership is divided into two parts: Big 3
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Institutional Investors and Big 1 Institutional Investors. The Big 3 institutional
investors are the largest three institutional investors in each company. The Big 1
institutional investor is the largest investor in each company.
Crawford's Directory of City connections is an annual business directory that
contains major UK companies and their professional advisers. The directory also
provide the board ownership information, which represented by BFA (Board,
family and associates). BFA indicates percents of the voting share interest held by
member of board, their families and associates. For each year data are also
collected manually.
7.2.5 Data for Performance and Risk measurement
For the performance measure, Net income and Tobin's Q is used. Net income is
the bottom line of the Income/Loss statement. Tobin's Q is defined as market
capitalisation plus total debt divided by total assets. For the calculation of Tobin's
Q, OSIRIS database for financial data and London Business School (LBS) for
market capitalisation data are used. To avoid the influence of extreme
observations, the top and bottom 1 percent of earnings and Tobin's Q were
removed, following Dichev and Tang (2005), Thomas and Zhang, (2000) and
Guay et al. (1996).
For the risk measure, Z-Score and Firm Specific Risk are used. Z-Score data are
obtained from OSIRIS data base. Higher score indicate healthier company. For
measure firm specific risk, Risk Measurement Service (RMS) data are used. RMS
is operated by London Business School (LBS). RMS is a quarterly updating
service, based on monthly observations extending back over five years. RMS
calculate beta using five years of monthly returns (RMS, 2001). Unlike to
Rosenberg Associates' estimates ofU.S. betas, which calculate beta based on both
stock prices and fundamental data, RMS beta are calculated only from past share
prices. RMS measures firm specific risk as a percentage return per year. The
higher the figure, the greater the specific risk.
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7.3 The issues of Performance and Risk measures
7.3.1 Introduction
The measures of performance and risk are mainly divided into two divisions;
accounting measure and stock market measure. Some measures include both the
accounting and stock price information. An understanding of the measure is
necessary to evaluate the results.
7.3.2 Accounting information and Market Information
7.3.2.1 Accounting information
Accounting information is the results of accounting processes based on Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles. Accounting profit is based on backwards
exploration and is constrained by standards set by profession (Demsetz and
Villalonga, 2001). Also the accountings measures are based on measures which
are subject to managerial manipulation.
7.3.2.2 Market information
It is arguable that to what extent the stock market is informative. An efficient
share market is the place that shares are correctly prices. That means stock prices
instantly and fully reflect all available information.
Fama (1970) defines three types of efficiency: weak-form efficiency, semi-strong
form efficiency and strong-form efficiency. Weak-form efficiency exists when
prices fully reflect all information contained in the past share price. In this case,
no investors can earn excess returns by using historical information. Semi-strong
efficiency exists when share price reflect all publicly available infonnation. In this
case, no investors can earn excess returns by using publicly available infonnation.
Strong-form efficiency exists when share prices fully reflect all knowable
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information including that, which is not publicly available. No investors can earn
excess returns by using publicly available.
Pike and Neale (1993) document that before the 1987 stock market crash; both the
USA and UK stock market shows the semi-strong form of efficiency. Copeland et
al. (2005) documents that most evidence supports the weak and semi-strong form
of capital market efficiency.
Yet there have been several reports that suggests the weak efficient market
hypothesis, Size effect and Timing effect. Dimson and Marsh (1986), in UK,
report that smaller firms show better performance than large firms. French (1980)
report the negative return on Monday. Also several researchers reported year-end




Reported earnings are the sum of cash flows from operations and accruals. The
perspective of performance measure considers accruals as a better indicator for
future cash flow than cash flow alone. Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB) expresses the view that accrual accounting provides a better indication of
firm's ability to generating cash flows than cash basis accounting does (FASB,
1978).
Many researchers report that earning is a better measure of performance than cash
flow. Dechow (1994) reports that earnings are more associated with stock return
than realized cash flow, and also argue that earnings are more informative than
cash flow because cash flows have timing and matching problems. The
perspective of improving earning quality insists that accruals record real economic
118
transaction arising from the timing and matching principles. Thus accruals smooth
temporary component of cash flow, this can lead improving earnings quality.
Accruals can be regarded as an opportunistic tool for management. Accruals can
hide poor performance or postpone a good portion of current earnings to future.
The following studies focus on the opportunistic use of accruals. Healy (1985)
reports that managers may choose income-decreasing accruals to enhance future
earnings. Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2001) see high discretionary
accruals as a sign of low quality earnings. Also they find that firms with high
annual discretionary accruals have lower excess equity returns over one to three
year holding periods. The perspective ofmisleading earning quality considers the
strong negative correlation between cash flows and accruals as earning
management activity. Therefore this view sees the smoothing as manager's
opportunistic activity to manipulate the earnings. Wysocki (2005) finds that a
stronger negative correlation between cash flows and accruals (i.e. smoothing)
leads to lower earnings quality. If a strong negative correlation between cash
flows and accruals improve earnings quality, then it should be negatively related
to the three earnings quality measures.
7.3.2.2 Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q is defined as following;
Equity Capitalization + Total Liabilities
Tobin's Q=
Total Assets
Tobin's Q is a proxy for how closely shareholder and manager interest have been
aligned. Tobin's Q is a measure of the real value created by management. The
higher the value of Tobin's Q the more effective the governance mechanisms is
and the better the market's perception of the company's performance. A high
value of Tobin's Q indicates that more value has been added or there is an
expectation of great future cash flow. Values of Tobin's Q above one indicate
that the market perceives the firm's internal organization as effective in leveraging
the company's assets; while a Tobin's Q below one shows that the market expects
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high agency costs. The stock market measure reflects investor expectation
between market value and firm value. This may not lead to a good proxy for
performance.
7.3.4 Risk Measures
7.3.4.1 Accounting risk measures
There is an argument that use of only financial statement information is
insufficient to be able to predict corporation failure. Zavgren(1985) states that
'any economic model containing only financial statement information will not
predict with certainty the failure or non-failure of a firm'. A question arises
whether failure can be generally modelled or whether it is particular to the
corporation under study. Also the financial information is reported at discrete
interval (e.g., quarterly), there are of difficulties in identifying rapidly
deteriorating companies (Saunders, 1999).
7.3.4.2 Stock prices measure
Sharpe (1964) separates the total risk of securities into two components:
systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk ((3) measures the degree of
co-movement between the asset's return and the return on the market portfolio.
Therefore systematic refers to the variability in return due to the impact of macro
economy, such as fiscal changes, exchange rate changes and interest rate changes.
Unsystematic risk (or firm specific risk) refers to the variability in return due to
factors unique to the individual firms, such as management ability and R&D
achievement.
Capital Asset Pricing Model defines the expected return on risks as following
equations (Pike and Neale, 1993);
E(Rj) = Rf + (3i E(Rm - Rf)
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where, Rj is the return on assets i, Rf is risk free rate, Rm is the return on the
market portfolio.
The coefficient can be estimated with the following regression equation:
E(Rj) - Rf = a; + Pi E(Rm- Rf) + Gj
where a; is a constant, Gj is an error term. From this equation, following
relationship can be drawn:
Oj2 = Pi2am? + oc2 = systematic risk + unsystematic risk
Hamada (1969), who connected Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory to CAPM
model, demonstrated the equity beta of a firm is related with asset and debts.
Pg=Pu.[l+(VB/Vs)(l-T)]
where, pg is geared beta, pu is ungeared beta, VB is the market value of debt, Vs is
the value of shareholder's stake in the company.
Empirical studies on CAPM reveal that the model is not perfectly valid. Fama and
French (1992) report that correct relationship disappeared over the period 1963-
1990. They argue that average stock return is more related to company size
measured by market capitalisation and book value to market value.
There are contradictory reports on the relationship between default risk and
systematic risk. Denis and Denis (1995) state that bankruptcy risk is positively
relate to systematic risk. Shumway (1996) finds that the risk of default is
systematic, in the NYSE and AMEX firms. However, Opler and Titman (1994)
state that bankruptcy is unrelated to systematic risk. Asquith, Gertner, and
Sharfstein (1994) find that bankruptcy is unrelated to systematic risk.
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7.4 Research Design for Board Study
7.4.1 Methodology issues
7.4.1.1 Difficulty on board studies
The major problem in board study is the difficult of observation of board
practices. In this case board working can only be surmised based on public
information. Zald (1969) expresses the difficulty of board study: the decision
process cannot be watched, the member are busy so they seldom provide a chance
to talk, but he still states that 'the study is possible, and pieces of evidence can be
brought to bear'. Leighton and Thain (1997) state the board of directors is a black
box. There has been a range of approaches to studies of the board and its
behaviour. These include database surveys, questionnaire surveys, interview
surveys and boardroom observation. Each of these has advantages and
disadvantages which will be discussed, see Table 7.2
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7.4.1.2 Endogeniety verse Exogeneity
This issue deals with are whether the internal governance mechanism is
exogenous or endogenous. If board composition is endogenous, every board will
have its optimum composition when the board composition affects performance.
Then there is no relationship between board composition and performance, see
Demsetz and Lehn(1985), Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002). During the 1990s,
the UK had changed dramatically the board composition and duality. This change
gives a good opportunity for researcher to alleviate the problems that may arise
from the possible endogeneity of board composition.
7.4.1.3 Timing issues
Timing of hiring the non-executive directors is also important in measuring
performance. Based on this explanation, firms add non-executive directors during
periods of poor performance. This makes the relationship between the boards and
performance obscure, see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).
7.4.1.4 Data issues
Prior studies have focused on US companies which have been dominated by non¬
executive directors for many years. This makes it difficult for researcher to find
boards with few non-executive directors to serve as a control group (Dahya and
McConnell, 2003).
7.4.2 Board study Design
7.4.2.1 Introductions
This thesis uses data measured for the period from 1989 to 2000 to investigate
indirectly the impact of board activity on performance and risk. Whilst there are
limitations that will become apparent later this approach was thought to be
adequate to investigate the research questions posed. The approach to analysis has
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been to start with descriptive statistics, which will provide insight into the
underlying trends. The use of means and error bars investigating a single issue
over differing time periods. This will be supported where appropriate with non-
parametric testing using for example Mann-Whitney tests. Regression models
will be used to explore several of the relationships, which have been already
discussed in early Chapters. In order to analyse the impact ofCG codes on several
variables, such as performance and risk, three periods are used; 90-92, 93-95, and
96-98. The rationale of the three periods is based on the UK CG code publication.
The Cadbury Report was published in 1992, the Greenbury in 1995, and the
Hampel Code and Combined Code in 1998. Therefore this study used 1993 the
first year of Cadbury Report and took next 3 year as one group.
7.4.2.2 Changes of Board structure and Board member tenures
The research will explore the impact of CG codes on board structures. Separation
of chairman and CEO, the board composition and the number of non-executive
officers on the board are investigated. The length of tenure of chairman, CEO,
financial directors will be explored. The average tenure and the period of the
tenure are analysed.
7.4.2.3 Board changes and tenure changes
The relationship between duality and tenure, and the relationship between
percentage ofNEO and tenure are analysed. Average and Mann-Whitney tests are
used in each area.
7.4.2.4 Board changes and performance
The association between performance and corporate governance variables is
analysed using Ordinary least square regression (OLS). The analysis was
performed using two different model and two different independent variables and
so four regression models are used. Both NI/TA and Tobin's Q (TQ) will be
explored using regression expressions looking at separation, NEO30P and PNEO,
size and CLCA. Separation is 1 if the roles of CEO and chairman are separated, 0
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otherwise, NEO30P is a binary variable taking value 1 if a firm has more than 30
percent non-executive directors in the board and 0 otherwise, PNEO is the
percentage of non-executive directors in the board, Size is the natural log of
market capitalisation (Demsets and Lehn(1985) report that size is associated with
ownership concentration) and CLCA is current liability divided by current assets.
NI/TA = Po + Pi Separation + P2 NEO30P + p3size + P4CLCA + e ~ (Model 1-1)
NI/TA = Po + Pi Separation + P2 PNEO + p3size + p4CLCA + e — (Model 1-2)
TQ = Po+Pi Separation + P2 NEO30P + p3size + p4CLCA + s --(Model 2-1)
TQ = po + Pi Separation + P2 PNEO + p3size + p4CLCA + s — (Model 2-2)
7.4.2.5 Board changes and firm risks
Z-score and firm-specific risks are analysed both duality-separation and NEO
difference. Error bar and Mann-Whitney test are used.
7.5 Research Design for Ownership
7.5.1 Methodology issues
There are two main sets of issues reported in the literature; firstly the endogeniety
of the ownership structure and secondly that the issues of non-linearity relation
between ownership and performance.
7.5.1.1 Endogeniety verse Exogeneity
Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Kole (1994) suggest that
managerial ownership structures are endogenously determined. They see the
ownership structure as an endogenous outcome from the maximizing process,
which the ownership structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that managerial ownership is the function of
market risk on stock volatility. Therefore the incentive to hold large stocks of their
companies decreases as the risk of the stock increases. In this situation, the firms
owning structure are decided by those who own it, this results in no systematic
relationship between ownership and performance. Cho (1998) also states
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regression results produce inconsistent coefficient to the extent that ownership
structure is endogenously determined. While Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell
and Servaes (1990) report the ownership structure as exogenous, result in a
positive correlation between performance and institutional shareholders.
7.5.1.2 Linear verse Non-linear (non-monotonic)
Based on the assumption of ownership structure as exogenous, the ownership-
performance relation studies show two different results. The issue of linear or
non-linear relations is that performance increase with ownership to a certain level,
performance decreases. The non-linear relationship is explained due to
management entrenchment in managerial ownership studies. When managers have
enough power to control the company, they pursue their own objectives at the
cost of shareholder values Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990),
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Short and




The ownership study was done to complement the UK codes study. Previous
studies have not provided the reason for not following the UK codes. This study
suggest that the ownership may impact on the implementing the UK codes.
The ownership in this study used board ownership and institutional ownership.
The board ownership in this study uses BFA data, BFA data represent the
ownership of board members, their family and associates. Therefore the BFA data
are more than board ownership, but this study assumes that family and associate
follow the decision of the board member.
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Before the Cadbury Report, there have been a large percentage of the institutional
investors in each company. In this study, the institutional ownership is divided
into two parts: the largest (Big 1) and the three largest (Big 3).
7.5.2.2 Ownership Structures changes
Board ownership (inside ownership) is shown through descriptive analysis.
Shareholders ofBig 3 and Big 1 Institutional Investors are demonstrated via
descriptive analysis. The Big 3 shareholders represent the three institutional
investors who hold the highest portion of the company. While the Big 1
shareholder is the Institutional Investors who has the highest portion of the share
in the company.
7.5.2.3 Ownership change and tenure changes
The relationship between board ownership and tenure are analysed. Regression
analysis is used.
7.5.2.4 Ownership changes and Board Structure
The relationship between duality and institutional ownership, and the relationship
between percentage of NEO and institutional ownership are analysed by Mann-
Whitey Test and regression.
Also the relationship between duality and institutional ownership, and the
relationship between percentage of NEO and institutional ownership are analysed
by Mann-Whitey Test.
7.5.2.4 Ownership and performance
The relationship between performance and ownership is studied using the two
regression equations:
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NI — PoPi BFA + P2 size + P3CLCA + s
TQ = p0 + pi BFA + p2 size + p3CLCA + s
where BFA is the percents of the voting share interest held by member of board,
their families and associates, size is the natural log of market capitalisation.
Demsets and Lehn (1985) report that size is associated with ownership
concentration. CLCA is current liability divided by current assets.
7.5.2.5 Ownership and risk
For the measure of firm risks, three measure are used: Z-score, firm-specific risk
and total liability. Regression is used in the analysis.
7.6 Research Design for Reporting Quality and Conservatism
7.6.1 Methodology issues
7.6.1.1 Limitation of discretionary models
The Jones model orthogonalises total accruals with respect to revenues and
extracts the discretionary component of accruals, causing the estimate of earning
management to be biased toward zero. This will increase the probability of type II
error, not rejecting null hypothesis, there are no earning management, when the
null hypothesis is not true. As Jones model assume that revenue is
nondiscretionary, there is more possibility that type II error. Thus it is more likely
to prove no earning management when there is earning management.
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7.6.1.2 Limitation of conservatism models
Previous research document negative relationship among different conservative
measure, see Givoly et al. (2003), Pope and Walker (2002). Also the models do
not fully catch the conservative pattern.
7.6.2 Measuring Reporting Quality
7.6.2.1 Introduction
Discretionary accruals are used to measure the reporting quality. Discretionary
accruals are the deduction of non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. Two
statistical methods are used to measure the non-discretionary: Pooling time series
and regression analysis. Following Qiang (2003), the research used accumulated
discretionary accruals. Longitudinal data analysis and Cross sectional regression
analysis used to calculate the non-discretionary accruals
7.6.2.2 Longitudinal data analysis (pooled cross-sectional time series)
Longitudinal data analysis combines regression with time series analysis. The data
is both regular temporal observation on a unit and cross-section observation.
Among the longitudinal data analysis, a fixed effect model (the dummy variable
model) is used.
TA it/Ait-i=aiit[l/Ait-i] + a2it[AREVit/Ait-i] + a3it[PPEjt/Ait_i] + £;t
The fixed effect model assumes that only the intercept parameter varies and the
intercept varies only across firms not over time (Hill et al., 2001). So that, ant^
an a2it = a2 and a3*t = a3. Therefore, all difference between individual firms and
overtime are captured by the intercept
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7.6.3 Measuring Conservatism using accruals
7.6.3.1 Accumulated accrual models
Givoly and Hayn (2000) used the cumulative non-operating accruals as their
measure of conservatism. This study use two different models in calculation
cumulated accruals.
Model 1
Model 1 follows Givoly and Hayn (2000)'s model.
TABD= Net Income + Depreciation - Cash from operation;
Operational Accruals = working capital accruals = AAR + A Inventories +
A prepaid Expenses - A Account payable - A Tax payables
Non Operating accruals = TABD - Operational Accruals
Model 2
Model 2 used working capital accruals based on Jones model (1991).
TABD= Net Income + Depreciation - Cash from operation;
Working capital accruals = (ACA - ACASH) - (ACL-ASTD-ATP);
NWCA= TABD - WCA.
7.6.3.2 Cumulative accruals index models
To test the impact of corporate governance, cumulative accruals are evaluated
based on governance scores. The governance scores are calculated on separation,
percentage of non-executive directors and sum of the separation and percentage of
NEO.
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The scores for separation are generated by sum of separation scores for the
periods of 1990 to 1998. If there is the separation of chairman and CEO in each
year, the score is 1. Therefore the index for separation is the sum of the score for
the periods.
Separation score = £ (during 1990- 1998)
The score for firms with more than 30% non-executive directors is the same for
calculation for separation score. If the firms has more than 30% non-executive
each year, the score for each year is 1.
NEO score = £ (during 1990- 1998)
Then the total score is the sum of separation score and NEO score.
Total score = Separation score + NEO score
7.6.3.3 Earning-return association using reverse regression
Basu's (1997) measure of conservatism assumes that earnings reflect bad news
more quickly than good news. The timeliness of conservatism is measured by the
extent to which the earning-return association is stronger during periods of
negative returns as compared with periods of positive returns.
Basu (1997) used Beaver et al. (1980) reverse regression, with earnings as the
dependent variables. Basu (1997) document that 'OLS standard errors and test
statistics are better specified when the leading variable is specified as independent
and lagging variables as dependent'.
This study also use cross sectional regressions of earnings on return as
conservatism measurement. The regression equation is following:
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Xjt= aot + fSiR\[ +
where X,t is firm i's earnings deflated by the market value of equity at the
beginning of the fiscal year and Rjt is the market rate of return on firm for the year
ending three months after fiscal year ending.
The cross-sectional regression coefficient pj measures the timeliness with which
earnings reflect annual returns. The measure of conservatism, following Pae et al
(2004), is the sensitivity difference in Pi between good news and bad news.
Difference = PiBN - PiGN
7.6.3.4 Book to market
BTMjt is the book to market ratio for firms i at t, calculated by book value of
common equity divided by market value of equity. Lower BTM indicates higher
conservatism. In the relation between duality and separation, Firms with
separation have lower BTM ratio through the three periods. Also in the relation
between percentage ofNEO and BTM, firms with higher percentage ofNEO has
lower BTM ratio, indicating higher conservatism.
7.7 Research Design for Risk Modelling
7.7.1 Methodology issues
7.7.1.1 Difficult to find comprehensive risk model
It is difficult for those outside a firm to be able to predict its default. A reason is
that firm will tend to keep secret the financial pressure until the default occurs.
Every default model has its limitation. So far, there is no single model to indicate
the risk of the company. Accounting model uses accounting measures which
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based on historical data. Market model uses stock market information to evaluate
the firm risks. The market information is the prediction of the future, but the
market is not a perfect reflection of the company information.
7.7.1.2 Bias from sampling methods
Non-random sample
The typical procedure used in the default studies is to draw a sample with an
approximately equal number of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, referred to as a
paired sample. This type of sample is not a pure random sample since there is an
element of choice in matching the firms.
There are, however, advantages in the paired sample approach. The primary
advantage is the efficiency. If a random sample were to be drawn from a
population, the bankrupt sample would only be a small part of the sample. It does
mean that the sample tends to be small and so this may lead to relatively imprecise
parameter estimates (Manski and McFadden 1981)
The disadvantages are serious. Non-random sample leads to biased and incorrect
inference (Palepu, 1986). The match sample cannot be distinguished from
different forms of survival, (Astebro and Winter, 2002). Prediction accuracy may
be overstated (Palepu, 1986, Zmijewski, 1984)
Palepu(1986) states that if the purpose of the study is only to rank probability, the
bias is unimportant, but if the estimated parameters are used to test hypothesis, the
bias and inconsistency become important. Zmijewski (1984) finds that the bias
from non-random samples do not appear materially affect the overall classification
rates.
Random sample
Alternative it is possible to consider a random sample approach. In such the aim
would be to random sample from both populations. Keasey and Watson (1991)
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suggest the 'ideal' approach, 'Ideally, the control sample should be a random
sample of non-failed firms with data covering the same year as the failed sample'.
7.7.2 Design for accounting default models
7.7.2.1 Introduction
To overcome the narrow coverage of the each default model, several default
models are used. Also to some extent it is possible to remove the sample biases
by using non-matched samples. For each model, default firms are from financially
distressed and delisted firms during 1990s. Five data set are used to build the
default models: 90-92, 93-95, 96-98, 99-01 and 90-01. For the example, 9092 data
include 23 default firm data in the default year and 306 firms data during the
periods of 1990 to 1992. Based on the data, the coefficients are calculated by logit
regression. Then the probabilities of default are calculated over the all periods.
7.7.2.2 Samples for financially distressed and delisted data
For a failed company to be included in the sample, it had to satisfy the following
criteria: financial statement data is available from OSIRIS during the periods of
1990-2000, the firms are financially distressed, delisted, and Stock market data is
available from database.
Most delisted firms in 1990s are in the late 1990s in the OSIRIS database.
Especially the year 1998 has the highest de-list rate in the 1990s. The application
of the above criteria resulted in a sample of 23 failed companies.
Table 7.3: Failed Company choosing processes
SIC All list De¬
list
Year of delist for 90s FD sample firms
90 95 96 97 98 99 00 97 98 99 00
Su
m
20 66 43 23 1 6 3 2 2 2 4
28 116 74 42 1 3 10 12 3 1 4 1 6
35 73 43 30 1 3 10 4 3 1 2 1 4
36 93 64 29 5 7 5 1 1 1 2
37 41 23 18 1 1 6 2 2 2 1 1 4
38 47 33 14 2 2 2 2 1 3
Sum 436 280 156 1 1 1 13 41 28 13 1 10 10 2 23
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Table 7.4: List of failed company
Company Name Failed Year SIC Asset size
ASPEN COMMUNICATIONS PLC 1997-12-31 36 43,440
SOLVERA PLC 1998-03-31 36 24,692
ADWEST AUTOMOTIVE PLC 1998-06-30 37 160,647
FOCUS DYNAMICS PLC 1998-07-31 35 17,945
BRIDPORT PLC 1998-07-31 37 21,647
IOC INTERNATIONAL PLC 1998-09-30 36 11,523
BRENT INTERNATIONAL PLC 1998-12-31 28 64,900
FORWARD TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 1998-12-31 35 21,725
CHIROSCIENCE GROUP PLC 1999-02-28 28 80,300
METROTECT INDUSTRIES PLC 1999-03-31 28 10,570
CPL AROMAS PLC 1999-03-31 28 28,390
CALLUNA PLC 1999-03-31 35 13,969
POWERSCREEN INTERNATIONAL PLC 1999-03-31 35 154,748
WHITECROFT PLC 1999-03-31 36 62,905
QUADRANT HEALTHCARE PLC 1999-12-31 28 30,383
SCOTIA HOLDINGS PLC 1999-12-31 28 45,289
OXFORD MOLECULAR GROUP PLC 1999-12-31 28 33,599
HICKSON INTERNATIONAL PLC 1999-12-31 28 187,100
SHALIBANE PLC 1999-12-31 37 14,087
CROWN EYEGLASS PLC 2000-04-02 38 3,964
ELBIEF PLC 2000-04-30 38 4,623
BROOKE INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS PLC 2000-09-30 35 29,484
CANTAB PHARMACEUTICALS 2000-12-31 28 32,243
7.7.2.3 Control samples
To identify the effect of negative earnings in default model, this research
employed five different matching periods with 23 financially distressed firms. The
matching periods are divided by 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001,
and 1990-2001 periods. The approach results in 5 sets of coefficients for Z-score
model and O-score model.
Tabic 7.5: Z-score model sample composition
WCTA RETA EBITTA MVTL SALETA
Distress sample 23 23 23 23 23
90-92 data 306 306 306 306 306
93-95 data 380 380 380 380 380
96-98 data 555 555 555 555 555
99-01 data 687 687 687 687 687
90-01 data 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928
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Table 7.6: O-score model sample composition
Data SIZE TLTA WCTA CLCA NITA CFO NNP TLTA NIABS
Distress 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
90-92 320 320 320 320 320 266 320 320 320
93-95 436 436 436 436 436 379 436 436 435
96-98 599 599 599 599 599 527 610 599 600
99-01 744 744 744 744 744 614 742 743 742
90-01 2099 2099 2099 2099 2099 1786 2108 2098 2097
7.7.2.4 Logit Regression
Based on the data, the coefficients are calculated by logit regreesion. Then the
probabilities of default are calculated over the all periods. Therefore, Z-score and
O-score models have 5 different sets of data. To check how the coefficients
change over the 1990s, the periods are divided by 5 periods: 1990-1992, 1993-
1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001, and 1990-2001. For the periods of 1990-1992, the
coefficients are estimated using FD outcomes in 1990s and 1990-1992 listed firms
that have not de-listed until 2001. For the second periods of 1993-1995, the
coefficients are estimated using FD outcomes in 1990s and 1993-1995 listed firms
that have not de-listed until 2001. This process continues to the 1990-2001
periods. The approach results in 5 sets of coefficients for Z-score model and O-
score model.
7.7.3 Design for Merton-type default models
7.7.3.1 Introduction
The Merton-type model is used as bench mark to compare with Altman model and
Ohlson Model. Among the Merton-type models, this study utilised the both the
KMV model and Hillegeist et al (2004) Model.
7.7.3.2 Data for Merlon Default modelling
The initial sample consists of from 230 to 334 in respect of each year during the
11-year period 1990-2000. After calculating the default probability, the final
dataset consists of from 130 to 224 in respect of each year. See Table 7.7
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Table 7.7 Data for Merton Default modelling
(a) The initial data
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
MV 230 232 234 252 282 310 338 355 364 363 334
Ve 208 210 213 225 250 268 299 315 330 319 295
X 174 183 192 215 250 286 317 334 343 326 308
203 209 211 217 235 255 268 293 318 311 283
MV= market value of the firm's assets, ve=market value of equity, X= book
value of total liability aE = volitarity of returen
(b) The final data after calculation
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All 130 136 148 159 180 204 223 239 270 243 224
List 105 110 117 123 134 140 155 168 182 156 144
delist 25 26 31 36 46 64 68 71 88 87 80
Table 7.8 : 1 year T-bill rate
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
rate 7.88 5.88 3.89 3.43 5.31 5.95 5.53 5.63 5.05 5.08 6.11
7.7.7.3 Calculation processes
To use as bench mark Merton-type model is utilized which is defined as followed.
VE = VAN(d,)-Xe-rTN(d2) (1)
where
InfW+O.S a])T





VE = the current market value of equity
VA = the firm's assets value, with an instantaneous drift fi, and an instantaneous
volatility oA
X = the book value of the debt at time t, that has maturity equal to T
r = risk-free rate of interest
oA= the volatility of assets value, the standard deviation of asset return
N = the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution
p. = the continuously compounded expected return on assets
To estimate VA, a A simultaneously, solve the call option equation (1) and optimal
hedge equation (3). SAS program is used to solve the equation (1) and (3),
following is the coding of the program including partial data.
• The starting values ofVA equal to book value of liabilities plus the market
value of equity
• The starting value of aA =aEVE / (VE + X).
• VE is set to equal to total market value of equity based on closing price at
the end of the firm's fiscal year.
• ge is computed using daily return data over the entire fiscal year
• X is set equal to the book value of the total liability
• T equals one year
• r is one year Treasury bill rate
7.7.7.4 Models
Model 1 estimated p (the expected market return on assets) in following equation.
ju(t) = max[-vA(t)-vA(t-1)
InA) + (//-0.5^)7-
BSM-Prob =N(- ) Model 1
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Model 2 used r as market return on assets, r is I year T-bill rate.
ln(—) + (r — 0.5(j2A)T
BSM-Prob =N(- ^ j= ) Model 2
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter described the designed for research. This research follows the
positivistic approach. Even though several flaws, the positivistic approach is still
most used approach in finance and accounting researches. Data sample and
collection was a long tedious process. Data were collected on 436 firms covering
board, tenure, ownership, performance and risk data.
The overall issue on performance study is the measurement data. The strength and
weakness of the both Net income and Tobin's Q are studied. Then the research
approach for each area is detailed. Each design consists of the methodology issues
and study design. The methodology issues deal with research problem in that area.
Then the research describes the approach later.
The major issue in research design is the limitation of the models. This is






This chapter provides the results of the analysis of this study. The impact of UK
Codes on changes of boards and board member tenures is described in first section.
This includes the changes in separation between chairman and chief executive office
(CEO), the changes in non-executive officers (NEO) percentages on boards and
changes of board composition. It also explores the changes in tenure of the board
member: the chairman, CEO and financial director.
Section two focuses on changes of ownership; this explores both board ownership and
institutional ownership. The relationship between the changes in board and tenure are
considered in section three, where the impact of separation, NEO and board
ownership on tenures is investigated. In section four, the influence of ownership to
board structure is analysed. The ownership considered is that of the board, the largest
3 investors and the largest institutional investigators.
Section five is devoted to the impact of board structure changes on the performance.
The measures of performance used are Net income, Tobin's Q and Z-score. The
relation of board changes and firm risk is studied in section 6, where firm risks are
measured using Altman's Z-score and Firm specific risk. Section 7 explores the
influence of ownership on performance and risks. Only board ownership is
considered and the measures of performance and risk are Net income, Tobin's Q, Z-
score and Firm specific risks.
The quality of financial reporting and conservatism are investigated in section 8. The
impact of board changes on conservatism is analysed in section 9. In section 10, the
relationship between ownership conservatism is explored. The impact of conservative
data on default models, which includes Altman's model, Ohlson's Model and
Merton's model, is investigated.
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8.1 Changes of Board and Tenure
8.1.1 Changes of Board Structure
(1) Separation of chairman and CEO
In 1990, 59% of the firms separated the chairman and CEO. The percentage increased
rapidly during the 1993-1996 periods to 77%. By the end of the 2000, the table shows
that 83% of all firms split the position of CEO and Chairman. Compared to pre-
Cadbury periods, it had increased 20%. This evidence is similar to the results of
previous studies, Dahya et al. (2002) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999). Table 8.1 gives
detail of change over years 1990 to 2000.
Table 8.1: Change of chairman-CEO separation
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
all 0.59 0.63 0.67 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.83
list 0.59 0.63 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.84 0.85
delist 0.58 0.62 0.64 0.76 0.74 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.81 0.79
Among the industry, SIC 20 (Food and kindred products) and SIC 28 (chemical and
allied product) shows highest rates of separation ofCEO and chairman, see Table 8.2.
This higher rate was seen before the Cadbury Report. Compared to other industries,
SIC 20 and SIC 28 have 60-70 percent companies with separation between chairman
and CEO. SIC 36, SIC 37and SIC 38 show relatively lower rate of separation ofCEO
and chairman.
Table 8.2: Separation over time by SIC
SIC 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
20 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.81 0.66 0.74 0.86 0.81 0.85 0.88
28 0.60 0.74 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.89
35 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.92 0.81
36 0.44 0.46 0.60 0.60 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.77
37 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.79 0.81 0.72 0.88 0.83 0.81
38 0.62 0.59 0.48 0.62 0.60 0.65 0.67 0.86 0.77 0.79
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(2) Change of Non-executive office (NEO) percentages in the board
Table 8.3 shows percentage of firms with NEO in each year. In the beginning of the
1990, 45% of firms have more than 3 non-executive directors, but 72% firms have
more than 3 non-executive directors in the 2000. This is highlighted in Figure 8.3.
Table 8.3: Presents percentage of NEO over time
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
NEOO 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
NEO=l 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05
NEO=2 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.22
NEO=3-5 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.62 0.61










Figure 8.1: Trends in NEO over time.
(3) Change ofBoard Composition
The average size of the board of directors was 7.1 to 7.3 over the 1990s. The average
size has not changed. The average number of non-executive directors, however, has
increased from 2.4 to 3.6. Corporate boards were comprised of between 32% and
36% of non-executive directors in pre-Cadbury periods, and this figure had risen to
between 40% and 49% in post-Cadbury periods. This increasing number of non¬
executive directors with constant number of total board number indicates that inside
directors are substituted by outside directors. These statistics indicate that Cadbury
report have impacted the composition of Boards. Table 8.4 gives the details of the
changes.
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director Number ofNEO Per cent O "NEO
Year All List Delist All List Delist All List Delist All List Delist
1990 7.1 7.2 7.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 2.4 2.5 2.3 0.32 0.33 0.32
1991 7.5 7.8 7.1 4.9 5.1 4.7 2.6 2.7 2.5 0.34 0.34 0.34
1992 7.3 7.7 6.7 4.6 4.8 4.2 2.8 2.9 2.6 0.36 0.36 0.36
1993 7.4 7.7 7.0 4.6 4.8 4.2 2.9 2.9 2.9 0.38 0.38 0.39
1994 7.2 7.4 6.8 4.3 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 0.40 0.39 0.42
1995 7.4 7.7 7.0 4.2 4.4 3.9 3.2 3.3 3.1 0.43 0.42 0.44
1996 7.2 7.4 6.9 4.0 4.1 3.9 3.2 3.3 3.1 0.44 0.44 0.44
1998 7.3 7.6 6.8 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.3 0.47 0.47 0.48
1998 7.2 7.4 7.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.2 0.47 0.48 0.46
1999 7.3 7.3 7.2 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 0.49 0.49 0.50
8.1.2. Changes of Board Member Tenure
(1) Changes of Chairman Tenure
Figure 8.2 also shows the tenure of chairman. In 1992, ten percent of companies have
new chairperson. Clearly if the tenure is less than a year it indicates that the chairman
is new to the company. This seems also to occur in again 1999, with ten percents of
the firms having a new chairperson.
Figure 8.2: distribution of chairman tenure
Table 8.5: Distribution of chairman tenure
Tenure 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
<1 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.05
1<T<3 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.24
3<T<5 0.34 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18
5<T<10 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.24
10> 0.14 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.29
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Figure 8.3 shows the average tenure of Chairman during the 1990s and Table 8.6
gives the detail. There had been increasing the average tenure before 1992-1993, but
the average tenure shortly decreased after 1993, which represents change in the Board
structure in UK after the Cadbury Report. As the Cadbury Report recommended,
more firms separated the chairman and CEO role, which results in the increase new
chairman. Also after the 1998-1999 period, the increasing number of new chairmen
results in the decreasing average tenure of the chairman.
1
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Figure 8.3: The tenure of Chairman during 1990s for all, list and de-listed firms.
Table 8.6: The average tenure ofChairman
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
Chair (All) 5.3 7.3 7.0 10.4 9.4 9.7 9.6 8.3 8.4 8.3
Chair(List) 4.0 6.0 5.9 9.9 9.8 10.2 9.5 8.6 8.5 8.5
Chair (Delist) 7.6 9.1 8.8 ll.3 8.7 9.0 9.7 7.8 8.1 7.9
(2) Changes ofCEO Tenure
Figure 8.4 shows the pattern of tenure in CEO. There are two peaks in the line
associated with appointment of new CEOs. These are 1992 and 1998 with nine
percent in 1992 and ten percent in 1998. Throughout the 1990s, the longest tenures
are in the range is 5 to 10 years, but the increasing pattern of the CEO tenure is
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Figure 8.4: Distribution of CEO tenure
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Table 8.7: Distribution of CEO tenure
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
<1 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08
1<T<3 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.21
3<T<5 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19
5<T<10 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.27
10> 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.25
Figure 8.5 shows the tenure of CEO. There is a turning point in 1992-1993 with the
lowest point for all companies but for listed companies this is a high point. Overall,
the average tenure ofCEO is 6-7 year. The CEO tenure for listed companies is higher
than that of delisted companies. This may be related to performance.
Figure 8.5: The average tenure of CEO
Table 8.8: The average tenure of CEO
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
CEO (All) 6.1 6.6 6.0 6.6 7.1 6.5 6.9 6.5 6.5 7.0
CEO (List) 6.9 7.2 5.5 7.3 7.9 7.0 7.3 6.7 6.4 7.0
CEO(Delist) 4.3 5.5 6.7 5.7 5.9 5.8 6.5 6.3 6.8 7.1
(3) Changes of Financial Directors (FD) Tenure
Figure 8.6 and Table 8.9 show that period in 1990-1992 17 percent of companies have
appointed new Financial Directors (FD), similar occurs in the period 1998. This
pattern may reflect two effects. Firstly, the appointment of financial director is
related to appointment of new CEO and new Chairman, see previous graphs. Another
explanation is the financial director may move up to CEO or Chairperson.
Figure 8.6: Distribution of Financial director tenure
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Table 8.9: distribution of Financial director tenure
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
<1 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.18
1<T<3 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.27
3<T<5 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.24
5<T<10 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.2-0
10> 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
Figure 8.7 shows increasing pattern of FD tenure before 1995 but after 1995, there is
a decrease, which may be accounted for by new financial directors being appointed in
the UK firms. The tenure of financial director in delisted firms has shorter tenure that
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Figure 8.7: Average tenure of financial directors
Table 8.10: Average tenure of financial directors
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
Fin Dir (All) 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.9 4.7 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.7
Fin Dir (List) 4.1 4.4 4.3 5.6 5.1 6.6 5.5 4.8 4.8 5.0
Fin Dir (Delist) 2.9 3.3 4.0 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.7
8.2 Changes of Ownership
8.2.1. Board ownership
The following graph, Figure 8.8, shows the average ownership by Directors or
Directors' Family. The shares of the average board ownership are decreasing after
1992. The board ownership is amounted to 19.7% in 1990, and fell to 13.8% in 1998,
but increased slightly after 1999.
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Figure 8.8: Average ownership of board
Table 8.11: Average ownership of board
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
BFA(All) 19.7 17.3 14.7 12.5 12.5 12.9 12.1 13.4 13.8 14.1
BFA(List) 17.1 16.6 14.3 12.1 11.8 11.7 12.0 13.2 14.2 14.0
BFA(Delist) 23.1 18.2 15.3 12.9 13.5 14.6 12.1 13.6 13.2 14.1
The Figure 8.9 and Table 8.12 show the different board ownership across the
industrial sectors. SIC 28 (Chemicals and allied products) shows lowest rate ofboard
ownership during 1990s. While the SIC 36 and SIC 38 show relatively high
percentage of average ownership.
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Figure 8.9: Average ownership of board in each sector
Table 8.12: Average ownership of board in each sector
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
SIC 20 29.10 25.54 23.26 18.88 16.40 14.53 12.44 13.52 11.88 11.97
SIC 28 13.13 12.53 9.26 7.05 7.22 9.09 8.77 9.03 9.78 9.63
SIC 35 22.43 14.49 11.06 9.12 10.07 10.63 11.83 11.50 13.07 13.91
SIC 36 17.50 19.41 17.05 13.88 13.72 15.02 13.74 18.14 18.11 19.33
SIC 37 18.90 17.95 15.30 12.19 12.49 13.01 10.39 12.38 13.40 13.08
SIC 38 17.45 12.98 12.34 15.29 18.39 19.65 19.32 19.76 21.85 19.33
8.2.2 Changes of Institutional shareholders
(1) The largest three Institutional Investors
Institutions held around 75 to 80 per cent of the shares in the late 1990s, with pension
funds alone owning about 35 per cent (Cadbury, 2002). The majority institutional
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investors take a portfolio approach by taking small stakes in a large number of the
companies (Vitols, 2001). Among the institutional shareholders, Figure 8.10 shows
the largest three institutional shareholders. All the firms show very similar average
ownership over the 1990s, which has 22-23 percentages of shares of the companies.
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Figure 8.10: Average ownership of the largest 3 institutional investors
Table 8.13: Average ownership of the largest 3 institutional investors
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
B3-AH 23.1 23.9 23.6 22.7 22.3 22.8 22.9 24.3 24.2 23.5
B3-List 25.4 25.5 23.9 22.9 21.3 21.7 22.2 22.6 23.1 22.9
B3-Delist 20.30 21.78 23.14 22.47 23.56 24.30 23.96 26.88 26.22 25.46
In Figure 8.11 and Table 8.14, there is no particular difference in institutional
ownership among industries. The range of ownership is between 22-24 percentages
















Figure 8.11: Average ownership of the largest 3 in each sector
Table 8.14: Average ownership of the largest 3 in each sector
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
SIC 20 23.23 24.18 23.29 20.84 20.98 20.77 22.53 23.23 24.86 23.58
SIC 28 25.06 24.79 24.73 23.73 24.07 26.14 24.22 26.06 24.20 23.25
SIC 35 28.19 28.27 27.89 25.81 24.50 23.74 23.92 23.56 26.04 27.46
SIC 36 18.29 18.51 22.32 24.11 22.10 21.39 22.31 24.78 23.26 22.10
SIC 37 20.25 23.56 19.77 20.98 19.16 21.30 22.24 23.66 22.64 24.75
SIC 38 21.83 23.38 21.10 18.62 20.14 20.21 20.15 21.88 22.97 19.93
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(2) The largest institutional Investors
Figure 8.12 and Table 8.15 show that the largest institutional investor holds on
average 15.3 % stake in firm in 1990, and this falls to 12.9% in 2000. The pattern of
shares of largest institution investor is the range of 12-13 percentages. The delisted












Figure 8.12: Average ownership of largest institutional Investors
Table 8.15: Average <
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
Bl-All 15.3 15.2 12.8 12.1 12.1 12.6 12.3 12.7 12.8 12.9
Bl-List 15.7 16.0 13.0 12.7 12.0 12.2 12.0 11.4 12.2 12.6
B1 -Delist 14.84 14.1 12.4 11.2 12.1 13.2 12.6 14.7 13.9 13.9
Before 1992, SIC 28 and SIC 37 show higher ownership of the largest investors, but
by the end of 1999, the ranges of percentages of ownership by the largest investor is
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Figure 8.13: Average ownership of the largest investor in each sector
Table 8.16: Average ownership of the largest investor in each sector
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
SIC 20 14.40 13.14 12.45 10.27 11.69 12.13 12.95 11.93 13.31 12.76
SIC 28 19.09 18.17 14.92 13.95 13.90 15.42 12.87 14.60 12.63 12.52
SIC 35 17.23 16.62 13.91 12.76 12.00 11.94 12.71 11.51 13.62 15.34
SIC 36 12.92 12.17 12.01 13.45 12.68 12.51 12.53 12.76 12.32 12.53
SIC 37 12.80 16.37 10.71 10.32 10.00 10.38 10.66 11.75 12.00 12.94
SIC 38 12.86 12.40 10.65 9.62 9.60 9.98 9.92 12.01 12.28 11.55
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8.3 Board structure, Board ownership and Tenure
8.3.1. Duality and Board Member Tenure
(1) Duality and Chairman Tenure
In Table 8.17, firms with duality have longer tenure of chairman than firms with
separation during the period of 1990-1998. In Table 8.18, Mann-Whitney test
indicates that it is significant during the period of both 1990-1992 and 1993-1998.
But the 1996-1998 periods shows not significant in the Mann-Whitney test.
Table 8.17: chairman tenure difference between dual firm and separation firm
CIlairman Average Tenure
Year Dual Separation Diff.
1990 5.9 4.4 1.6
1991 8.2 7.1 1.1
1992 9.1 6.4 2.8
1993 12.8 9.6 3.2
1994 11.4 8.5 2.9
1995 12.7 9.1 3.5
1996 13.6 8.7 4.9
1998 8.9 8.1 0.8
1999 7.9 8.5 -0.6
2000 5.0 7.0 -1.9
Table 8.18: Results ofMann-Whitney test in duality and chairman tenure
990-1992 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 62 85 65
Separation 160 -2.94 0.003 351 -2.85 0.004 365 -0.84 0.397
(2) Duality and CEO Tenure
Over the all period, there is difference between firm with separation and firms with
duality are shown in Table 8.19. Firms with duality firms show longer CEO tenure.
This pattern can be identified by the Mann-Whitney test, see Table 8.20. Over the
three periods, the results are statistically significant.
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Table 8.19: CEO tenure difference between dual and separation
CEO Average Tenure
Dual No dual Diff.
1990 11.2 4.4 6.8
1991 7.0 6.5 0.5
1992 9.7 5.2 4.5
1993 12.1 5.4 6.7
1994 11.6 6.2 5.4
1995 11.9 6.0 5.9
1996 12.6 6.2 6.3
1998 10.3 6.3 4.0
1999 8.1 6.4 1.7
2000 0.4 6.0 -5.6
Table 8.20: Results ofMann-Whitney test in duality and CEO tenure
1990-1992 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 46 59 34
Separation 187 -2.98 0.003 378 -4.55 0.000 380 -2.11 0.035
(3) Duality and FD Tenure
In 1990-1992 periods, it seems that firms with separation have higher average FD
tenure, see Table 8.21. Yet this is not confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test in Table
8.22, which shows no difference between two groups. In 1993-1995, firm with
separation has longer FD tenure than firms with duality, supported by Mann-Whitney
test.
Table 8.21: FD tenure difference between dual and separation
Financial Director Average' "enure
Dual No dual Diff.
1990 3.5 4.4 -0.9
1991 3.5 4.9 -1.4
1992 3.6 5.2 -1.7
1993 4.6 5.2 -0.5
1994 4.6 4.9 -0.2
1995 5.1 4.8 0.3
1996 5.2 4.7 0.4
1997 4.9 4.7 0.3
1998 4.7 4.6 0.1
1999 4.6 4.3 0.3
2000 2.7 2.6 0.1
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Table 8.22: Results ofMann-Whitney test in duality and FD tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 103 101 61
Separation 206 -1.41 0.158 381 -2.57 0.010 361 -1.09 0.272
8.3.2 NEO Percentages and Board Member Tenure
(1) Percentage ofNEO and Chairman Tenure
Table 8.23 shows the relationship between chairman tenure and NEO. Before 1996,
firms with less than 30% NEO show longer tenure than firms with more than 30%
NEO. This is confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test in Table 8.24. In the 1990-1992,
firms with more than 30% NEO have longer tenure of chairman than firms with less
than 30% NEO. This is also true for the 1993-1995 periods, but for the 1996-1998
periods the results differ.
Table 8.23: Chairman Tenure difference between NEO different firms
CIlairman Average Tenure
Year NEO<30% NEO>=30% Differences
1990 6.4 7.1 -0.7
1991 8.9 7.7 1.2
1992 9.9 6.5 3.3
1993 10.3 9.4 1.0
1994 11.4 9.0 2.4
1995 11.6 9.1 2.6
1996 12.0 8.8 3.2
1998 7.6 8.3 -0.8
1999 7.8 8.4 -0.6
2000 6.0 6.7 -0.7
Table 8.24: Results ofMann-Whitney test in NEO difference and Chairman
tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 67 96 48
NEO>30% 159 -2.96 0.003 344 -2.22 0.026 382 -1.21 0.226
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(2) Percentage ofNEO and CEO Tenure
In 1990-1992 period, there is difference between those with more than 30% NEO and
firms with less than 30% NEO, but after 1993, there is no difference between firms,
see Table 8.25 and Table 8.26.
Table 8.25: CEO Tenure difference between NEO different firms
CEO Average Tenure
NEO<30% NEO>=30% Differnce
1990 9.2 4.5 4.7
1991 7.2 6.4 0.8
1992 8.7 5.2 3.5
1993 9.0 6.4 2.6
1994 7.6 7.0 0.6
1995 6.7 6.8 -0.1
1996 6.4 6.8 -0.5
1998 6.2 6.5 -0.4
1999 4.2 6.5 -2.3
2000 3.4 5.3 -2.0
Table 8.26: Results ofMann-Whitney test in NEO difference and CEO tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 78 82 45
NEO>30% 159 -3.30 0.001 354 -0.15 0.877 370 -1.07 0.281
(3) Percentage ofNEO and Financial Director Tenure
In the period of 1990-1992, Firms with more than 30% NEO show longer FD tenure
than firms with less than 30% NEO, but after 1993, there are no difference in
statistically; see Table 8.27 and Table 8.28.
Table 8.27: FD Tenure difference between NEO different firms
Financial Director Average" "enure
NEO<30% NEO>=30% Differnce
1990 3.6 4.0 -0.4
1991 3.4 4.4 -1.0
1992 3.4 4.3 -0.9
1993 3.9 4.7 -0.8
1994 4.6 5.0 -0.4
1995 3.6 5.3 -1.7
1996 4.3 5.1 -0.8
1997 4.1 5.2 -1.1
1998 4.2 4.8 -0.6
1999 3.2 4.5 -1.2
2000 2.4 2.6 -0.2
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Table 8.28: Results ofMann-Whitney test in NEO difference and CEO tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 112 97 60
NEO>30% 202 -2.55 0.011 386 -0.66 0.505 364 -0.01 0.993
8.3.3 Board Ownership and Tenure
(1) BFA and Chair Tenure
Using regression, board ownership is positively related to chairman tenure in 93-55
periods and 96-98 periods, see Table 8.29. The higher board ownership is the higher
chairman tenure.
Table 8.29: BFA and Chair tenure
90-92 93-95 96-98
Modell Dependent=Chair Tenure Dependent=Chair Tenure Dependent=Chair Tenure
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
constant -10.001 -1.616 0.108 -19.569 -4.063 0.000 -8.779 -2.040 0.042
BFA 0.050 1.694 0.092 0.116 4.056 0.000 0.149 5.785 0.000
capln 0.947 2.906 0.004 1.504 5.950 0.000 0.909 3.983 0.000
R square 0.047 0.103 0.074
Adj R2 0.036 0.098 0.070
F-statistics 4.272 19.867 19.098
(2) BFA and CEO Tenure
Board ownership is positively related to CEO tenure in 93-55 periods and 96-98
periods, see the regression results in Table 8.30.
Table 8.30: BFA and CEO Tenure
90-92 93-95 96-98
Modell Dependent=CEO Tenure Dependent=CEO Tenure Dependent=CEO Tenure
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
constant 8.068 0.976 0.331 -6.984 -2.243 0.026 1.491 0.512 0.609
BFA -0.030 -0.589 0.557 0.110 5.624 0.000 0.100 5.759 0.000
capln -0.070 -0.151 0.880 0.666 4.093 0.000 0.242 1.571 0.117
R square 0.002 0.097 0.072
Adj R2 -0.010 0.092 0.068
F-statistics 0.177 18.426 16.700
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(3) BFA and FD Tenure
The tenure of financial director is not related to Board Ownership, see regression
results for the 3 periods in Table 8.31.
Table 8.31: BFA and FD Tenure
90-92 93-95 96-98
Dependent=Financial Dir Tenure Dependent=Financial Dir Tenure Dependent=Financial Dir Tenure
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
constant 4.511 1.317 0.190 5.089 1.767 0.078 6.683 2.347 0.020
BFA 0.005 0.265 0.791 -0.010 -0.630 0.530 -0.020 -0.989 0.324
capln -0.030 -0.187 0.852 0.007 0.043 0.965 -0.070 -0.495 0.621
R square 0.002 0.002 0.003
Adj R2 -0.014 -0.006 -0.003
F-statistics 0.105 0.251 0.495
8.4 Ownership and Board structure
8.4.1. Board Ownership and Board Structures
(1) Board Ownership and duality
It appears that the board ownership is different under duality and separation with
duality showing higher board ownership board see Table 8.32. The difference is
significant after the 1993 see Table 8.33 using Mann-Whitney test statistics.
Table 8.32: Average Board ownership difference under duality and separation
BFA
Dual Separation Differnce
1990 21.9 19.0 2.9
1991 19.8 16.3 3.5
1992 19.0 13.8 5.1
1993 16.0 10.6 5.4
1994 18.6 10.5 8.2
1995 18.6 11.7 6.9
1996 15.9 11.3 4.6
1998 23.5 12.5 11.0
1999 28.7 12.5 16.2
2000 21.8 14.9 6.9
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Table 8.33: The results ofMann-Whitney test between duality and Separation
1990-1992 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 144 113 91
Separation 253 -1.9 0.058 405 -3.4 0.001 518 -3.83 0.000
The regression results are the same as that of Mann-Whitney test, see Table 8.34.
Separation is negatively related to BO in the 93-95 periods and 93-98 periods. The
lower the percentage of BO, the higher the rate of separation is.
Table 8.34: Results of Regression between duality and Separation
90-92 93-95 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=Separation Dependent=Separation Dependent=Separation
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
constant 0.199 0.742 0.458 0.527 2.629 0.009 0.378 2.490 0.013
BFA -0.002 -1.500 0.134 -0.003 -2.994 0.003 -0.003 -3.155 0.002
capln 0.030 1.847 0.005 0.020 1.504 0.133 0.030 3.439 0.001
R square 0.026 0.033 0.053
Adj R2 0.021 0.029 0.050
F-statistics 5.189 8.671 16.685
(2) Board Ownership and NEO
Table 8.35 shows that the firm with less than 30% NEO have greater board ownership
than a firm with more than 30% NEO and the differences in mean are significant
using Mann-Whitney test statistic over the whole period, see Table 8.36. Jensen
(1993) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found a similar result, stating that as
managerial ownership increases, the percentage ofNEO diminishes.
Table 8.35: BFA difference between NEO different firms
BFA
NEO<30% NEO>=30% Difference
1990 30.4 14.2 16.1
1991 27.9 11.6 16.3
1992 23.5 11.4 12.1
1993 20.7 8.5 12.1
1994 24.8 9.6 15.3
1995 29.7 10.1 19.6
1996 27.4 9.2 18.2
1998 35.2 11.3 23.9
1999 39.4 12.1 27.3
2000 41.9 12.3 29.6
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Table 8.36: The results ofMann-Whitney test between NEO different firms
1990-1992 1993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 139 108 87
NEO>30% 255 -6.27 0.000 407 -6.73 0.000 568 -8.51 0.000
From the regression results presented in Table 8.37, over the three periods, the
percentage of NEO is negatively related to BFA, the less the percentage of the BFA,
the higher the percentage ofNEO.
Table 8.37: The results of Regression between NEO different firms
90-92 93-95 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=NEO30% Dependent=NEO30% Dependent=NEO30%
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
constant 1.067 4.217 0.000 0.422 2.243 0.025 0.581 4.489 0.000
BFA -0.009 -6.953 0.000 -0.006 -6.077 0.000 -0.007 -9.661 0.000
capln -0.010 -1.098 0.273 0.020 2.464 0.014 0.020 3.006 0.003
R square 0.122 0.114 0.178
Adj R2 0.117 0.110 0.176
F-statistics 26.779 32.261 70.009
8.4.2 The largest three Institutional shareholders and Board Structure
(1) The largest three institutional investors and duality
In the 1990-1992 periods, there is no difference between two groups, see Table 8.38
and Table 8.39, in the 1993-1995 periods; firms with separation have higher
percentage of the largest three institutional investors, the results are significant using
Mann-Whitney test see Table 8.38.
Table 8.38: BFA dilTerence between duality and separation
Big 3 Institutional shareho ders
Dual Separation Differnce
1990 22.9 23.3 -0.3
1991 26.4 22.8 3.6
1992 22.6 23.8 -1.3
1993 21.4 21.9 -0.5
1994 20.0 23.1 -3.2
1995 22.6 22.8 -0.2
1996 23.3 22.9 0.4
1998 25.4 24.1 1.3
1999 22.5 24.5 -1.9
2000 22.3 23.8 -1.4
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Table 8.39: The results ofMann-Whitney test between duality and separation
1990-1992 993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 169 167 97
Separation 278 -0.62 0.53 472 -2.36 0.018 459 -0.04 0.965
(2) The largest three institutional investors and Percentage ofNEO
Both 1990-1992 periods and 1993-1995 periods show the difference in the largest
three institutional investors, see Table 8.40 and Table 8.41. During the two periods,
firms with more than 30% NEO have larger percentage ofbig 3 institutional
shareholders. There are two possible explanation that for this. Firstly, the institutions
invest their money in companies that have advanced corporate governance systems.
Secondly the institutional investors intervene to force the companies to adopt more
outside executive directors.
Table 8.40: The largest three institutional difference between NEO different
firms
Big 3 Institutional shareho ders
NEO<30% NEO>=30% Differnce
1990 21.5 24.1 -2.7
1991 20.1 25.6 -5.5
1992 20.3 25.0 -4.7
1993 19.0 23.0 -4.0
1994 20.8 22.7 -1.9
1995 23.5 22.7 0.8
1996 25.7 22.5 3.2
1998 21.6 24.7 -3.2
1999 22.5 24.4 -1.9
2000 18.3 24.1 -5.8
Table 8.41: The results ofMann-Whitney test between NEO different firms
990-1992 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 161 146 76
NEO>30% 282 -3.08 0.002 478 -2.18 0.029 477 -0.51 0.610
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8.4.3 The Largest Institutional shareholders and Board Structure
The data show that only during the period 1993-1995 the largest institutional
shareholders differ: firms with separation have higher percentage of largest
institutional shareholders than those with duality, see Table 8.42. This is supported
by the Mann-Whitney Test see Table 8.43.
Table 8.42: The largest institutional investor difference between duality &
separation
Big one Institutional shareholders
Dual Separation Difference
1990 16.5 14.4 2.1
1991 18.3 13.4 4.9
1992 12.4 12.8 -0.3
1993 11.4 11.1 0.4
1994 10.5 12.7 -2.2
1995 14.2 12.1 2.1
1996 12.7 12.2 0.5
1998 12.7 12.8 0.0
1999 12.1 12.9 -0.8
2000 12.0 13.1 -1.1
Table 8.43: The results ofMann-Whitney test between duality and separation
1990-1992 993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 169 167 97
Separation 278 -0.73 0.466 472 -2.92 0.004 459 -0.45 0.649
(2) Largest and Percentage ofNEO
Both 1990-1992 periods and 1993-1995 periods shows that firms with more than 30%
NEO has higher percentage of big 1 shareholders, see Table 8.44, the result are seen
to be significant in Table 8.45. As previously mentioned the reason may be either that
institutional investors invest in such companies or alternative they encourage
companies they have invested in move in this direction.
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Table 8.44: The largest investor difference between NEO different firms
Big one Institutional shareholders
NEO<30% NEO>=30% Difference
1990 15.1 15.5 -0.4
1991 11.9 16.1 -4.2
1992 10.8 13.6 -2.8
1993 9.5 12.0 -2.5
1994 11.5 12.3 -0.8
1995 13.6 12.4 1.2
1996 14.3 12.0 2.4
1998 10.9 13.0 -2.1
1999 11.5 12.9 -1.4
2000 10.1 13.3 -3.2
Table 8.45: The results ofMann-Whitney test between NEO different firms
1990-1992 1993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 161 146 76
NEO>30% 282 -2.08 0.037 478 -2.73 0.006 477 -0.67 0.502
8.5 Boards changes and Performance
8.5.1. Board changes and Performance: Error bar analysis
(1) Duality and net income
Figure 8.14 shows the difference in net income between dual firms and separation
firms in three periods. The average incomes, deflated by previous year total assets,
are declining over the 1990s. The graph also shows that separation firms show less
average net income than dual firms except in 1990-1992.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
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Figure 8.14: Net Income for Dual and Separation over time, 1990-2 Dual (a) &
Separation (b), 1993-5 Dual (c) & Separation (d), 1996-8 Dual (e) & Separation
(f>-
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(2) Duality and Tobin's Q
Figure 8.15 shows the difference in Tobin's Q between dual firms and separation
firms in three periods. Contrary to previous analysis, which used deflated net income
the figure shows the increase in Tobin's Q over the time, the slightly higher mean for







Figure 8.15: Tobin's Q for Dual and Separation over time, 1990-2 Dual (a) &
Separation (b), 1993-5 Dual (c) & Separation (d), 1996-8 Dual (e) & Separation
(t).
(3) Percentage ofNEO and net income
Similar to the picture for duality the analysis for percentage ofNEO has similar
decrease in the net income over the period. Figure 8.16 shows the difference in net
income based on percentage of non-executive directors. The graph indicates that firms
with more than 30% non-executive have a slightly lower net income than firm with
less than 30% non-executive. Again those with lower percentage ofNEO have a
higher variance.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
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Figure 8.16: Percentage of NEO and net income. 1990- 2 Less than 30% NEO
(a) & More than 30% NEO (b), 1993-5 Less than 30% NEO (c) & More than
30% NEO (d), 1996-8 Less than 30% NEO (e) & More than 30% NEO (f),
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(4) Percentage ofNEO and Tobin's Q
Again the plot of the mean and confidence intervals over years are similar to the
previous plot for Tobin's Q, see Figure 8.17. The figure shows the difference in
Tobin's Q based on percentage of non-executive directors. The pattern also shows
increasing Tobin's Q. The firms with more than 30% outside-directors shows higher
average Tobin's Q compared to firms with less than 30% non-executive directors.





Figure 8.17: Percentage of NEO and Tobin's Q, 1990- 2 Less than 30% NEO (a)
& More than 30% NEO (b), 1993-5 Less than 30% NEO (c) & More than 30%
NEO (d), 1996-8 Less than 30% NEO (e) & More than 30% NEO (1),
8.5.2 Board changes and Performance: Regression analysis
In model 1, the explanatory variables are separation, firms with more than 30 % non¬
executive directors (NEO30P), size (Capln), and current ratio (CLCA). In model 2,
instead of dummy variable (NEO30P), percentage ofnon-executive director (PNEO)
is used.
(1) CG and NI
In Table 8.46 and 8.47, the dependent variable is deflated net income. The F-value
for each model is significant at the 5% level. The explanatory power of each model is
between 8% and 11%.
In model 1, the association between separation and deflated net income shows
different relationships over the timescale. In pre-Cadbury, the sign is insignificant,
but post Cadbury, especially during the period 1993-1998, the association of
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separation to deflated net income shows a negative sign, see Table 8.46. The
NEO30P, which indicate firms with more than 30 %, shows negative signs throughout
the 1990s. Model 2 shows similar pattern as model 1 see Table 8.47.
Table 8.46: Regression ofNI on board changes in model 1
90-92 93-95 96-98 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=Nl Dependent=NI Dependent=NI Dependent=NI
Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig
Sep 0.00 0.08 0.93 -0.01 -1.05 0.30 -0.05 -2.46 0.01 -0.03 -2.34 0.02
NEO30p -0.03 -3.54 0.00 -0.05 -4.42 0.00 -0.08 -3.62 0.00 -0.06 -4.93 0.00
capln 0.01 6.51 0.00 0.02 6.10 0.00 0.03 8.47 0.00 0.02 10.03 0.00
clca -0.03 -3.54 0.00 0.04 2.62 0.01 0.05 2.67 0.00 0.06 5.40 0.00
constant -0.16 -4.46 0.00 -0.30 -5.41 0.00 -0.56 -7.71 0.00 -0.40 -9.39 0.00
R square 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.10
Adj R2 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.09
F-stat 12.75 13.35 21.82 37.67
Table 8.47: Regression ofNI on board changes in model 2
90-92 93-95 96-98 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=Nl Dependent=NI Dependent=NI Dependent=Nl
Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig
Sep 0.00 0.28 0.78 -0.01 -1.01 0.31 -0.05 -2.58 0.01 -0.03 -2.37 0.02
PNEO -0.06 -2.76 0.01 -0.11 -3.22 0.00 -0.23 -4.29 0.00 -0.15 -5.04 0.00
capln 0.01 6.70 0.00 0.02 6.11 0.00 0.03 8.50 0.00 0.02 10.05 0.00
clca -0.03 -3.61 0.00 0.03 2.32 0.02 0.05 2.46 0.01 0.06 5.04 0.00
constant -0.16 -4.40 0.00 -0.29 -5.18 0.00 -0.52 -7.09 0.00 -0.38 -8.84 0.00
R
square 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.10
Adj R2 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10
F-stat 13.68 12.99 23.28 37.67
(2) CG and Tobin's Q
In Tables 8.48 and 8.49, the dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The F-value for each
model is significant at the 5% level. The explanatory power of each model is between
11% and 18%. Table 8.48 shows the results there is not a significant relation between
Tobin's Q and Corporate governance changes. Only in the pre-Cadbury period does
there appear to be a negative association between Tobin's Q and NEO30P in model 1
and PNEO in model 2. These relationships are identified in Figures 8.16 and 8.18.
Whilst the pattern of performance is improving over the period the confidence
intervals are still overlapping, indicating the lack of significant in regression analysis.
163
Table 8.48: Regression of Tobin's Q on board changes in model 1
90-92 93-95 96-98 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=Tobin's Q Dependent=Tobin's Q Dependent=Tobin's Q Dependent=Tobin's Q
Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig
Sep 0.11 1.80 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.96 0.13 0.57 0.57 -0.03 -0.29 0.77
NEO30p -0.27 -4.59 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.93 0.08 0.33 0.74 0.05 0.50 0.62
capln 0.13 8.79 0.00 0.13 4.89 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.16 7.90 0.00
clca -0.06 -0.96 0.34 -0.92 -7.60 0.00 -1.81 -7.88 0.00 -1.16 11.39 0.00
constant -0.83 -3.13 0.00 0.17 0.38 0.71 -0.18 -0.23 0.82 -0.26 -0.69 0.49
R squa 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.12
Adj R2 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.12
F-stat 23.45 18.83 19.45 45.30
Table 8.49: Regression of Tobin's Q on board changes in model 2
90-92 93-95 96-98 93-98
Model 1 Dependent=Tonin's Q Dependent=Tonin's Q Dependent=Tonin's Q Dependent=Tonin's Q
Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig Coeff t sig
Sep 0.12 1.93 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.98 0.08 0.35 0.72 -0.03 -0.32 0.75
PNEO -0.74 -4.53 0.00 -0.12 -0.41 0.68 1.21 2.05 0.04 0.18 0.72 0.47
capln 0.13 8.89 0.00 0.13 4.97 0.00 0.18 3.94 0.00 0.16 7.90 0.00
clca -0.07 -1.08 0.28 -0.92 -7.62 0.00 -1.81 -7.91 0.00 -1.16 11.37 0.00
constant -0.80 -2.98 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.70 -0.41 -0.50 0.62 -0.28 -0.76 0.45
R
square 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.12
Adj R2 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.12
F-stat 23.28 18.87 20.58 45.38
8.6 Boards changes and Firm Risks
8.6.1 Board changes and Firm Risks: Error bar analysis
(1) Duality and Z-Score
Altaian's Z-Score is a measure of financial strength, the higher Z the lower
probabilities of bankruptcy and the lower score the higher risk. Table 8.50 provides
the average Z-score for both firms with duality and firms with separation. Firms with
duality show an increasing Z-Score, indicating decreasing default risk, but firms with
separation show decreasing Z-score, which indicate increasing default risk. Figure
8.18 shows the Z-scores, one can see that there is considerable variance associated to
1996-8 period for dual companies. This may be partially due to sample size.
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Table 8.50: Average Z-score between duality and separation
90-92 93-95 96-98
Duality 2.980 3.202 3.841
Separation 2.921 2.926 2.368
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 8.18: Z-score for Dual and Separation over time, 1990-2 Dual (a) &
Separation (b), 1993-5 Dual (c) & Separation (d), 1996-8 Dual (e) & Separation
(f)-
(2) Duality and Firm specific risk
Table 8.51 shows increasing pattern of firm risk see also Figure 8.19. Both firms with
duality and firms with separation indicate the increasing firm specific risk unlike for
the Z-score. The firms with separation are not more risky than dual firms.
Table 8.51: Average Firm specific risk between duality and separation
90-92 93-95 96-98
Duality 33.649 35.810 43.592
Separation 31.908 35.489 38.177
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
tag
1 |§ I X
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Figure 8.19: Firm specific risk for Dual and Separation over time, 1990-2 Dual
(a) & Separation (b), 1993-5 Dual (c) & Separation (d), 1996-8 Dual (e) &
Separation (f).
(3) Outside director and Z-Score
Table 8.52 shows two patterns ofZ-score between firms with more than 30 % non¬
executive directors and other firms. Firms with more than 30% non-executive director
shows higher risk than firms with lower percentage of non-executive director
according to the Z-score. Figure 8.20 provides illustration of the results.
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Table 8.52: Average Z-score between PNEO different firms
90-92 93-95 96-98
PNEO(< 0.3) 3.098 3.538 3.683
PNEO(> 0.3) 2.858 2.847 2.645
* Z-score data from OSIRIS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
* "j z I IIII ^ ^ I
Figure 8.20: Average Z-score between PNEO different firms, 1990- 2 Less than
30% NEO (a) & More than 30% NEO (b), 1993-5 Less than 30% NEO (c) &
More than 30% NEO (d), 1996-8 Less than 30% NEO (e) & More than 30%
NEO (f),
(4) Outside director and Firm Specific risk
Table 8.53 shows the increasing pattern of firm risk, but the difference is not
significant, see also Figure 8.21.
Table 8.53: Average Firm specific risk between PNEO different firms
90-92 93-95 96-98
PNEO(< 0.3) 34.124 35.603 40.602
PNEO(> 0.3) 31.843 35.585 37.069
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
m ~
ss
I I I I
T-1 X
Figure 8.21 Firm specific risk between PNEO different firms, 1990- 2 Less than
30% NEO (a) & More than 30% NEO (b), 1993-5 Less than 30% NEO (c) &
More than 30% NEO (d), 1996-8 Less than 30% NEO (e) & More than 30%
NEO (f),
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8.6.2. Board changes and Firm Risks: Mann-Whitey Test
(1) Duality and Z-Score
Mann-Whitey Test is significant only in the 96-98 periods for difference in Z-score
risk, see Table 8.54. Firms with duality are healthier than firms with separation in the
1996-1998 in terms ofZ-score.
Table 8.54: Mann-Whitey Test between duality and separation with Zscore
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 142 145 124
Separation 250 -0.18 0.856 397 -1.79 0.073 573 -4.43 0.000
(2) Duality and Firm specific risk
The test shows no differences between firms for the periods of 1992-1995 and 1993-
1995, but for the periods of 1996-1998, sees Table 8.55. Firms with separation are
less risky than dual firms. This is the opposite result to the Z-score analysis.
Table 8.55: Mann-Whitey Test between duality and separation with Firm
specific risk
992-1995 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 164 161 140
Separation 308 -1.76 0.079 465 -1.61 0.108 648 -3.13 0.002
(3) Outside director and Z-Score
The Mann Whitney test in Table 8.56 shows there are risk difference between firms
with more than 30% non-executive firms and other firms. Firms with more than 30%
non-executive director shows higher risk than firms with less than 30% NEO
Table 8.56: Mann-Whitey Test between NEO different firms with Z-score
1990-1992 993-1995 996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 152 136 104
NEO>=30% 223 -3.35 0.001 401 -6.12 0.000 634 -5.80 0.000
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(4) Outside director and Firm Specific risk
Table 8.57 shows no difference in firm specific risk over the periods.
Table 8.57: Mann-Whitey Test between NEO different firms with Firm specific
risk
1992-1995 1993-1995 1996-1998
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 175 160 121
NEO>=30% 277 -1.56 0.118 459 -1.58 0.113 718 -1.80 0.07
8.7 Ownership, Performance and Firm Risk
8.7.1 Ownership and performance
(1) Board ownership and Net Income
There is no significant relationship between board ownership and net income during
the periods of 93-95 and 96-98, but in the periods of 1990-1992, there is positive
relationship, see Table 8.58
Table 8.58: Regression ofNI on BFA in model 1
90-92 93-95 96-98
Model 1 Dependent=NI Dependent=NI Dependent=NI
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
BFA 0:001 3.721 0.00 0.0004 1.34 0.18 0.001 1.15 0.25
capln 0.030 7.77 0.00 0.020 5.09 0.00 0.020 5.28 0.00
CLCA -0.080 -4.64 0.00 0.020 1.40 0.16 0.003 0.13 0.89
constant -0.402 -6.17 0.00 -0.263 -4.62 0.00 -0.346 -4.86 0.00
R square 0.192 0.058 0.045
Adj R2 0.185 0.052 0.041
F 26.109 9.933 9.641
(2) BFA and Tobin's Q
There are positive relationship between Tobin's Q and Board ownership. Over the
three periods, the regression results show that the relation is strong, see Table 8.59.
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Table 8.59: Regression of Tobin's Q on BFA in model 1
90-92 93-95 96-98
Model 1 Dependent=TQ Dependent=TQ Dependent=TQ
Coefficient t sift Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
BFA 0.006 3.65 0.00 0.010 4.14 0.00 0.02 4.41 0.00
cap In 0.170 9.63 0.00 0.179 6.76 0.00 0.292 8.34 0.00
CLCA -0.427 -4.98 0.00 -0.729 -5.78 0.00 -1.253 -6.82 0.00
constant -1.462 -4.34 0.00 -1.212 -2.40 0.02 -2.727 -4.10 0.00
R square 0.256 0.133 0.152
Adj R2 0.250 0.127 0.148
F 37.795 24.761 36.463
8.7.2 Ownership and Firm Risks
(1) Board ownership and Z-score
The regression results show that Board ownership has a positive relationship with Z-
score in the 96-98 periods. This means the larger the board ownership, the higher the
Z-score and therefore the firm has less risk, see Table 8.60.
Table 8.60: Regression of Z-Score on BFA
90-92 93-95 96-98
Model2 Dependent=Z score Dependent=Z score Dependent=Z score
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
BFA 0.006 1.80 0.07 0.006 1.79 0.07 0.010 2.38 0.02
capln -0.030 -0.92 0.36 -0.030 -0.98 0.33 0.090 2.07 0.04
constant 3.349 5.06 0.00 3.385 5.69 0.00 0.971 1.20 0.23
R square 0.024 0.014 0.013
Adj R2 0.017 0.010 0.010
(2) Board ownership and Firm Specific Risk
When using the measure firm specific risk, the result is significant only in 93-95
periods, see Table 8.61. The larger the board ownership, the less the risk is.
Table 8.61: Regression of Firm Specific Risk on board ownership
90-92 93-95 96-98
Model2 Dependent=FSR Dependent=FSR Dependent=FSR
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
BFA -0.030 -1.11 0.27 -0.123 -3.20 0.00 0.020 0.57 0.57
capln -4.562 -14.78 0.00 -5.992 -16.20 0.00 -5.139 -15.95 0.00
constant 114.293 19.81 0.00 146.619 20.87 0.00 130.144 21.40 0.00
R square 0.386 0.340 0.311
Adj R2 0.383 0.338 0.309
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(3) BFA and TL/TA
The following regression, Table 8.62, shows the relationship between Board
ownership and total liability. The results are significant over the test periods. The
larger the BFA, the less are the total liability.
Table 8.62: Regression of TL/TA on BFA
90-92 93-95 93-98
Model2 Dependent=TL/TA Dependent=TL/TA Dependent=TL/TA
Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig Coefficient t sig
BFA -0.002 -3.55 0.00 -0.001 -2.96 0.00 -0.002 -3.02 0.00
capln 0.001 0.12 0.91 0.008 2.01 0.05 0.009 1.80 0.07
constant 0.558 6.21 0.00 0.396 4.97 0.00 0.410 4.36 0.00
R square 0.045 0.039 0.030
Adj R2 0.039 0.035 0.027
8.8 Reporting Quality and Conservatism in UK
8.8.1 Earning and Liability Pattern in Sample Companies
(1) UK Earning Pattern
The annual growth rates ofGDP show that 1990-1991 was a recessionary period, see
Figure 3.2. Yet over the 1990s, there is a stable growth rate in GDP. Figure 8.22
shows decreasing patterns of average net income and EBIT when deflated by total
assets. This is the result of increasing number of firms with negative income. In terms
of earnings, the firm risks increased over the period. This may be due to an increasing
adoption of conservative accounting practices, where the increasing reporting of
negative earnings does not present a correct view of firm risk.
| • Net Income(all) — EBIT(all) [
Figure 8.22: Average NI and EBIT
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In Table 8-63, the percentage of negative net income has increased from 3 percents in
1985 to 47 percents in listed firms. For the de-listed firms the percentages of negative
income, also, have been increasing over the sample periods, but at a greater rate.
Table 8.63: Frequency of Loss in Sample companies
Earnings
List iirms Delisted firms
Number % Neg Number % Neg
1985 30 0.03 20 0
1986 40 0.07 26 0
1987 53 0.04 36 0.06
1988 65 0.05 44 0.09
1989 75 0.08 56 0.05
1990 80 0.14 62 0.10
1991 84 0.25 65 0.22
1992 87 0.15 68 0.26
1993 91 0.14 75 0.20
1994 101 0.17 84 0.26
1995 121 0.17 96 0.26
1996 140 0.23 112 0.20
1997 151 0.25 119 0.26
1998 164 0.32 121 0.44
1999 173 0.30 111 0.59
2000 190 0.34 82 0.70
SD 0.149 0.259
Notes: a) Deflated earnings is Net Income deflated by prior period Total Assets.
(2) Liability pattern
Figure 8.23 shows the time series pattern of total liabilities and current liabilities,
actual figures given in Table 8.64. Both liabilities maintain constant level based on
deflated assets. Even the liability levels show decreasing patterns after 1995. In terms
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Figure 8.23: Average liabilities deflated by total assets
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Table 8.64: Liability deflated ry tota assets
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
LT 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19
ST 0.52 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.36 0.41
Total 0.68 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.54 0.60
8.8.2 Reporting Quality in UK
(1) Discretionary Accrual by pooling method
Average discretionary accruals in each year
Figures 8.24, 8.25 and 8.26 show the average discretionary accruals in each year. The
calculation processes are in the Appendix 2.1. When applied to all data, there are
some discernible patterns in the sample periods: Before the 1992, there is negative
average discretionary accrual, during the periods of 1992-1994, it is zero, and there is
peak in 1996 and fall after that year. When compared the average discretionary
accruals between listed firms and delisted firms, there is slight difference in
discretionary accruals. The listed companies show less discretionary accruals than
delisted companies before the 1994, see Figure 8.25 and Figure 8.26.
Discretionary Accruals(all)
• Discretionary Accruals(oll)
Figure 8.24: The average discretionary accruals with all company






Figure 8.25: The average discretionary accruals with listed company
Discrot ionary Accruals (dofcst)
1991 1992 1993 19<
-O.OS
- Discretionary Accruals (deist)
Figure 8.26: The average discretionary accruals with delisted company
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Cumulative discretionary accruals by Pooling Analysis
Figure 8.27, 8.28 and 8.29 shows the cumulative discretionary accruals. Figure 8.27
shows low discretionary accruals during the period of the 1992-1994 and after 1998.
The low discretionary in Figure 8.28 are from the listed companies.
Figure 8.27: Cumulative discretionary accruals with all company
Figure 8.28: Cumulative discretionary accruals with listed company
Figure 8.29: Cumulative discretionary accruals with delisted company
(2) Discretionary Accrual by Cross-section analysis
Average discretionary accruals
The listed firms show lower discretionary accruals over the period of 1989-1993, see
Figure 8.30, 8.31, and 8.32. Also the pattern moves around zero discretionary accruals.
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Figure 8.30: Average discretionary accruals with all company
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Average(delist)
Figure 8.32: Average discretionary accruals with delist company
Cumulative discretionary accruals
When accumulated the discretionary accruals, the listed comapies show lower
discretionary accruals over the periods of 1991-1994, see Figure 8.33, 8,34 and 8.35
Figure 8.33: Cumulative discretionary accruals with all company
Figure 8.34: Cumulative discretionary accruals with list company
Figure 8.35: Cumulative discretionary accruals with delist company
8.8.3 Earning conservatism in UK
To measure earning conservatism, cumulative non-operating accruals, regression of
earnings on returns and book to market ratio are used.
(1) Cumulative non-operating accruals (CNNOA): All Samples
For the analysis of the negative cumulative non-operating accruals, the study used two
models and the results are presented in three parts: all sample, listed firm sample and
de-listed firm sample. Here the all sample model is displayed. The listed and delisted
firm samples are given in appendix 3.
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Model 1, in Figure 8.36 shows the negative cumulative non-operating accruals
(CNNOA) in the periods of 1988 - 1997 in this graph. The CNNOA expanded 90-96
periods and decreased after 1997.
TABD (A 11 > mm- Accum OA (al I > NOA(all)
Figure 8.36: Cumulative negative non-operating accruals with model 1
Model 2 in Figure 8.37, there seems no sign of the negative cumulative non-operating
accruals. The difference is due to the calculation of the working capital accruals.
Model 1 used operational accruals tc calculate non-operational accruals following
Givoly and Hayn (2000), but model 2 used working capital accruals. The results
indicate the difference based on models.
NOA(all)
Figure 8.37: Cumulative negative non-operating accruals with Model 2.
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Figure 8.38: Difference between Operating accruals and Working capital
accruals
(2) Cross-sectional regression of earnings on returns
Table 8.65 shows that the net income is more sensitive to bad news than good news
over the sample period. This result indicates that there exists conservatism during the
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1990s. Basu (1997) states that stock price lead accounting earning because stock
price reflect information other than current earnings. With conservative account
practices loss is recognised more timely. The result is that earnings are expected to be
more strongly associated with negative unexpected return, as a proxy for bad news.
Table 8.65: Cross-sectional regression of earnings on returns
Period Good news Bad news
N Ad R2 a P i N AdR" a P. (3(BN)- p GN)
90-92 165 0.026 0.070 -0.030 125 0.065 0.080 0.239 0.269
(7.211) (-2.307) (3.128) (3.101)
93-95 171 -0.005 0.030 0.020 154 0.038 0.050 0.100 0.080
(1.513) (0.337) (5.199) (2.009)
96-98 229 0.030 0.060 -0.070 189 0.08 0.090 0.483 0.553
(4.252) (-2.853) (2.207) (4.162)
99-01 189 0.021 0.137 -0.610 336 0.054 0.192 0.804 1.414
(0.708) (-2.254) (2.544) (4.466)
* t-statistics in parenthesis
(3) Book to Market ratio
Lower book to market indicates higher conservatism. Figure 8.39 shows that there is
relatively strong conservatism in the period 1993-1997. Figure 8.40, which removed
1 percent extreme data, shows the same results.
Book "t:<=> Market ratio
1 987 -l 988 I 990 1 991 I 993 1 994 1 996 1 997
Figure 8.39: Mean of Book to Market, *BTMit = the book to market ratio for
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Figure 8.40: Mean of Book to Market with removing 1% extreme data, *MV
from Worldscope DB.
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There is mean difference between 1990-1992 period and 1993-1995, see Table 8.66.
The period of 1993-1995 shows strongest level of conservatism.
Table 8.66: Mann Whitney test of BTM between two periods
Pre & Post Cadbury After Cadbury Period
n z sig n z sig
1990-1992 631 1993-1995 743
1993-1995 743 -2.235 0.025 1996-1998 944 -0.43 0.668
(4) More on negative earning and conservatism
Figure 8.22 and Table 8.63 shows increasing number of firms with negative income.
There may bring about confusion between negative income and accounting
conservatism. Negative income is the results of the poor operation, while
conservatism is care selection of accounting practices.
The measures of the conservatism, in this thesis, based on established methods by
Basu (1997) and Givoly and Hayn (2000). Basu (1997) measures conservative
accounting using the income -return response. The method is based on theory that
conservative accounting recognizes bad news in a timely manner than good news.
Also Givoly and Hayn (2000) provide a very useful tool to measure conservatism:
negative non-operating accruals. Companies with conservative accounting increase
the cumulative negative non-operating accruals. The measures of the conservatism are
used by Beekes et al (2004), Lara, et al. (2005), LaFond (2005) with UK data.
Therefore the thesis confirms the previous studies and methods.
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8.9 Board and Conservatism
8.9.1 Regression of earnings on returns under bad news
In this section the aims to address the relationship between earnings on returns and the
changes induced by the codes in the context ofbad news. Again the measures of the
changes are the duality and separation and percentage ofNEO. The work parallels
that of Basu (1997) and Beekes et al. (2004) who explored the issue through their beta
model. They assumed that those firms, which separate the roles will show stronger
earnings on return that should be indicated by p^
(1) Duality and Conservatism
Under the bad news, the firms with separation show stronger association of earning on
return than the firms with duality see Table 8.67. For the period 1990-1998, the Ps of
separation firm are greater than those of duality firms.
Table 8.67: Regression of earnings on returns between duality and separation
Period Duality Separation
PrPiN AdR2 a Pi N AdR2 a P2
90-92 51 0.075 0.050 0.128 64 0.084 0.100 0.381 0.253
2.603 2.254 2.219 2.601
93-95 30 0.014 0.040 0.080 113 0.072 0.070 0.126 0.046
2.545 1.192 5.874 3.117
96-98 26 -0.021 0.050 0.178 135 0.081 0.090 0.530 0.352
0.545 0.697 1.775 3.579
99-01 48 0.053 0.209 0.729 235 0.028 0.141 0.542 -0.187
1.293 1.907 1.760 2.761
(2) NEO30P and Conservatism
Also firms with more than 30 percent NEO have a stronger association than the firms
with less than 30 percent NEO during the period of 93-98 see Table 8.68. This
indicates that firms with more than 30% NEO operate more conservative reporting.
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Table 8.68: Regression of earnings on returns between NEO different firms
Period PNEO <30% PNEO >=30%
P 2" P 1N Ad Rs a P. N Ad R2 a P2
90-92 44 0.139 0.120 0.332 66 0.034 0.040 0.190 -0.142
3.076 2.822 1.095 1.820
93-95 28 -0.03 0.050 0.040 117 0.084 0.060 0.134 0.094
2.498 0.518 6.036 3.417
96-98 32 0.225 0.169 0.477 145 0.069 0.080 0.510 0.033
3.065 3.166 1.468 3.419
99-01 31 -0.005 0.372 0.763 251 0.041 0.136 0.574 -0.189
1.083 0.923 1.984 3.415
8.9.2 Board changes and BTM
In relation between duality and separation, firms with separation have lower BTM
ratio through the three periods. Also in the relation between percentage ofNEO and
BTM, firms with higher percentage of NEO has lower BTM ratio, indicating higher
conservatism.
(1) Duality and Conservatism
During the period of 1993-1995 andl996-1998, the average BTM is lower with
separation see Figure 8.41. The Mann Whitney test shows only the period of 96-98
has significant difference between dual firms and separation firms. Details are given
in Table 8.69.





Figure 8.41: Duality and Conservatism with BTM, 1990-2 Dual (a) & Separation
(b), 1993-5 Dual (c) & Separation (d), 1996-8 Dual (e) & Separation (f).
Table 8.69: Mann Whitney test between duality and Separation
1990-1992 BTM 1993-1995 BTM 1996-1998 BTM
n z sig n z sig n z sig
Dual 218 165 146
Separation 357 -0.052 0.958 493 -1.97 0.048 665 -3.08 0.002
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(2) NEO30P and Conservatism
Error bar analysis, Figure 8.42, shows that during the period of 1993-1995 and 1996-
1998, the average BTM is lower with more than 30% NEO firms. The Mann Whitney
test given in Table 8.70 is significant only for the 96-98 period.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
I
3=
Figure 8.42: NEO30P and Conservatism with BTM, 1990- 2 Less than 30% NEO
(a) & More than 30% NEO (b), 1993-5 Less than 30% NEO (c) & More than
30% NEO (d), 1996-8 Less than 30% NEO (e) & More than 30% NEO (f),
Table 8.70: Mann Whitney test between NEO different firms
1990-1992 BTM 1993-1995 BTM 1996-1998 BTM
n z sig n z sig n z sig
NEO<30% 217 164 130
NEO>=30% 342 -1.706 0.088 487 -1.49 0.14 734 -2.29 0.022
8.10 Ownership and Conservatism
8.10.1 Cross-sectional regression of earnings on returns
(1) Sensitivity under Good and Bad News
During the period of 1990-1992, all firms show conservative reporting patterns
regardless of board ownership, see Table 8.71. During the period of 1993-1995, only
the firms with less than 5% board ownership show conservative reporting signs, see
Table 8.72. Then during the period of 1996-1998, all firms with BFA show
conservative signs see Table 8.73.
Table 8.71 : Sensitivity under Good anc Bad News in Year 1990 -1992
BFA% Good news Bad news
N Ad R2 a Pi N Ad R2 a Pi P(BN)- P GN)
BFA<5% 60 0.138 0.090 -0.060 32 0.018 0.020 0.283 0.343
7.747 -3.236 0.271 1.249
5<BFA<25 31 0.002 0.030 0.100 25 0.024 0.128 0.215 0.115
0.978 1.030 2.175 1.260
BFA >25 26 -0.024 0.004 0.030 22 0.125 0.080 0.184 0.154
0.108 0.635 2.504 2.000
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Table 8.72: Sensitivity under Good and Bad News in Year 1993 -1995
BFA% Good news Bad news
N AdR2 a P. N AdR2 a P. P(BN)- P GN)
BFA < 5% 69 0.015 0.080 -0.050 87 0.003 0.050 0.060 0.110
6.544 -1.417 4.128 1.117
5<BFA<25 30 -0.028 -0.010 0.050 18 0.071 0.040 -0.111 -0.161
-0.196 0.466 2.208 -1.517
BFA >25 31 0.005 -0.070 0.399 11 -0.105 0.010 -0.040 -0.439
0.217 -0.216
Table 8.73: Sensitivity under Good and Bad News in Year 1996 -1998
BFA% Good news Bad news
N AdR2 a P. N AdR2 a P. P(BN)- P GN)
BFA < 5% 109 0.073 0.070 -0.100 68 0.061 0.070 0.308 0.408
4.708 -3.074
5<BFA<25 38 0.279 0.114 -0.137 35 0.035 0.070 0.173 0.310
5.741 -3.915 1.890 1.498
BFA >25 32 -0.032 0.040 -0.010 31 0.027 0.211 0.810 0.820
0.847 -0.190 0.893 1.349
(2) Sensitivity under Bad News
Firms with less than 5 % board ownership are more conservative than firms with more
than 5% during the all period except 96-98 periods, see Table 8.74. This is also true
for the same more than 10% and 20% as presented in Table 8.75 and Table 8.76.
Table 8.74: BFA sensitivity under Bad News between BFA 5% and above
Period BFA >5% BFA <5%
N AdR2 a P. N AdR2 a P2 P 2" P 1
90-92 47 0.06 0.10 0.20 32 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.09
3.06 1.98 0.27 1.25
93-95 29 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 87 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.12
1.43 -0.63 4.13 1.12
96-98 66 0.03 0.13 0.52 68 0.06 0.07 0.31 -0.21
1.30 1.79 1.85 2.31
99-01 51 0.05 0.09 0.26 64 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.03
1.83 1.96 0.17 1.09
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Table 8.75: BFA sensitivity under Bad News between BFA 5% and BFA 10%
Above
Period BFA> 10% BFA <5%
N Ad R2 a P. N AdR2 a P2 P 2" P 1
90-92 0.13 0.10 0.19 32 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.10 0.09
3.69 2.46 0.27 1.25
93-95 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 87 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.12
0.82 -0.66 4.13 1.12
96-98 0.03 0.16 0.61 68 0.06 0.07 0.31 -0.30 -0.21
1.05 1.48 1.85 2.31
99-01 0.08 0.10 0.22 64 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.03
2.63 2.17 0.17 1.09
Table 8.76: BFA sensitivity under Bad News between BFA 5% and BFA 25%
Above
Period BFA >25% BFA <5%
N AdR2 a P. N AdR2 a P2 P 2" P 1
90-92 0.13 0.08 0.18 32 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.10
2.50 2.00 0.27 1.25
93-95 11 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 87 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.10
0.22 -0.22 4.13 1.12
96-98 31 0.03 0.21 0.81 68 0.06 0.07 0.31 -0.50
0.89 1.35 1.85 2.31
99-01 23 0.11 0.14 0.29 64 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.00
.2.449 1.96 0.17 1.09
8.10.2 BFA and BTM
Mann Whitney test confirms that firms with less than 5% board ownership are more
conservative in reporting see Table 8.77.
Table 8.77: Mann Whitney test for BFA in three period
1990-1992 BTM 1993-1995 BTM 1996-1998 BTM
n z sig n z sig n z sig
BTA>5% 222 < 232 944
BTA<5% 185 -3.974 0.00 290 -3.07 0.002 670 -1.19 0.233
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8.11 Impact of Conservative Data on Default models
8.11.1 Impact of conservative data on Altman model
Figure 8.43 shows the results of the probability of default in Altman model, details
given in Table 8.78. The calculation processes are in Appendix 5. The graph shows
the increasing risks during the period of 1990-1993 and the period of 1997-2000. In a
more conservative data year, each model has turned down. This indicates the data
influence the outcome of the models. With the turndown, the model looses its
predictive power of classification. The reason is that a given level of negative
earnings has a smaller effect on the probability of bankruptcy when the Altman model
is built on more conservative data. Figure 8.44 and 8.45 shows the same results from












Figure 8.43: Probability of default in Altman Model with all firms
Table 8.78: Probability of default in Altman Model
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PDzAltman 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.12
PD(z9092) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13
PD(z9395) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
PD(z9698) o:o3 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
PD(z990l) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
PD(z900l) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01


























Figure 8.45: Probability of default in Altman Model with delisted firms
8.11.2. Impact of conservative data on Ohlson model
The Original Ohlson model also shows the increasing pattern of risk in the UK firms
Figure 8.46, details given in Table 8.79. The calculation processes are in Appendix 6.
The 9092 model, which used 90-92 data with 23 defaults, also shows an increasing
pattern. The rest of the sample shows similar results as that of the Altman models.
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Figure 8.46: Probability of default in Ohlson Model with all firms
Table 8.79: Changes of Probability of Default in Oh
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PDOhlson 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.47
PD(o9092) 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15
PD(o9395) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
PD(o9698) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
PD(o9801) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
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Figure 8.47: Probability of default in Ohlson Model with listed firms
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Figure 8.48: Probability of default in Ohlson Model with delisted firms
8.11.3 Option models as bench mark
(1) Model 1
Considering Merton's option based model, model 1 shows different trend in the
default risk Figures 8.49, 8.50 and 8.51, details given in Table 8.80. The calculation
processes are in Appendix 7. This is a more volatile graph, which appears to decrease
from 1990 to 1994. From 1994 till 1997 it becomes more stable and at end of series
becomes again more volatile with possible increase.
Table 8.80: Probability of Default with model 1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Prob(u)All 0.43 0.24 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.33 0.22 0.29
Prob(u)list 0.46 0.28 0.36 0.16 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.36 0.23 0.29
Prob(u)delist 0.33 0.09 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.28
! - ' ~ ~
1 ■ «««
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Figure 8.50: Probability of default in Merton model (1) with list firms
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Figure 8.51: Probability of default in Merton model (1) with delisted firms
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(2) Model 2
Merton's Model 2 has the same pattern with model 1 Figures 8.52, 8.53 and 8.54,
details are given in Table 8.81.
Table 8.81: Probability of default with model 2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Prob®All 0.43 0.32 0.37 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.28 0.31
Prob®list 0.46 0.36 0.40 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.38 0.29 0.32
Prob®delist 0.33 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.30
Figure 8.52: Probability of default in Merton model (2) with All firms
Figure 8.53: Probability of default in Merton model (2) with listed firms
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Figure 8.54: Probability of default in Merton model (2) with delisted firms
(3) Comparing Model 1 and Model 2
When comparing the two models in Figure 8.55 it appears that model 2 is always
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Figure 8.55: Comparing Merton modcl(l)and (2)
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8.11.4. Impact of Conservative Data on each model
(1) Using original accounting models
Figure 8.56 compares three models: Altman model, Ohlson model and Merton models.
Both Altman model and Ohlson model used the same coefficient values as those of
the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1984).
It is clear that the Altman model has the lowest default rate and is on gentle increase
over the period. Merton model seem most volatile over the period starting initially
above the Ohlson model then for the remaining period being below it. The Ohlson
model has the highest default except at the beginning and like the Altman model is on
a gentle rise over the period.
0.1 ^ ♦
o T T T - . - t :
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997" 1998 1999 2000
. ♦ Altman «n» Ohlson —* Merton (u)
Figure 8.56: Comparing Altman model, Ohlson model and Merton model
(2) Using Rebuilding models
In this section the models are rebuilt using the variables suggested by Altman (1968)
and Ohlson (1984). The coefficients are estimated using logistic regression based on
current data. This is to allow for change due to the period of study.
Figures from 8.57 to 8.61 show the sensitivity to the conservative data. For the
models, the 23 default companies are drawn and 5 period data are used. For example,
the models in Figure 8.57, the Altman and Ohlson model are built by 1990-1992 data
with the 23 default company data.
When the models are built by each period data, the Ohlson model drops dramatically
to just above the Altman model compare Figure 8.56 with Figure 8.57. With more
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conservative data period, the changes of the default probability are shown in Figure
8.58, 8.59, 8.60, and 8.61. As the data have contain more negative income data, the
newly built Altman and Ohlson model has no distinction and lost the predictive power.
The differences from previous curves show that re-estimation may be an important
issue when using Altman and Ohlson model.
• <— O0002 a Morton(u)
Figure 8.57: Rebuilding model with data 1990-1992
Z9393 mm o9395 A Merton(u)
Figure 8.58: Rebuilding model with data 1993-1995
Figure 8.59: Rebuilding model with data 1996-1998
Figure 8.60: Rebuilding model with data 1999-2000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1 996 "» 997 1 960 1 999 2000
09001
Figure 8.61: Rebuilding model with data 1990-2000
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8.12 Conclusion
In this Chapter the results obtained from the empirical study have been presented. It
has presented a broad sweep across areas ofboard changes, ownership and impact of
conservatism. For the analysis of the board changes, separation ofCEO and Chairman,
the introduction ofNEO, Board member tenure are analysed. The ownership studies
contain board ownership and institutional ownership. In relation to performance and
risk evaluation, income, Tobin's Q, Z-score and firm specific risk are analysed. To
investigate the inconsistent results, reporting quality and conservatism are studied.
Also how the board changes are related with conservatism is analysed. Then the
impact of the conservatism on the risk models is studied. In the next Chapter these





The objective of this study was to consider the impact of changes in Corporate
Governance in UK on performance of companies and especially their risk
management. The approach taken was empirical based on a sample of manufacturing
companies. This chapter summarise findings from the research carried out. The
study started with a review of the literature on Corporate Governance and its
relationship to roles of the Board and Owners of the company. It explored the
different theories and models for the relationship. Subsequently the work explored
the definition of Risk and its measurement, to provide a basis for the empirical study.
In the research it was found there was an ambiguity over measurement of risk with
different measures implying different behaviours between the groups applying the
recommendations and those not. It would appear that these differences could be
accounted for by conservatism of accounting practices. Perhaps the main impact of
the reports during the period of study is those that have adopted the recommendation
have tended to take a more conservative approach. The Chapter will provide the
summary of the work within the thesis. It will start with review of the literature
highlighting the key insights. It will then explore the relationship between the
Board/Ownership and performance/risk. It will look at the evidence for conservatism.
Finally it will discuss the findings for the empirical study.
9.1 Key insights from existing works
This section will summarise the findings form the literature on corporate governance,
risk and conservatism.
9.1.1 Many theories
Many theories abound for corporate governance and so researchers are faced with
several options for the basis of study. It is, though, helpful to take on board the view
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of Donaldson and Davis (1991), which suggest that one can select the appropriate
theory for a specific use. They argue that the important thing is not the issue of
superiority of one theory over another theory, but the validity of theory as an
explanation for some phenomena. Similarly Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) argue
that 'a multi-theoretic approach to corporate governance is essential for recognising
the many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance organizational
functions'. Hence the basis of this research has been pragmatic in dealing with
underlying theory. The main impetus has been towards empirical research.
9.1.2 The risk management aspect of corporate governance
The study has intended to explore the relationship between corporate governance and
risk management. It is generally assumed within the UK that corporate governance
has a major role in the management of risk. The issue in this study is whether the risk
management can be controlled through regulation in the form of codes applied to
corporate governance. The UK tradition of corporate governance is through self-
regulation, with the trend to codification being distinctly recent phenomena.
9.1.3 Ownership, board and performance
There are two different views on endogenety of managerial ownership structures.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership structures are endogenously
determined while Morck et al. (1988) report the ownership structure as exogenous.
The study on relationship between managerial ownership and performance reports
that the relationship is certainly non-monotonic. Each previous study reveals a
different relationship in percentage terms between ownership and performance.
The growth of institutional ownership has lead to an increased institutional role in the
governance of companies. There is also a social demand for their participant in the
corporate governance.
9.1.4 Risk models and risk studies
Risk is an ambiguous term with many potential definitions. Hence many authors have
suggested a variety of measures to assess risk. Two broad categories are accounting
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and market based approaches. Each measure has its limitation. The accounting data
can be regarded as historic whilst market data can be regarded as future expectations
ofmarket. In this work both are considered.
9.1.5 Linking board change, risk management and conservatism
The change in the codes that develop in the 1990s had an impact on the composition
of the Board. Hence this study has explored the changes that have taken place at
Board level to see if that has effected the management of risk. Another change that
has occurred is the more conservative approach to accounting. It can be argued that
these three issues are highly related in that they are trying to achieve the same goals.
The changes in the Board are to ensure greater monitoring role and hence the ability
of the Board to actively manage and so reduce risk. Risk management within a
company should be focused on reducing the cost of bankruptcy, reducing tax,
facilitating optimal investment, improving decision making and capital budgeting, and
develop risk reducing management. Conservatism within accounting aims to reducing
the cost of contracting, reducing shareholder litigation, avoiding regulations
intervention, and reducing taxes.
9.2 Research Findings
r
9.2.1 Finding (1): Changes of Board and Tenure
(1) Board changes
The results show that the Cadbury report had an impact
separation of chairman and CEO was apparent after 1992.
separated the chairman and CEO. In the end of the 2000,
all firms split the position ofCEO and Chairman.
on board composition. The
In 1990, 59 % of the firms
the table shows that 83% of
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Also the percentage of the NEO has increased to 50 percent by the end of the 1999,
but there are some differences between industries. The average board size has not
changed much during the 1990s, but the average number of non-executive directors
has increased from 2.4 to 3.6. Firms with more than 3 non-executive directors were
only 45% in 1990, but 72% firms have more than 3 non-executive directors by 2000.
Technical oriented industries, such as SIC 36 to SIC 38 show lower rate of separation.
Also there are 10-20 percent of the companies which did not follow the Cadbury
Report's recommendations.
(2) Tenure changes
After Cadbury Report, the accelerated separation of chairman and CEO brought in
new CEO and Chairman to the companies. New financial directors are appointed
both 1990-1992 periods and 1998-2000 periods, again possibly reflecting changes in
CEOs and Chairmen.
(3) Implication
The tenure results show that Cadbury Report had impact on the appointment of new
board members: chairman, CEO and financial director. The analysis shows, though,
it is possible that financial director may move up to CEO or Chairman. These results
may indicate, contrary to the desire of the Cadbury Committee, that increased
independence has not been achieved and so the greater monitoring has not been the
outcome.
9.2.2 Findings (2): Changes ofOwnership
(1) Board Ownership
For the board ownership, the patterns indicate that the share of the directors and their
relatives were decreasing: while the board ownerships amount to 19.7 per cent in
1990, they decrease to 13.8 percent in 1998.
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(2) Institutional Ownership
For the largest 3 institutional ownership, all the firms show very similar average
ownership over the 1990s, which has 22-23 percentages of shares of the companies
being owned by 3 institutions. The average holding, though, of the largest
institutional investor has declined over the 1990s: 15.3 percent of the each firm in
1990 to 12.9 in 2000. The decrease was especially notable after 1992-1993 periods.
(3) Implication
The 10-20 percent of the companies which did not follow the Cadbury Report's
recommendation may be explained by the structure of the board ownership. The trade
off pattern between board ownership and duality are shown to be the higher the board
ownership is, the less separation of the chairman and CEO.
9.2.3 Findings (3): Board structure and Tenure
(1) Impact of duality on tenure
The tenure of chairman and CEO is related to duality. Firms with duality show longer
tenure for Chairman and CEO. This pattern was significant for both 1990-1992 and
1993-1995. In the 1993-1995, the firms with no duality also show longer tenure of
financial director. For the rest of the period the results were not significant
statistically, see Table 9.1
Table 9.1: Impact of duality on tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
Chairman Dual > No dual Dual > No dual
CEO Dual > No dual Dual > No dual Dual > No dual
FD Dual < No dual
(2) Impact of Percentage NEO on tenure
The tenure of Chairman and CEO is related to percentage ofNEO. Firms with less
than 30% NEO in board have longer tenure for chairman and CEO. In the 1990-1992,
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the firms with more than 30% NEO have longer tenure for financial directors, see
Table 9.2.
Table 9.2: Impact of Percentage NEO on tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
Chairman NEO301ess > NEO30more NEO301ess > NEO30more
CEO NEO301ess > NEO30more
FD NEO301ess < NEO30more
(3) Board ownership and tenure
Board ownership is positively related to chairman tenure and CEO tenure during both
1993-1995 periods and 1996-1998 periods. This indicates possibly that ownership
structure decides the CEO and chairman tenure, see Table 9.3
Table 9.3: Board ownership and tenure
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
BFA-Chairman tenure n/a positive positive
BFA-CEO tenure n/a positive positive
BFA-FD tenure n/a n/a n/a
(4) Implication
Firms with duality, firms less than 30% NEO and firms with higher board ownership
show longer tenure of the CEO and Chairman. This fact indicates that board are
controlled by the ownership.
9.2.4 Findings (4): Ownership and Board structure
(1) Board ownership and board structure
Firms with duality show larger percentage board ownership in the 1993-1995 and
1996-1997. Also firms with less than 30% NEO have larger percentage of BFA
shareholders, see Table 9.4.
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Table 9.4: Board ownership and board structure, Mann-Whitney test
1990-1992 1993- 1995 1996-1998
Dual > No dual Dual > No dual
NEO301ess > NEO30more NEO301ess > NEO30more NEO301ess > NEO30more
The regression results are the same as that ofMann-Whitney test. Separation is related
to BFA in the 93-95 periods and 93-98 periods. Over the three periods, the percentage
ofNEO is related to BFA, see Table 9.5.
Table 9.5: Board ownership and board structure, regression
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
BFA-separation n/a negative negative
BFA-NEO30% negative negative negative
(2) Institutional ownership and board structure
Firms with separation of chairman and CEO have larger percentage of the largest 3
institutional shareholders in 1993-1995 periods. This pattern is the same with big 1
shareholders, see Table 9.6
Table 9.6: Institutional Ownership and duality
1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
Big 3 Dual < No dual
Big 1 Dual < No dual
Firms with more than 30 NEO has larger percentage ofbig 3 shareholders in 1990-
1992 and 1993-1995. This pattern is the same for big 1 shareholders in the 1993-1995
periods, see Table 9.7.
Table 9.7: Institutional Ownership and NEO
1990-1992 1993- 1995 1996-1998
Big 3 NEO301ess < NEO30more NEO301ess < NEO30more
Big 1 NEO301ess < NEO30more
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(3) Implication
Before Cadbury Report, there had been majority institutional ownership in the UK.
The institutional shareholders own the majority of the shares of quoted companies
(Cadbury Report, paragraph 6.9). The analysis confirms that the institutional investor
may influence the board structure or they invest their fund in well governed
companies.
9.2.5 Findings (5): Boards changes and Performance
(1) Duality and performance by Error bar analysis
The error bar graph shows that firms with separation show less average net income
than firms with duality, but measured with Tobin's Q, the results are different. The
firms with separation show no sign of less Tobin's Q than firms with duality.
(2) Percentage ofNEO and performance by Error bar analysis
The error bar graph shows that firms with more than 30% NEO are lower net income
than firm with less than 30% NEO, but the results are different when measured with
Tobin's Q. The firms with more than 30% NEO show higher average Tobin's Q than
firms with less than 30% NEO.
(3) Separation and performance by regression analysis
The results of regression analysis show that there are negative relationship between
net income and separation. Firms with separation show negative net income during
the periods of 1996-1998 and 1993-1998. There is not a significant relation between
Tobin's Q and corporate governance changes except 1990-1992 periods see Table 9.8
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Table 9.8: Separation and performance by regression analysis
Model 1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998




(4) Percentage ofNEO and performance Q by regression analysis
The percentage ofNEO also shows negative relationship with net income. In case of
Tobin's Q, there is negative relation with percentage ofNEO before 1992, but during
the 1996-1998 periods, the relation becomes positive, see Table 9.9.
Table 9.9: Percentage of NEO and performance Q by regression analysis
Model 1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998
Net income 1 negative negative negative negative
2 negative negative negative negative
Tobin Q 1 negative
2 negative positive
(5) Implication
The relation between board changes and performance shows a distinct pattern. When
measured with net income, the firms with separation and firms with more than 30%
NEO seems have lower performance, but the results are different when measured with
Tobin's Q. These results are consistent with previous results. Weir and Laing
(2000)'s study confirm that firms with separation do not perform better than firms
with duality. Firms with at least three non-executive directors have negative relation
in 1992 (statistically not significant), negative and significant in 1995. These results
are contrary to expected results. The Cadbury and other report expect better
performance with the adoption of the Code recommendation.
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9.2.6 Findings (6): Boards changes and Firm Risks
(1) Duality and Risk
The results show those firms with separation are more risky firm in terms of Z-score,
but the risk is measured with firm specific risk, the results are different, see Table
9.10. Mann-Whitey Test is significant only in the 96-98 periods both Z-score risk and
Firm specific risk, see Table 9.11.
Table 9.10: Duality and Risk, Error bar graph
90-92 93-95 96-98
Z-score risk Dual < Non-dual Dual < Non-dual Dual < Non-dual
Firm specific risk Dual > Non-dual Dual > Non-dual Dual > Non-dual
Table 9.11: Duality and Risk, Mann-Whitey Test
90-92 93-95 96-98
Z-score risk significant
Firm specific risk significant
(2) Percentage ofNEO and Risk
The results show those firms more than 30 % NEO are more risky firms in terms ofZ-
score, but measured with firm specific risk, the results are reverse, see Table 9.12.
Mann-Whitey Test is significant only for Z-score risk over the test periods, see Table
9.13.

















Table 9.13: Percentage of NEO and Risk, Mann-Whitey Test
90-92 93-95 96-98




The results of firms risk evaluation also show similar results of that ofperformance
study. When measure Z-score, the firm with duality and with less than 30% NEO is
healthier, but measure with firm specific risk the result is contrary.
9.2.7 Findings (7): Ownership, Performance and Firm Risk
(1) Board ownership and Performance
There are no significant relationship between Board ownership and net income during
the periods of 93-95 and 96-98. There are positive relationship between Tobin's Q
and BFA, see Table 9.14.
Table 9.14: Board ownership and Performance
Measure 1990-1992 1993-1995 1996-1998
Net income positive
Tobin Q positive positive positive
(2) Board Ownership and firm risk
The regression results show that BFA has a positive relationship with Z-score in the
96-98 periods. This means the larger the BFA, the higher the firm's risk. When
measured with firm specific risk, the result is significant only in 93-95 periods, the
larger the BFA, the less risky. Also the larger the BFA, the lower liabilities the firm
has.
Table 9.15: Ownership and firm risk
The arger the Board ownership
90-92 93-95 96-98
Z-score risk Less risky
Firm specific risk Less risky Less risky Less risky
Total liability Less liability Less liability Less liability
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(3) Implication
With the increase of board ownership firms are positive in performance measured by
Tobin's Q, and lower in risk measured by firms specific risk and Total liability. This
fact indicates that board with higher percentage of inside ownership are more
conservative to maintain the financial risk.
9.2.8 Findings (8): Reporting Quality and Conservatism in UK
(1) Earning pattern in 1985- 2000 periods
There has been increasing negative income over the period 1985-2000. The
percentage of negative net income has increased from 3 per cent in 1985 to 47 per
cent in listed firms. For the de-listed firms the percentage of negative income, also,
has been increasing over the sample period, and the rate is greater than that of listed
firms.
(2) Reporting Quality by discretionary accruals
Cumulative discretionary accrual analysis show low discretionary accruals. When
analysed using a pooled analysis, there is signs of low discretionary accruals in the
period 1991-1995, see Table 9.16
Table 9.16: Reporting Quality by discretionary accruals
All sample Listed firm sample Delisted firm
Pooling analysis 1991-1995
Cross-sectional analysis
(3) Earning conservatism in UK
The negative cumulative non-operating accruals (CNNOA) exist in the period 1988—
1997 for model 1 in the all sample, listed firm sample and delisted firm sample, but in
model 2, it only exist occurs for the delisted firm sample, see Table 9.17.
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Table 9.17: The negative cumulative non-operating accruals
All sample Listed firm sample Delisted firm sample
Model 1 1988- 1997 1988-1995 1988-2000
Model 2 none none 1987-1995
With Cross-sectional regression of earnings on returns, over the sample period the net
income is more sensitive to bad news than good news over the sample periods. This
result indicates that there exists conservatism during the 1990s, see Table 9.18.
Table 9.18: Response difference: P(BN)- p GN)
90-92 93-95 96-98 99-01
(3(BN)- p GN) 0.269 0.080 0.553 1.414
Lower BTM indicates higher conservatism. There is relatively strong conservatism in
the period of the 1993-1997. This results also supported by Mann Whitney test.
(4) Implication
There are strong evidences of conservatism over the period of the 1990s. Also there
is low discretionary evidence after the Cadbury Report. There may a relationship
between low discretionary accrual and conservatism.
9.2.9. Findings (9): Board and Conservatism
(1) Cross-sectional regression of earnings on returns
binder the bad news, the firms with separation show more conservative than the firms
with duality. Also the firms with more than 30% NEO show more conservative than
firms with less than 30 percent NEO, see Table 9.19.
















(2) CG and BTM
Under the book to market measure, firms with separation have more conservative in
earning reporting in the 93-95 period and 96-98 period. Also firms with more than
30% NEO has more conservative reporting in the 96-98 period, see Table 9.20.













Firms with separation and with more than 30% NEO are more conservative in
reporting than those with other board structures. Especially after the Cadbury Report
the conservative practice is more apparent. This result can be the results of increasing
monitoring by boards. With separation of the chairman and CEO, the check and
balance seemed to work during the 93-98 periods. Also the adding new NEO were
another force to increase monitoring.
9.2.10. Findings (10): Ownership and Conservatism
(1) Board Ownership and conservatism
Firms with less than 5 % BFA show more conservative than firm with more than 5%
board ownership, see Table 9.21.
Table 9.21: Ownership and conservatism comparing with 5% ownership






























The firms with less than 5% board ownership are more conservative than any other
firms with more than 5% board ownership. This fact matches with the finding in In
Section 9.2.4 and 9.2.9. Firm with separation and with more than 30% NEO are more
conservative in reporting than those with other board structures in section 9.2.4.
Those firms are the firms that have lower percentage ofboard ownership. Section
9.2.9 confirm that firms with duality and firms with less than 30% NEO show larger
percentage board ownership.
9.2.11 Findings (11) Impact of Conservatism on Default models
(1) Comparing three models
The Altman model has the lowest default rate and is on gentle increase over the
period. The Ohlson model has the highest default except at the beginning and like the
Altman model is on a gentle rise over the period. Merton model seem most volatile
over the period starting initially above the Ohlson model then for the remaining
period being below it.
(2) Impact of conservatism on rebuild models
When the models are built by each period data, the Ohlson model drops dramatically
to just above the Altman model. As the data have contain more negative income data,
the newly built Altman and Ohlson model has no distinction and lost the predictive
power.
(3) Implication
When the original Altman model is applied to UK data the default risk increases. The
result may explain the Altman's findings, Altman (2003), that the Type II error
(misclassifying a non-bankrupt firm as bankruptcy) increased by as much as 15-20%
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for all firms. Altman (2003) performed three tests using data from 1969-1975, 1976-
1995, and 1997-1999. Givoly and Hayn (2000) reported that there was an increasing
pattern of the US accounting conservatism for the period from 1950 to 1998. Under
more conservative accounting practices Altman's model will predict greater numbers
ofbankruptcy than there ought to be and hence the increase in Type II errors.
9.3 Conclusion of the Study
Initially this study starts with 14 research questions. Among them two research
question (Q1 and Q2) are answered in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Other questions are
analysed and concluded in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. Following is the summary of the
answers.
9.3.1 Theory basis ofUK Codes
Whilst the Hampel Report contains some concept of the stakeholder perspective, the
UK Codes are based on the shareholder perspective. The Codes have adapted various
theories as they have developed. The Cadbury Report includes agency theory and
resource theory. Yet the Hampel theory includes agency theory, the myopic market
theory, steward theory, resource theory and managerial hegemony theory. The
combination of theory in Codes makes it difficult to evaluate each theory in practice.
Under this circumstance, researches based on single theory (i.e. agency theory) are
likely not to be successful since other effects will arise possibly from other theories.
9.3.2 UK codes as risk management
The company scandals motivated the development of UK codes, but these scandals
arose from lack of risk management. Hence the UK Codes can be considered to be a
risk management initiative. The development ofUK codes follows the process of risk
management: Awareness, Assessment, Evaluation, and Managing risk. Each code
reinforced the role of the risk management. Cadbury Report focuses on the financial
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aspect of risk management by way of board and internal control. Greenbury report
controls the excessive remuneration of the top management. Hampel Report support
the Cadbury Report and expanded the risk management not only financial controls but
operational and compliance controls. These developments of UK codes provide the
framework on risk management for the UK companies.
9.3.3 Impact of Code/ Ownership on Board structure
The study finds two main factors that determine the structure: the Codes and board
ownership. After Cadbury Report (1992), there has been a change in the board
structure in UK. The main changes are the separation of chairman and CEO, and
increasing the percentages of outside directors in the board. Most firms have adopted
the Cadbury recommendations. The board ownership also has affected the board
structure. The higher the board ownership, the less separation of the chairman and
CEO, and the less percentage of the outside directors the firms have. Also board
ownership is positively related to Chaimian tenure and CEO tenure. These findings
imply that UK codes and ownership study are confounded. The unexplained reason
for not following the UK Codes is due to ownership structure.
9.3.4 Impact ofUK Codes/ownership on Performance
The research indicates that different results arise if one uses net income and Tobin's Q
as performance measurement in board changes. The relationship between board
changes and net income is negative, while the relationship between board changes and
Tobin's Q is positive. There are positive relationship between Tobin's Q and board
ownership.
9.3.5 Impact ofUK Codes/ownership on firm risks
The relationship between board changes/ownership and firm risks are measured
through Altman's Z-Score and firm specific risks. Altman's model contains two
income related variables among five variables, whilst the firm specific risk model is
based on stock prices. When measured with Z-Score, firms with advanced corporate
governance show higher risk, but when measured with finn specific risks, firms with
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advanced corporate governance show either lower than or similar to risk to those less
advanced firms. With the increase of board ownership firms are lower in risk
measured by firm specific risk and Total liability.
9.3.6 Impact of the Codes/Ownership on reporting
The net income in financial reports follows generally accepted accounting principles.
The net income is the bottom line item (net income) after treatment of income and
expenses. Therefore the net income contains the information of accounting practice
in the company.
In the current research, there seems to be a period of accounting conservative during
the 1990s. The Codes have impact on the reporting. The firm with separation and
with more than 30% NEO shows more conservative reporting than the firm with
duality and less than 30% NEO. Also the firm with lower board ownership shows
more conservative reporting than firms with higher board ownership. Also the low
discretionary related to more conservative reporting.
From these results, it can be infer that the firms with advanced board structure tend
toward conservative financial reporting and this leads to negative relationship
between board changes and performance when measured by net income. In such
circumstances it may be better to use Tobin's Q to measure performance.
9.3.7 Impact ofConservative data on Risk models
The study also demonstrated how the conservative data influence the risk models.
Three risk models were considered: Altman's model, Ohlson's Model, and Merton's
Model. Merton model is used as a benchmark. Both Altman's model and Ohlson's
model are sensitive to the nature of the data employed giving some concern when
using them for assessing risk. It appears in this study that Ohlson's Model is more
sensitive than Altman Model.
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9.4 Conclusion
The study has explored through an empirical methodology the relationship between
changes in corporate governance, performance, risk and conservatism. It is clear from
the study that there has been a change in corporate governance reflecting the
recommendation of the Cadbury report. This is true both in structure of the board and
in ownership. The questions whether these changes have had their desired impact is
more problematic. It has been shown that if naive measures of performance are used
then there is a great danger of perceiving the changes as having a negative effect.
Using more appropriate measures then it is seen that the changes may be having the
required effect. The same is true in measure of risk.
From the study it appears the main influence of the changes may have been on the
accounting practices with companies that have adopted more advanced corporate
governance being more conservative. It is hard to know whether the conservative




CONTRIBUTION AND FURTHER STUDY
10.0 Introduction
The findings of the study were given in the previous Chapter. These were based on
the research choices made. Obviously there can be criticism of the choices made, for
all studies have limitations. One cannot address all the issues relevant to an area of
work. This has been an empirical exploration of the relationship between corporate
governance, performance, risk and conservatism. In such one has to express some
reservation, which suggests further research might be needed to confirm the findings.
In this Chapter the main areas of concerns are contribution of this thesis and
suggestion of possible further work. For example it might be interesting to consider
alternative research approaches, for example qualitative approaches. The size and
nature of the study sample might also be a concern, yet no sample can be guaranteed
to be a reflection of the population of interest. The analysis selected appeared to be
the best to address the issues of relevance to this study. There are others that could
have been employed and need to be considered. Throughout the empirical work there
is a concern over the noise within the system and perhaps further work is needed to
reduce its impact. The study has only addressed specific aspects of the Cadbury
Report. It is felt this may be appropriate for further research on the Cadbury Report
and the other Reports. These concerns will be discussed in the Chapter.
10.1 Contribution
10.1.1 Explanation of the inconsistent results in the performance studies
The UK studies have shown inconsistent results the relationship of board changes and
performance. Several explanations were given for the results. This study provides
evidence that the reporting conservatism is one of the reasons for inconsistent results.
This finding can be utilized by future study in performance evaluation.
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10.1.2 Corporate governance changes and risk
The previous studies have more focused on changes of corporate governance and
performance. Few studies have explored the relationship between governance
changes and risk changes. This study explored the relationship between corporate
governance changes and risk.
10.1.3 Ownership and Compliance to the Codes
In the past studies have concentrated on the UK codes and changes in board structure.,
They have used this to explain to what extent the companies have complied with the
codes. There are few studies on non-complying firms. This study provides the
evidence that board ownership is another important aspect when investigating the
codes and corporate governance.
10.1.4 Ownership and conservatism
The conservatism studies in UK are rare. There is no study for the relationship
ownership and conservatism. This is the first study to provide evidence of interaction.
10.1.5 Discretionary accruals and Conservatism
Few studies have conducted the relationship between discretionary accruals and
conservatism. The studies on discretionary accruals are pervasive in related to earning
management. This study reports that the low discretionary related to the accounting
conservatism.
10.1.6 Conservatism and default models
The previous studies on default primarily develop the model. No research has
considered the impact of conservative accounting data. This study shows the impact




As indicated in previously there are a number of potential underlying theories for
research into corporate governance and these were reviewed in Chapter 2. The study
has taken a positivistic approach in which empirical data has been gathered and
general patterns of behaviour have been deduced from this information using
statistical analysis. Such an approach assumes that it is possible to measure aspects of
company and relate these to performance. Hence it is necessary to define aspects,
which represent corporate governance and can be quantified, and also to define
aspects of performance that can be measured and the two can then be related. This
requires the complexity of the codes of corporate governance to be reduced to
measurable quantities. It is possible to argue that the codes are fundamentally such
that their impact on corporate governance cannot be represented by simple measures.
In these circumstances one would have to contemplate other styles of analysis.
Alternative qualitative approaches could have been employed.
One approach, which parallels the current study, would be to gather all the public
statements associated with corporate governance of firms and the impact of codes and
from them tries to determine the impact of the changes. There are several issues,
which arise from such an approach. There may be a lack of statements on the impact
of the changes in the corporate governance related to the codes. Statements may be
ambiguous and require interpretation, and there might be the challenge of
subjectivism to the research. It may be difficult to amass sufficient information across
a range of companies to form a consistent view of the impact on corporate governance
on the codes. Even if there are sufficient statements this may lead to the difficulty of
being able gather and analyses the infonnation within the constraints of the current
studies.
Another approach would be to negotiate access to all relevant internal information
relating to the changes arising from the codes within a set of firms. This again suffers
from the many of the problems of the previous approach. Again it may be difficult to
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find the appropriate data and there may be again problems in terms of its
interpretation. Amount of information to process may be too voluminous to proceed.
Again this case study approach may be restricted to a few companies and then there is
a question how the results can be generalised.
In defence of the approach taken whilst it has reduced the impact of the codes to some
limited measures it has been able to relate these to measurable quantities on
performance and risk. It has established some aspects of the relationship which seems
consistent with the belief that there has been an impact of the codes on corporate
governance and hence performance and risk. It might be worth further investigation
of the qualitative aspects of the implementation of the codes along those described
above.
10.2.2 Data Collected
All samples can be challenged on the basis that they are not a study of the whole
population and that the results obtain should not be inferred to the whole population.
This study has elected to look at a specific sub-population, manufacturing companies.
It has not investigated Financial Services or Utilities. This choice was justified early
in the thesis. The utilities and financial institutions are restricted by regulation and are
structurally different.
The sample was selected to reflect the specific target sub-population. The samples
contain most companies in the six industries. It is clearly possible that the results
obtained are just a reflection of the specific industries. It is hard to assess this without
collection of another sample that could confirm the results obtained.
Obviously one aspect of its ability to reflect the population is the size of the sample
taken. The size of sample is the result of the compromise between two forces in
conflict the need to gain a sufficiently large sample for meaningful results and
resources available to carry out the research. It is believed that the sample is of an
adequate size given the need to explore an extensive range of variables about the
firms incorporated in the sample. Future studies could explore a wider range of
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companies and this may overcome some of the limitations, which might be contained
within the current study. Also the study of financial institution is needed due to the
increasing role of the institutional investors.
10.2.3 Form ofAnalysis
The approach taken can be characterised as an exploration through statistical methods
of the sample gathered by looking splitting the whole sample according to specific
measures of interest at specified times. Broad comparisons are made across the whole
sample. Many alternative approaches could have been considered. For example it
might have been plausible to consider just those companies that had seen change over
the period in terms of the measure of interest. This would have ignored a swathe of
the population where there may have been impact of the changes due to the code. It is
also the case that firms may implement and then reverse the implementation over the
period and so there might become difficulties in disentangling the groups. Such an
analysis would further reduce the sample size, perhaps making it problematic to
obtain significant results. It might be possible to explore such approach, even based
on the current sample, to see if consistent results are obtained with the current
findings.
10.2.4 Noise
One difficulty facing those who undertake empirical research in finance is the noise in
the system. Many factors can have an impact on performance which it is either
difficult to include or may be un-measurable. The models used in the study have
suffered from this problem, and the lack of some significant results may be due to this
problem of high variability. It might be possible to include other variables in the
analysis to see if further variation can be accounted for in a systematic manner. The
endeavours within the research have not been as successful as desired, though
extensive work was carried out to reduce model variation. Further studies might
consider other variables to include.
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10.2.5 Other Aspects of the Code
This study has only considered the perceived main aspects of the Cadbury Report.
There might be other aspects of the Cadbury Report, which could be studied by the
current approach. It would require identification of the aspect and an ability to
produce an appropriate measure, which could be used as a proxy for it. Further
research could be employed to tackle this.
Alongside this would be to explore the impact of the other reports within the UK. For
example the Turnbull Report. One might argue that the Turnbull report has specific
interest in risk management. The difficulty is assessing whether firms are compliant.
This would more detailed study of the firms to ensure they are addressing Turnbull
fully. This is left for future researcher to consider.
10.2.6 Developing new discretionary models
The discretionary model has its limitation to discern the difference between
discretionary and non-discretionary. This result low R2 in models. Since the Jones
(1991) innovative models, many researchers have developed other models, but the
results are not satisfactory. This study had tried to develop new method using DEA
(data envelop analysis) models. Yet the model has not developed to the satisfactory
level. The information on the discretionary accrual is of importance to both regulators
and academics. The research can contribute to an understanding that conservatism
may have a major effect on many of the measures used and so new methods may be
required to overcome these deficiencies.
10.2.7 Ownership aspect studies
Ownership is still of important aspect of corporate governance. This study mainly
analysed the impact of board ownership, but institutional ownership is increasing over
the years. The public really require institutional investors to take a more active role in
management. The further study is needed to investigate this activity or lack of it. A
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further study would face the problem of research methods, as explained earlier. The
activity of the investor is not easy to conceive by outsiders.
10.2.8 Conservative data and default models
The interesting in developing credit risk models has increased. Most studies focus on
developing models by new technologies, but the data changes are equally important
aspect of the default models. This study initiated the exploration of the impact of
conservative data on default models in UK data. Researches need to extend this to
other countries, especially USA. The tendency of conservatism in USA is reported by
Givoly and Hayn (2000).
10.2.9 Corporate governance and enterprise risk management
This study formulated the risk management aspect of corporate governance in chapter
3. The UK codes are interpreted as risk management tools. Based on this framework,
this study investigates the financial aspect of risk management. The main finding is
the reporting conservatism through the board control, which is enforced by separation
of chairman and CEO and Increasing the NEO.
The corporate governance structure in Codes can provides the basic framework of
enterprise risk management. The board and internal control have major role to prevent
firm risk. This study couldn't afford to setup the enterprise risk management. Further
study is needed to establish the framework of enterprise risk management.
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10.3 Conclusion
All studies are limited and cannot be expected to address all aspects of the intended
area of research. The study has taken a specific empirical approach to research and
can be criticised.
In this Chapter, firstly the contribution of this study is shown. The study provided the
evidence of inconsistent results of the performance studies. It explored the
relationship between risk measures and corporate governance changes, filling a gap in
previous studies of corporate governance. Further this study explored ownership to
complement the UK codes studies. The relationship of conservatism and ownership,
and the relationship between conservatism and default models were investigated.
Secondly, the further work was suggested. There are alternative research approaches,
which could have been employed, but it is believed that the one chosen was efficient
in establishing the findings obtained. Others could explore qualitative approaches to
add to the current findings. Empirical studies are frequently restricted to the sample
on which they are based. The study has endeavoured to ensure that the sample
reflected the sub-population chosen, but clearly this cannot be guaranteed. The form
of analysis was thought best given the nature of the sample taken but clearly further
work may be taken to look at specific aspects. Noise bedevils empirical studies and
considerable effort was employed to reduce its impact. Further studies could explore
introduction of further variables to reduce the noise of the system. Yet it may not be
successful since there are so many other factors, which can affect performance and
risk within a firm. It is possible to have explored other aspects of the Cadbury Report
or of the other Reports. Also the ownership aspect of corporate governance studies is
needed. This study can extend to the study of institutional investors. The study on the
conservative data on default model is needed. It is felt this may be appropriate for
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APPENDIX 1
Data Collection and Data Information
1.1 Data Collection
Table 1: Summary of data collection
Data Data detail Sources
Corporate
governance





















Beta & Firm Specific risk
OSIRIS= FAME
London Business School Data




Interest rate 1 Year Treasury Bill rate http://research,stlouisfed.org/fred2/seri
es/WTB 1YA/downloaddata
1.2 Data for Boards
Table 2: Brea cdown of sample bv dua itv over time.
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 184 208 206 206 233 264 283 315 288 237
20 41 45 41 45 36 45 42 48 47 40
28 47 50 47 48 56 65 77 84 77 66
35 35 38 37 37 41 47 52 55 50 36
36 40 41 42 42 47 53 59 67 54 44
37 22 22 28 25 29 31 29 33 29 27
38 20 22 22 22 25 26 27 29 33 33
235
Table 3: Brea cdown by NEO percentage data
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 199 205 207 203 237 263 284 323 289 239
20 34 43 35 42 35 42 42 48 47 40
28 44 45 45 46 57 65 77 83 77 63
35 32 35 36 35 42 46 52 56 51 37
36 39 41 42 39 48 53 57 67 54 43
37 28 19 28 20 29 31 29 33 29 27
38 22 22 21 21 26 26 27 29 31 29
1.3 Data for Ownership
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
All 128 151 151 165 179 206 209 229 232 194 151
20 24 23 23 28 30 34 32 36 35 31 22
28 24 32 32 33 38 46 50 56 60 48 35
35 16 23 23 27 30 38 43 44 45 37 30
36 30 34 34 37 37 43 42 48 50 40 27
37 20 24 24 25 24 27 24 25 25 20 19
38 14 15 15 15 20 18 18 20 17 18 18
Table 5: Shareholders of Institutional Investors.
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 128 142 192 203 209 250 260 298 274 224
20 21 22 34 33 32 41 40 46 47 39
28 29 33 41 44 51 62 69 79 75 59
35 24 27 34 34 37 45 47 54 47 36
36 23 25 42 42 44 51 54 64 53 41
37 18 20 24 26 25 28 26 29 26 23
38 13 15 17 24 20 23 24 26 26 26
1.4 Data for Tenure
Table 6: Chairman Tenure data.
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 56 70 100 104 161 179 199 234 212 184
20 10 11 15 20 23 30 30 35 32 30
28 14 19 23 26 41 45 57 67 64 54
35 7 12 11 11 22 26 32 37 36 26
36 10 13 27 20 36 37 38 46 35 30
37 9 9 17 14 21 23 23 29 22 21
38 6 6 7 13 18 18 19 20 23 23
236
Table 7: CEO Tenure data-
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 54 78 105 113 147 178 194 222 205 171
20 8 13 18 26 23 30 35 38 34 32
28 15 21 24 30 42 47 57 61 58 47
35 7 10 16 14 19 25 30 34 37 23
36 11 15 25 20 31 39 35 44 34 31
37 7 11 13 11 18 21 21 24 19 16
38 6 8 9 12 14 16 16 21 23 22
Table 8: Financial director Tenure data.
SIC 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 98 99 00
All 87 111 116 130 167 190 199 226 216 196
20 14 25 22 28 26 33 33 39 39 37
28 15 21 16 26 40 44 51 56 62 51
35 17 22 26 27 30 37 37 40 35 24
36 18 23 28 27 36 37 39 49 41 37
37 13 10 13 9 17 21 21 20 16 21
38 10 10 11 13 18 18 18 22 23 26
1.5 Data for Risk

























all 159 162 138 170 211 273 303 288 297 306 277 222
20 34 36 30 35 37 47 50 47 53 51 43 34
28 35 35 32 38 52 67 79 72 80 80 72 61
35 27 22 22 30 34 43 50 49 46 45 41 30
36 29 31 23 32 43 56 62 59 56 64 65 46
37 18 22 13 19 23 32 32 27 29 27 24 22
38 16 16 18 16 22 28 30 34 33 39 32 29

























all 203 209 211 218 235 255 268 293 318 311 283 290
20 33 32 32 33 33 37 41 42 47 44 38 39
28 56 58 59 61 62 64 66 73 78 73 66 78
35 33 37 37 38 43 46 46 53 60 59 54 51
36 40 41 42 44 52 58 61 66 68 66 63 60
37 21 21 21 21 23 24 27 28 31 31 27 29
38 20 20 20 21 22 26 27 31 34 38 35 33
237
1.6 Discussion of data
Table 1 shows the incorporated companies before the specific year. The Total firm in
1990 indicates that 1,628 firms are listed before year 1990. The number of the total firms
increased to 2,512 at the end of the year 2000. As I mentioned in the introductory
chapter, this study focuses on manufacturing industry. Among the industry, 6 sub-
industries are chosen. The six sub-industries represent almost 20% of the total firms, see
Table 1.
Table 1: Incorporation before specific year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total
Firm
1628 1685 1744 1824 1913 1987 2067 2134 2206 2325 2512
SIC20 51 53 53 54 54 54 54 54 55 56 58
SIC28 64 67 69 76 78 82 87 92 97 101 105
SIC35 60 60 62 65 65 68 69 69 71 73 76
SIC36 75 76 77 82 86 88 92 94 95 100 104
SIC37 31 31 32 33 34 34 35 35 35 36 36
SIC38 37 39 39 41 41 43 43 43 43 44 47
Sum
SIC20-38 318 326 332 351 358 369 380 387 396 410 426
SIC20-38
(%) 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
The data related to this study is shown in Table 2. Unfortunately there is missing data for
some of the companies and so the total number of the companies is less than presented in
Table 1. In most cases this represents more than 50% of the companies of the sub¬
section. There may be some bias because their reporting may be different from that of
population. This could be considered in future research.
Table 2: Number of data from Sample Industry
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Duality 184 208 206 206 233 264 283 315 288 237
NEO 199 205 207 203 237 263 284 323 289 239
BFA 128 151 151 165 179 206 209 229 232 194 151
Institution 128 142 192 203 209 250 260 298 274 224
Z-Score 159 162 138 170 211 273 303 288 297 306 277
FSR 203 209 211 218 235 255 268 293 318 311 283
238
Table 3: Percentage of data from Sample Industry
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Duality 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.74 0.00 0.80 0.70 0.56
NEO 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.58 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.00 0.82 0.70 0.56
BFA 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.47 0.35
Institution 0.40 0.44 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.00 0.75 0.67 0.53
Z-Score 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.65
FSR 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.66
1.6 Discussion of failed companies
The failed companies in the risk models are chosen by three criteria; two year
consecutive negative income, delist and stock price availability. The two year
consecutive negative income indicates poor performance of the company. There are many
other reasons for delisting from stock market besides for negative income. The sample
consists of 156 delisted firms, among which 2 firms are under administration, 7 firms are
under liquidation process, 37 firms are related to M&A. The database do not provide any
information for the rest of the delisted firms.
As indicated before, 23 companies are selected for failed companies; among which only 2
companies are under the liquidation processes, the rest companies are not related to
administration, liquidation, and M&A. Therefore the samples of the failed companies are
chosen by poor performance and then delisted.
239
APPFMniY P
Reporting Quality - Calculation of discretionary accruals
2.1 Pooling Analysis
The fixed effects model incorporates difference between finns by allowing the intercept
to change. The intercept is different for each firm, but each intercept stays constant over
time.
(1) SAS Program for Pooling Analysis by a fixed effect Model










proc glm data=WORK.accrualpool ;
class ID;
model TAccrual=ID Assets REVREC PPE/ solution noint;
run;
(2) Pooling analysis results
The value of the test statistics F=2.96 yields a p-value of less than .0001; we reject the
null hypothesis that the intercept parameters for all firms are equal.
Table 1
Dependent Variable: Total Accrual
Source DF Sum of squares Mean squares F
Value
Pr > F
Model 367 16.74016220 0.04561352 2.96 <.0001
Error 2371 36.59701015 0.01543526
Uncorrected Total 2738 53.33717235
R-Square CoeffVar Root MSE TAccrual Mean
0.280788 -415.1348 0.124239 -0.029927
Parameter estimates ofAssets, REVREC and PPE are the same or all firms but the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ID 54 0.01378934 0.04524646 0.30 0.7606
ID 56 0.03758613 0.08835330 0.43 0.6706
ID 57 -0.01628419 0.03482398 -0.47 0.6401
ID 58 -0.07442707 0.05582342 -1.33 0.1826
ID 59 -0.01885758 0.04455994 -0.42 0.6722
ID 60 -0.09533069 0.03741180 -2.55 0.0109
ID 61 -0.03480524 0.03553271 -0.98 0.3274
ID 62 -0.01303406 0.04939025 -0.26 0.7919
ID 63 -0.13123304 0.06513026 -2.01 0.0440
ID 64 -0.07802034 0.03820322 -2.04 0.0412
ID 65 -0.01874578 0.03637077 -0.52 0.6063
ID 66 -0.04667318 0.03534621 -1.32 0.1868
ID 67 -0.00944810 0.03512438 -0.27 0.7880
ID 68 -0.01419940 0.03838198 -0.37 0.7115
ID 69 0.04767504 0.03675569 1.30 0.1947
ID 70 -0.07273151 0.07280141 -1.00 0.3179
ID 71 -0.075418C5 0.03690744 -2.04 0.0411
ID 72 -0.00812960 0.06288261 -0.13 0.8971
ID 73 -0.02442541 0.03695557 -0.66 0.5087
ID 74 -0.05700995 0.03636098 -1.57 0.1170
ID 75 -0.18384190 0.12447381 -1.48 0.1398
ID 76 -0.03025882 0.03694620 -0.82 0.4129
ID 77 0.02758823 0.05565380 0.50 0.6201
ID 78 -0.43847057 0.12434210 -3.53 0.0004
ID 79 -0.02150510 0.04034793 -0.53 0.5941
ID 80 -0.03533189 0.03566749 -0.99 0.3220
ID 85 -0.04252634 0.07229278 -0.59 0.5564
ID 88 -0.02139467 0.04190463 -0.51 0.6097
ID 89 -0.08333489 0.03825050 -2.18 0.0295
ID 90 -0.00559420 0.06241708 -0.09 0.9286
ID 92 0.00723392 0.03817612 0.19 0.8497
ID 94 -0.02490346 0.03823389 -0.65 0.5149
ID 95 0.17214738 0.05095165 3.38 0.0007
ID 96 -0.02934569 0.03640136 -0.81 0.4202
ID 98 -0.05190620 0.06275885 -0.83 0.4083
ID 100 -0.04682456 0.03471992 -1.35 0.1776
ID 101 0.05574445 0.03463132 1.61 0.1076
ID 102 -0.14355880 0.03559858 -4.03 <.0001
ID 104 0.16353070 0.08966449 1.82 0.0683
ID 106 0.03311594 0.07571416 0.44 0.6619
ID 107 0.09997043 0.05108785 1.96 0.0505
ID 108 -0.04819592 0.03548391 -1.36 0.1745
ID 109 -0.02441455 0.04710870 -0.52 0.6043
242
ID 111 -0.08373046 0.05100204 -1.64 0.1008
ID 113 -0.02082433 0.03479374 -0.60 0.5496
ID 114 0.10788444 0.05683768 1.90 0.0578
ID 116 -0.01573214 0.05244452 -0.30 0.7642
ID 117 -0.02111728 0.04229396 -0.50 0.6176
ID 119 -0.00717585 0.04203118 -0.17 0.8645
ID 121 -0.03898433 0.08865413 -0.44 0.6602
ID 123 -0.03273264 0.06762470 -0.48 0.6284
ID 124 -0.09065214 0.03892475 -2.33 0.0199
ID 125 -0.06619742 0.03820178 -1.73 0.0833
ID 126 -0.07517036 0.03698750 -2.03 0.0422
ID 127 -0.03086113 0.04453417 -0.69 0.4884
ID 128 -0.03475041 0.03630762 -0.96 0.3386
ID 129 -0.07876494 0.03720475 -2.12 0.0344
ID 130 -0.03118219 0.03552099 -0.88 0.3801
ID 131 -0.0303460C 0.04528057 -0.67 0.5028
ID 132 -0.07391533 0.05713577 -1.29 0.1959
ID 133 -0.06612787 0.03578296 -1.85 0.0647
ID 134 -0.07041224 0.05182298 -1.36 0.1744
ID 135 -0.01464849 0.04853053 -0.30 0.7628
ID 137 -0.03731440 0.04027903 -0.93 0.3543
ID 138 -0.03808542 0.05590977 -0.68 0.4958
ID 140 0.34697071 0.08788044 3.95 <.0001
ID 141 0.23654477 0.04509697 5.25 <.0001
ID 142 -0.01240697 0.05277749 -0.24 0.8142
ID 143 0.32893041 0.09018711 3.65 0.0003
ID 144 -0.01757482 0.05140600 -0.34 0.7325
ID 145 -0.07208477 0.08837036 -0.82 0.4147
ID 146 -0.04952298 0.03730103 -1.33 0.1844
ID 147 -0.07547465 0.06382599 -1.18 0.2371
ID 148 -0.05266260 0.05565423 -0.95 0.3441
ID 149 -0.03074842 0.03611262 -0.85 0.3946
ID 150 -0.03201996 0.03555360 -0.90 0.3679
ID 151 -0.04690470 0.03550977 -1.32 0.1867
ID 152 0.01979774 0.05573446 0.36 0.7225
ID 153 -0.04530082 0.03596633 -1.26 0.2080
ID 154 -0.05274077 0.03491787 -1.51 0.1311
ID 155 -0.04428098 0.03883843 -1.14 0.2543
ID 156 -0.07038007 0.08812014 -0.80 0.4246
ID 157 0.01666061 0.12452761 0.13 0.8936
ID 165 -0.10322191 0.08799594 -1.17 0.2409
ID 166 -0.06329310 0.12427995 -0.51 0.6106
ID 167 0.06792931 0.12475812 0.54 0.5862
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ID 225 -0.05542627 0.03568372 -1.55 0.1205
ID 226 -0.02665861 0.03515729 -0.76 0.4484
ID 227 -0.03645109 0.03507770 -1.04 0.2988
ID 228 -0.05541051 0.04189689 -1.32 0.1861
ID 229 0.09733004 0.12467607 0.78 0.4351
ID 230 -0.08507891 0.05776380 -1.47 0.1409
ID 231 1.07837148 0.12630651 8.54 <.0001
ID 232 0.77775266 0.12521638 6.21 <.0001
ID 233 0.08437567 0.12474945 0.68 0.4989
ID 235 -0.07804269 0.04428972 -1.76 0.0782
ID 236 -0.11325761 0.08811354 -1.29 0.1988
ID 237 -0.01626659 0.03998661 -0.41 0.6842
ID 238 0.04522209 0.08817829 0.51 0.6081
ID 239 -0.02739065 0.03591711 -0.76 0.4458
ID 240 -0.07620909 0.04752900 -1.60 0.1090
ID 241 -0.02561859 0.03541238 -0.72 0.4695
ID 242 -0.01202725 0.03537689 -0.34 0.7339
ID 243 -0.04427651 0.03482901 -1.27 0.2038
ID 244 -0.04269400 0.03518227 -1.21 0.2251
ID 245 -0.05108666 0.03550400 -1.44 0.1503
ID 246 -0.14781788 0.04144490 -3.57 0.0004
ID 247 -0.00766857 0.03495163 -0.22 0.8264
ID 248 -0.02492337 0.03755362 -0.66 0.5070
ID 251 -0.02023747 0.03559578 -0.57 0.5697
ID 252 -0.03542380 0.04212384 -0.84 0.4005
ID 253 -0.07232205 0.04756378 -1.52 0.1285
ID 254 -0.01336546 0.04088648 -0.33 0.7438
ID 257 0.10270213 0.05600066 1.83 0.0668
ID 258 -0.02840171 0.03941493 -0.72 0.4712
ID 262 0.22931931 0.12438535 1.84 0.0654
ID 263 -0.03383262 0.07303746 -0.46 0.6432
ID 264 -0.04748010 0.03687699 -1.29 0.1980
ID 265 0.02510008 0.12436176 0.20 0.8401
ID 266 -0.01394325 0.03791729 -0.37 0.7131
ID 267 -0.15966361 0.12514040 -1.28 0.2021
ID 268 -0.02272657 0.03814676 -0.60 0.5514
ID 271 0.06785944 0.08889523 0.76 0.4453
ID 272 0.06838157 0.08891426 0.77 0.4419
ID 273 -0.01732761 0.08952388 -0.19 0.8465
ID 275 -0.02802903 0.03600675 -0.78 0.4364
ID 276 -0.07089559 0.12435905 -0.57 0.5687
ID 279 -0.06183642 0.03953380 -1.56 0.1179
ID 281 -0.03325427 0.05971968 -0.56 0.5777
ID 282 -0.05032594 0.04205817 -1.20 0.2316
245
ID 283 -0.04562863 0.05647046 -0.81 0.4192
ID 284 0.37171345 0.08996749 4.13 <.0001
ID 286 -0.11811795 0.08920159 -1.32 0.1856
ID 287 -0.08473686 0.03795235 -2.23 0.0257
ID 288 -0.04581625 0.12473656 -0.37 0.7134
ID 289 -0.23546845 0.12425810 -1.89 0.0582
ID 290 -0.00520656 0.04794363 -0.11 0.9135
ID 291 0.02066904 0.05754901 0.36 0.7195
ID 292 -0.01899230 0.03704644 -0.51 0.6082
ID 293 0.01283601 0.06663968 0.19 0.8473
ID 294 -0.21968630 0.05771156 -3.81 0.0001
ID 296 -0.22326517 0.07257294 -3.08 0.0021
ID 297 -0.16253133 0.12424719 -1.31 0.1910
ID 298 -0.14029172 0.07200294 -1.95 0.0515
ID 299 -0.00549778 0.03860520 -0.14 0.8868
ID 300 -0.01589022 0.07188980 -0.22 0.8251
ID 301 -0.04192660 0.03609361 -1.16 0.2455
ID 302 -0.03997731 0.03526214 -1.13 0.2570
ID 303 -0.04156086 0.03898296 -1.07 0.2865
ID 304 -0.10487667 0.06342648 -1.65 0.0984
ID 305 -0.04974070 0.04500166 -1.11 0.2691
ID 306 -0.02101187 0.03550240 -0.59 0.5540
ID 308 -0.01048350 0.04784015 -0.22 0.8266
ID 309 -0.01615202 0.05074371 -0.32 0.7503
ID 310 -0.03361223 0.08855491 -0.38 0.7043
ID 311 -0.14760323 0.08828642 -1.67 0.0947
ID 312 -0.06697361 0.03710161 -1.81 0.0712
ID 313 -0.05393223 0.06289799 -0.86 0.3913
ID 315 -0.02157566 0.08827332 -0.24 0.8069
ID 316 -0.07095530 0.03909917 -1.81 0.0697
ID 317 -0.02527763 0.07458358 -0.34 0.7347
ID 318 -0.08031080 0.03955109 -2.03 0.0424
ID 320 0.10752717 0.12428140 0.87 0.3870
ID 321 -0.04765441 0.03882577 -1.23 0.2198
ID 322 0.11442184 0.12804939 0.89 0.3716
ID 323 -0.00438001 0.03544233 -0.12 0.9017
ID 324 -0.09270737 0.06215374 -1.49 0.1359
ID 325 -0.20082454 0.03823245 -5.25 <.0001
ID 326 0.00395627 0.03545837 0.11 0.9112
ID 327 0.07516986 0.06365384 1.18 0.2378
ID 329 -0.09402858 0.12525180 -0.75 0.4529
ID 330 -0.06662843 0.06330345 -1.05 0.2927
ID 331 -0.03195916 0.04185630 -0.76 0.4452
ID 333 -0.02590886 0.03585882 -0.72 0.4700
ID 334 -0.06988310 0.07186990 -0.97 0.3310





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ID 382 -0.00572378 0.03970574 -0.14 0.8854
ID 383 -0.02676221 0.04448213 -0.60 0.5475
ID 384 -0.04596771 0.04758817 -0.97 0.3342
ID 385 0.01568567 0.03856055 0.41 0.6842
ID 386 -0.04055802 0.03930276 -1.03 0.3022
ID 387 -0.02909331 0.03981518 -0.73 0.4650
ID 388 -0.05171670 0.05114913 -1.01 0.3121
ID 389 -0.04517483 0.04154963 -1.09 0.2770
ID 390 -0.05605814 0.03837800 -1.46 0.1442
ID 391 -0.05361877 0.03982105 -1.35 0.1783
ID 392 -0.07484353 0.04050917 -1.85 0.0648
ID 393 -0.01503330 0.04526070 -0.33 0.7398
ID 395 -0.03989498 0.07208028 -0.55 0.5800
ID 396 -0.14664018 0.08824533 -1.66 0.0967
ID 397 -0.03332102 0.07265080 -0.46 0.6465
ID 398 0.00999379 0.03757842 0.27 0.7903
ID 399 -0.10437263 0.03922034 -2.66 0.0078
ID 400 -0.00002010 0.12445631 -0.00 0.9999
ID 401 0.01124297 0.03613706 0.31 0.7557
ID 402 0.04458947 0.06283179 0.71 0.4780
ID 403 -0.05668539 0.04444759 -1.28 0.2023
ID 404 -0.05201857 0.03878339 -1.34 0.1800
ID 405 -0.04706010 0.04052707 -1.16 0.2457
ID 406 -0.00467196 0.03993891 -0.12 0.9069
ID 407 0.08456420 0.05577163 1.52 0.1296
ID 408 -0.03917918 0.04513322 -0.87 0.3854
ID 409 -0.02308383 0.04695054 -0.49 0.6230
ID 410 -0.08093153 0.04445525 -1.82 0.0688
ID 411 0.05403580 0.05611393 0.96 0.3357
ID 412 0.00381092 0.05588964 0.07 0.9456
ID 413 -0.08106782 0.03995903 -2.03 0.0426
ID 414 -0.01739647 0.05718122 -0.30 0.7610
ID 415 -0.09459645 0.07198303 -1.31 0.1889
ID 416 -0.03534349 0.03973783 -0.89 0.3739
ID 417 0.00801262 0.08798257 0.09 0.9274
ID 418 -0.05418861 0.04053192 -1.34 0.1814
ID 419 -0.02461432 0.03970647 -0.62 0.5354
ID 420 -0.03482727 0.07394346 -0.47 0.6377
ID 421 -0.08940802 0.04234527 -2.11 0.0348
ID 422 -0.03877028 0.03970205 -0.98 0.3289
ID 423 -0.06422402 0.04091519 -1.57 0.1166
ID 424 -0.02943340 0.07201843 -0.41 0.6828
ID 425 -0.06906716 0.08961526 -0.77 0.4410
ID 426 0.02128495 0.04059743 0.52 0.6001
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ID 427 -0.03421037 0.04451263 -0.77 0.4422
ID 428 -0.02617310 0.04248934 -0.62 0.5380
ID 429 -0.06166411 0.04833803 -1.28 0.2022
ID 430 -0.03573982 0.07208420 -0.50 0.6201
ID 431 -0.02565693 0.05167950 -0.50 0.6196
ID 432 -0.02725400 0.04509641 -0.60 0.5457
ID 433 0.01916052 0.12450204 0.15 0.8777
ID 434 -0.04493675 0.06230789 -0.72 0.4709
ID 435 -0.01154072 0.08845010 -0.13 0.8962
Assets 76.22944644 28.22055418 2.70 0.0070
REVREC 0.03166758 0.00906554 3.49 0.0005
PPE -0.01159182 0.02447266 -0.47 0.6358
2.2 Cross-sectional Regression results
The Table 2 shows the Cross-sectional regression results. The regression used ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation to the below equation 13 times.
TA it/Ait-i = antfl/Ait-i] + a2it [ASaleit/Ait_i] + a3it [PPE it/Ait.i]
Adjust R2 shows very low over the period.
Table 2 Regression results
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
N 114 145 158 168 173 187 208 232 264 283 279 271 256
R" 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.42
A-R2 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.41
Con
(sig
0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.52) (0.04) (0.00) (0.51) (0.55) (0.58) (0.05) (0.48) (0.83) (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
Asset
(sig)
14.8 -6.9 27.7 -260 -260 -190 232.1 95.3 -17.5 141.3 163.3 69.9 957.1
(0.61) (0.89) (0.74) (0.05) (0.03) (0.14) (0.00) (0.25) (0.87) (0.13) (0.14) (0.27) (0.00)
Sales
(sig
0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.09
(0.00) (0.09) (0.76) (0.12) (0.01) (0.79) (0.40) (0.33) (0.73) (0.01) (0.14) (0.38) (0.00)
PPE
(sig)
-1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05
(-2.15) (0.94) (0.92) (0.01) (0.03) (0.33) (0.24) (0.43) (0.44) (0.33) (0.51) (0.31) (0.21)
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APPENDIX 3
Cumulative negative non-operating accruals (CNNOA)
3.1 Listed firm Samples
The breakdown of accruals between listed and delisted companies is of interest. See
Figure 1 for listed companies. In Model 1 for the listed firms, the Figure shows that the
negative cumulative non-operating accruals exist during the periods of 1998-1995. In
Model 2 for the listed firms, there do not exist any sign of the negative cumulative non-
operating accruals see Figure 2. The difference between Operating accruals and Working
capital accruals is presented in Figure 3.













Accum TABD (listl) «* Accum OA (List) a Accum NOA(list)












• Accum TABD (list) mm Cum WCA(list) a Cumum NOA(list)
Figure 3 Difference between Operating accruals and Working capital accruals
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3.2 Delisted Firms Samples
The same analysis can be repeated for delisted companies. For the delisted firms in
Model 1, there exist the negative cumulative non-operating accruals over the sample
periods, see Figure 4. For Model 2, there exist the negative cumulative non-operating
accruals before 1995, see Figure 5. This result is different from that of the listed firm
sample. The difference between Operating accruals and Working capital accruals is
presented in Figure 6
Figure 4 Cumulative negative non-operating accruals with listed firms
Accum TABD (delist) Accum OA (Delist) - Accum NOA(delist)
Figure 5 Cumulative negative non-operating accruals with listed firms
I n Accum TABD (delist) Cum WCA(delist) - Cum ljm NOA (del is t)
Figure 6 Difference between Operating accruals and Working capital accruals
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APPFKiniY A
Conservatism - Calculation of cumulative accruals
4.1 Cumulative non-operating accruals
Figure 1 shows the average cumulative non-operating accruals based on three governance
scores: separation score, NEO score and total score. The cumulative non-operating
accruals are the accumulation of non-operating accruals for the periods of 1990-1998.
The score indicate the implementation for Cadbury report's recommendation. The higher
the scores is, the higher the compliance to the recommendations. Though for this model,
the test is not significant.
I I
Figure 1 Separation score = X (during 1990- 1998)
"* °
—
* I I 3E 3E I *
Figure 2 NEO score = X (during 1990- 1998)
Figure 3 Total score = Separation score + NEO score
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4.2 Cumulative total accruals before depreciation
The following graph shows the average cumulative total accruals before depreciation
Figure 4 Separation score = £ (during 1990- 1998)
Figure 5 NEO score = £ (during 1990- 1998)
Figure 6 Total score = Separation score + NEO score
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APPENDIX 5
Impact of conservative data on Altman Model
5.1 Introduction
Appendix 5 explores the probability of default using Altman model. Data and the results
of logistic regression are displayed.
5.2 Data
This table presents the mean of the five financial ratios over the 6 models see Table 1.
Table 1 Mean of the Data in Altman model
WCTA RETA EBITTA MVTL SALETA
DISTRES 0.2633 -0.2610 -0.1310 3.3787 1.0469
NDS90-92 0.2309 0.2196 0.1043 3.1149 1.4305
NDS93-95 0.3295 0.1204 0.0690 5.0617 1.4079
NDS96-98 0.3652 -0.1382 0.0257 8.1089 1.3478
NDS99-01 0.4263 -0.6370 -0.0664 14.3859 1.2068
NDS90-01 0.3586 -0.2082 0.0139 8.9518 1.3225
The working capital is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firms. Working capital is
current assets minus current liabilities. Current assets are expected to generate cash
within a year while current liabilities are obligations to pay within a year. Figure 1, there
is difference between distressed sample and NDS93-95, NDS96-98, NDS99-01, but not



















Retained earning is the cumulative profitability over time. Technically, retained earnings
are the same as equity. Altman(l968) states that the age of a firm is implicitly considered
in this ratio. Altman(2000) documents that about 50% of the failed firms is in the first
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five years of their existence in 1993. There are ratio similarity between distress sample









Altman (2000) states that EBIT/TA is particularly appropriate for studies dealing with
corporate failure because a firm's ultimate existence is based on the earning power of its
assets. In Figure 3, it can be observed the difference between distressed sample and
NDS90-92, NDS93-95, and NDS 96-98, but the difference are minimised between










The measure Market value of equity/Book value of the total debt shows how much the
firm's assets can decline in value. During the 1990s, there is difference between








Altman (1968) regards Sale/Ta ratio as the measure of management's capability in
dealing with competitive conditions. It can be clearly observed that the average of the








5.3 Variables in the equation
(l) All variables
Following is the results of the logistic regression. B represents the change in the logit of
the outcome variables associated with a one-unit change in the predictor variables.
Table 2 Logit results of the Altman models
B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
90-92 WC 0.469 1.192 0.155 0.694 1.599
RE -1.958 1.191 2.705 0.100 0.141
EBIT -5.903 2.257 6.843 0.009* 0.003
MV -0.113 0.056 4.110 0.043* 0.893
sale 0.141 0.270 0.274 0.601 1.152
Constant -2.402 0.513 21.951 0.000* 0.091
93-95 B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
WC -0.985 0.727 1.834 0.176 0.374
RE 0.378 0.722 0.274 0.601 1.459
EBIT -4.637 1.843 6.331 0.012* 0.010
MV -0.062 0.039 2.553 0.110 0.940
sale -0.661 0.424 2.436 0.119 0.516
Constant -1.574 0.530 8.812 0.003 0.207
96-98 B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
WC -0.698 0.542 1.655 0.198 0.498
RE 0.439 0.384 1.311 0.252 1.552
EBIT -2.892 0.989 8.549 0.003* 0.055
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MV -0.048 0.033 2.142 0.143 0.953
sale -0.621 0.333 3.485 0.062 0.537
Constant -2.114 0.455 21.617 0.000* 0.121
99-01 B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
WC -0.382 0.422 0.819 0.365 0.683
RE 0.261 0.213 1.502 0.220 1.299
EBIT -1.504 0.595 6.398 0.011* 0.222
MV -0.030 0.029 1.099 0.294 0.970
sale -0.424 0.366 1.345 0.246 0.654
Constant -2.659 0.467 32.377 0.000 0.070
90-'01 B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
WC -0.547 0.549 0.992 0.319 0.579
RE 0.206 0.222 0.857 0.355 1.229
EBIT -1.812 0.599 9.146 0.002* 0.163
MV -0.032 0.028 1.251 0.263 0.969
sale -0.598 0.369 2.631 0.105 0.550
Constant -3.471 0.469 54.686 0.000* 0.031
(2) Changes of coefficient
Wald statistics has a chi-square distribution and give information whether b-coefficient is
significantly different from zero. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero,
then the predictor is making a significant contribution to the prediction of the outcome.
There needs to be caution with using Wald test. Menard (1995) state that when the
regression coefficient is large, the standard error tends to become inflated, resulting in the
Wald statistic being an underestimate.
Table 3 Changes of coef icient in Altman model
WC re ebit mv sales constant
9092data 0.469 -1.958 -5.903 -0.113 0.141 -2.402
9395data -0.985 0.378 -4.637 -0.062 -0.661 -1.574
9698data -0.698 0.439 -2.892 -0.048 -0.621 -2.114
9901 data -0.382 0.261 -1.504 -0.030 -0.424 -2.659
9001 data -0.547 0.206 -1.812 -0.032 -0.598 -3.471
Altman -1.200 -1.400 -3.300 -0.600 -1.000 0.000
Figure 6 Changes of coefficient in Altman model
257
—♦— 9092data —»— 9395data —*— 9698data
; x- 9901 data —*5—9001 data —•—Altman
(3) Changes ofExp(B)
If the value ofExp(b) is greater than l then it indicates that as the predictor increases, the
odds of the outcome occurring increase. When a value less than I it indicates that as the
predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decreases. The odds of bankruptcy
firms decrease as the ebit increase, but odds ratio in the table shows systematic increase
with the data using late 1990s. With 9092 data, the odds of bankruptcy decrease 0.003
times, while 9901 data, 0.222 times. This indicates that higher bankruptcy decreasing can
result in no difference in calculating firm risk as the samples are used recent data.
Table 4 Changes of Exp (B) in Altman model
wc re ebit mv sales constant
9092data 1.599 0.141 0.003 0.893 1.152 0.091
9395data 0.374 1.459 0.010 0.940 0.516 0.207
9698data 0.498 1.552 0.055 0.953 0.537 0.121
9901 data 0.683 1.299 0.222 0.970 0.654 0.070
9001 data 0.579 1.229 0.163 0.969 0.550 0.031
Figure 7
Change of EXp(B)
9092data —■—9395data —a—9698data —iK—9901 data ——9001 data
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APPENDIX 6
Impact of conservative data on Ohlson Model
6.1 Introduction
Appendix 6 explores the probability of default using Ohlson model. Data and the results
of logistic regression are displayed.
6.2 DATA
Table 1 Mean of t ie Data in Ohlson model
size TLTA WCTA CLCA NITA CFOTL NNP TLBTA NIABS
DISTRESS 4.4555 0.6017 0.2574 0.6669 -0.1852 -0.6135 0.4783 0.0435 0.7105
NDS90-92 5.1786 0.5167 0.2031 0.'7387 0.0413 0.1641 0.0750 0.0000 0.3717
NDS93-95 4.9597 0.5296 0.2231 0.7587 0.0063 -0.1684 0.0917 0.0161 0.9223
NDS96-98 4.8068 0.5284 0.2537 0.6979 -0.0361 -0.2985 0.1393 0.0384 -0.1147
NDS99-01 4.7742 0.4938 0.2338 0.7229 -0.0996 -0.6358 0.2224 0.0390 0.0171
NDS90-01 4.8837 0.5146 0.2326 0.7256 -0.0380 -0.3180 0.1490 0.0281 0.2213
Xi (Size) = log (total assets / GNP price level index)
X2 (TLTA)=Total liabilities / total assets
X3 (WCTA)=working capital / total assets
X4 (CLCA)= Current liabilities /current assets
X5 (NITA)=Net income / total assets
X6 (CFOTL) Funds provided by operations / total liabilities
X7 (NNP)= ( l=if net income was negative for the last two years, 0= otherwise )
Xg (TLBTA)= ( 1= if total liabilities > total assets, 0= otherwise )
X9 (NTABS)= (Net Income t - Net Income t-i) / (|Net Income t| + | Net Income t-i|)
6.3 Variables in the equation
(1) All variables
In 90-92 data, variables size, TLTA, WCTA, CFO are statistically significant. In 93-95
data, Variables NITA, NNP are statistically significant.
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Table 2 Logit results of the Ohlson model
B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
90-92 size -0.898 0.424 4.54 0.033* 0.407
JTLTA 7.345 2.335 9.898 0.002* 1548.246
WCTA 7.665 3.249 5.565 0.018* 2131.462
CLCA 1.152 1.415 0.663 0.415 3.164
NITA -2.315 1.769 1.713 0.191 0.099
CFO -0.977 0.427 5.221 0.022* 0.377
NNP -0.732 0.777 0.889 0.346 0.481
TLBTA 0.896 36.756 0.001 0.981 2.449
NIABS 0.048 0.075 0.407 0.523 1.049
CONSTANT -5.29 37.014 0.02 0.886 0.005
B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
93-95 size -0.245 0.355 0.475 0.491 0.783
TLTA 0.852 0.479 3.161 0.075 2.345
WCTA 0.346 1.57 0.048 0.826 1.413
CLCA -0.337 0.812 0.172 0.679 0.714
NITA -2.511 1.174 4.573 0.032* 0.081
CFO 0.173 0.159 1.192 0.275 1.189
NNP -1.854 0.547 11.51 0.001* 0.157
TLBTA 2.951 2.325 1.615 0.204 19.126
NIABS 0.026 0.039 0.449 0.503 1.026
CONSTANT -3.551 3.257 1.189 0.276 0.029
B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
96-98 size -0.073 0.319 0.053 0.818 0.929
TLTA 1.836 0.954 3.704 0.054 6.274
WCTA -0.973 1.965 0.245 0.62 0.378
CLCA -0.284 1.144 0.062 0.804 0.753
NITA 0.136 0.953 0.02 0.887 1.145
CFO 0.004 0.197 0 0.985 1.004
NNP -2.2 0.641 11.79 0.001* 0.111
TLBTA 3.162 1.988 2.53 0.112 23.611
NIABS 0.051 0.046 1.246 0.264 1.053
CONSTANT -4.865 3.282 2.197 0.038* 0.008
99-01 B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
size -0.169 0.299 0.318 0.573 0.845
TLTA 3.34 1.123 8.845 0.003* 28.225
WCTA 1.113 1.836 0.368 0.544 3.044
CLCA -0.133 1.09 0.015 0.903 0.876
NITA 0.494 0.801 0.38 0.538 1.639
CFO 0.02 0.135 0.023 0.879 1.021
NNP -1.591 0.546 8.482 0.004* 0.204
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TLBTA 3.617 1.891 3.658 0.056 37.233
NIABS 0.028 0.038 0.512 0.474 1.028
CONSTANT -6.865 3.041 5.097 0.024* 0.001
B S.E Wald Sig. Exp(B)
90-'01 size -0.151 0.303 0.247 0.619 0.86
TLTA 0.621 0.368 2.85 0.091 1.861
WCTA -0.391 1.459 0.072 0.789 0.676
CLCA -0.198 0.826 0.058 0.81 0.82
NITA -0.117 0.465 0.063 0.801 0.89
CFO 0.067 0.127 0.28 0.597 1.07
NNP -1.748 0.515 11.52 0.001* 0.174
TLBTA 1.172 1.494 0.615 0.433 3.228
NIABS 0.032 0.036 0.819 0.365 1.033
CONSTANT -3.646 2.307 2.497 0.114 0.026
(2) Changes of coefficient
Table 3 Changes of coef Icient in Ohlson models
WCT TLBT NIAB CONS
Data size TLTA A CLCA NITA CFO NNP A S TANT
9092 -0.898 7.345 7.665 1.152 -2.315 -0.977 -0.732 0.896 0.048 -5.290
9395 -0.245 0.852 0.346 -0.337 -2.511 0.173 -1.854 2.951 0.026 -3.551
9698 -0.073 1.836 -0.973 -0.284 0.136 0.004 -2.200 3.162 0.051 -4.865
9901 -0.169 3.340 1.113 -0.133 0.494 0.020 -1.591 3.617 0.028 -6.865
9001 -0.151 0.621 -0.391 -0.198 -0.117 0.067 -1.748 1.172 0.032 -3.646
Ohlson -0.407 6.030 -1.430 0.075 -2.370 -1.830 0.285 -1.720 -0.521 -1.320
9 39 £5 data

























(3) Changes of Exp(B)
Table A Changes ofExp( B) inO ilson models
WCT TLBT NIAB CONS
Data size TLTA A CLCA NITA CFO NNP A S TANT
9092 0.407 1548 2131 3.164 0.099 0.377 0.481 2.449 1.049 0.005
9395 0.783 2.345 1.413 0.714 0.081 1.189 0.157 19.13 1.026 0.029
9698 0.929 6.274 0.378 0.753 1.145 1.004 0.111 23.61 1.053 0.008
9901 0.845 28.23 3.044 0.876 1.639 1.021 0.204 37.23 1.028 0.001






Appendix 7 explores the probability of default using Merton model. Data and the results
of SAS are displayed.
7.2 DATA
Tab e 1 Means of the data for option model
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
X 392370 381302 399572 357606 366049 347478 311055 302919 322826 382551 404679
Ve 456925 619269 612463 496886 567466 631538 659153 724181 671902 935736 895729
Oe 0.370 0.378 0.396 0.382 0.393 0.391 0.393 0.383 0.411 0.441 0.488
Va-
init 849295 1000571 1012035 854492 933514 979016 970207 1027100 994728 1318287 1300408
oa-
init 0.199 0.221 0.208 0.230 0.240 0.253 0.263 0.256 0.251 0.294 0.340
X= book value of liability, Ve=Market value of
init - X + Ve, cA =crEVE / (VE + X).
Equity oe = volitarity of stock return, Va
Table 2 Standard Deviation o the data for option model
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
X 969560 1023541 1174314 1071654 1070633 1069772 921837 973307 1153492 1367993 1348844
Ve 1241947 2029340 2184929 1330929 1749027 2197655 2566186 3345773 4025834 4817664 4365984
ae 0.104 0.115 0.135 0.159 0.166 0.177 0.195 0.187 0.191 0.197 0.208
va-
init 2052839 2786006 2994570 2267197 2739652 3172716 3360591 4085782 4833325 5888868 5398521
aa-
init 0.073 0.078 0.091 0.104 0.106 0.132 0.159 0.166 0.168 0.186 0.229
7.3 Simultaneous Calculation
SAS program is used to solve the equation (1) and (3), following is the coding of the
program including partial data.
VE = VAN(d1)-XerTN(d2) (1)
263
InM-)+ (//-().5<j>
P def =Prob (VA < X) = N( ^ j= ) (2)
CJa^T
Ge = i)cr a (3)
where,
ln& + (r + 0,5a\)T
di = —— 7= , d2=d, -aAVr
(J a
VE = the current market value of equity
VA = the firm's assets value, with an instantaneous drift n, and an instantaneous
volatility aA
X = the book value of the debt at time t, that has maturity equal to T
r = risk-free rate of interest
cA= the volatility of assets value, the standard deviation of asset return
N = the cumulative density function of the standard nonnal distribution
7.4 SAS Program
Data one;
Input id r x ve sige va siga;
Datalines;
1991001 5.88 87,216 382000 0.23 469216 0.19
1991003 5.88 1,130,400 2189000 0.19 3319400 0.13
1991004 5.88 3,498,000 5515000 0.27 9013000 0.17
1991008 • 5.88 38,058 115000 0.23 153058 0.17
1991010 5.88 80,096 205000 0.26 285096 0.19
1991015 5.88 312,000 1207000 0.24 1519000 0.19
1991016 5.88 7,116 28000 0.23 35116 0.18
1991017 5.88 24,165 81000 0.18 105165 0.14
1991019 5.88 569,600 731000 0.30 1300600 0.17
1991021 5.88 1,306,300 1330000 0.30 2636300 0.15
1991025 5.88 25,052 86000 0.21 111052 0.16
264
1991029 5.88 159,313 248000 0.30 407313 0.18
?
Run;
Proc model data = one;
Bounds 0< va siga;
eq.call = va * probnorm(((log(va/x) + (r + siga * siga /2 ))) / (siga * sqrt(l)))
- x*exp(-r )* probnorm(((log(va/x) + (r - siga * siga /2 ))) / (siga * sqrt(l)))
- ve;
F.q.hedge = (siga * va / ve) * probnorm(((log(va/x) + (r + siga * siga 12 ))) / (siga *
sqrt(l))) -sige;
Solve va siga / solveprint;
Run;
7.5 Samples of SAS Program










Model Variables va siga
Equations call hedge





















7.6 Estimation result of VA and oA
Table 3 Average VA data for option model
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Va(all) 454414 608155 620632 511168 569275 632443 660386 727919 676167 938115 856287
valist) 456489 611859 629858 492701 586461 700222 737447 813666 780837 1164808 1011168
va(delist) 446390 593222 586100 575125 518046 478748 485248 527845 446123 489768 550212
266
Table 4 Average oA data for op ion model
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ca(all) 0.333 0.337 0.350 0.338 0.355 0.362 1.722 0.358 0.424 38.726 0.458
oa(list) 0.338 0.343 0.356 0.345 0.366 0.369 0.361 0.357 0.434 0.399 0.431
aa(delist) 0.314 0.315 0.325 0.314 0.324 0.347 4.815 0.360 0.403
114.52
8 0.511
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